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INTRODUCTION 
1. The Purpose of this Thesis. 
Quintus Septemius Florens Tertullianus, usually referred to 
simply as Tertullian, is universally regarded as an important 
Latin prose writer, a lawyer whose philosophy was influenced 
mainly by Stoicism, and an early Christian theologian and schis-
~atic. His work to be examined in this thesis, De Anima, (A 
Treatise) On the Soul, has also been generally regarded as an 
early and heterodox Christian philosophical anthropology, and 
with his other writings, as representing irrationalism in epis-
temology and materialism in metaphysics. 
These opinions are in part valid and in part erroneous; it 
is the general purpose of this thesis to clarify Tertullia.n's 
position with respect to each of the above items through the de-
tailed examination of his De Anima. Certain definite objectives 
for this investigation have also been set, and they constitute 
the answers to the following questions: How has Tertullian's 
philosophy in De Anima been treated by previous critics; what 
were the influences on Tertullian 1 s philosophy and theology as 
found in De Anima; in what sense is it valid to spe~~ of De Ani-
ma as representing the first Christian psychology; in what sense 
is it valid to speak of Tertullian as a materialist and irra-
tionalist; what exactl~ was his theory of man in De Anima; to 
what extent does De Anima reveal influences from Hellenistic 
philosophy; and how did his doctrines in De Anima influence 
later Christian thinkers? 
1 
2 . The T:!:ethod of t h is Thesis . 
In order t o understand the b a c k ground of De Anima in Ter-
ullian's l ife and writing s as a whole, the influences on him and 
is interests must be considered first (Chapter I). This i s con -
tinued and brought closer to De Anima by introducing the maj or 
theses of that tre atise in conne c tion with c e rtain of his other 
writings (Chapter II). Two chapters are devoted t o the s tructt..U'E 
of hi s tb.ought in De Anim~, its exposition and critical anal y sis 
(Chapters III-IV) . Tertullian 1 s use of classical Gre ek philos-
ophy p x•eface s a more extensiv e clis ctu3sion of hi s views as seen 
in the frame work of Hell enisti c t h ou ght (Ch2,pter V). ·Last l y , 
De Anima 1 s p osit i on and signifi c ance in tl ... e h ist ory of ChPist ian 
t hou ght, from the Hew Testrunent to the early Middle Ages , is ex-
p lored ( Chapter VI ). The the sis terminate s vdth a brief survey 
of the whole investigat i on and present s the conclusions e stab -
lished i n the course of the analysis in p rop ositi onal f orm. 
Two themes run t hrougb.otlt the thesis . 'rhe'JT are the p rob-
lems of 'I' ertullian 1 s use of re a s on and critel~ion of t ruth and th • 
motivating ideas, arguments and documents for his p osition. His 
criterion of truth is dealt vrith progress ive l y in terms of h is 
1 l • C' · t ' · I- 1 · I rr -'- • , ' ' L • -'-leg a i sm, ·ns nr:~.s -lanl·cy, J.lS ;lon L- anlsm, n l s opposl-ulon uO 
he resy, h is irratione.lism, an d his ep i s t emology . Th e emphasis 
on h is motivat inG interests n eeds a further word of connuent and 
e:x.--pl anat ion. 
In this thesis , while much emphasis is p l a ce d on m~cover-
ing rl'ertullian's mot ivation for h i s posit ions , j_t must be 
2 
clear from the beginning that this is primarily an explanation 
of his position and not a judgment of its validity. Its validit 
or invalidity is established on rational grounds; and every psy-
chologist and philosopher has motivations which channel his ac-
tivities, and these, while instruct·ive to know, do not determine 
I 
the truth-value of his arguments and theories. 
3. The Scope of this Thesis. 
This investigation pretends neither to deal comprehensively 
with the great variety of topics which it introduces nor exhaus-
tively with the abundant critical literature subsumed by these 
topics. The history of philosophical ideas discussed in Chap-
ters V and VI is quite inconwlete and at b est indicates the line 
' for future study. The direct influences and similarities of 
'
1
'ertullian 1 s thought with that of the Old and New Testament wri-
ters is very incompletely studied. 
Because this thesis concentrates in philosophy and secon-
dari ly in psychology, but not in theology, those portions of De 
Anima dealing with eschatology, largely confined to the l ast 
five chapters of the treatise, will be neglected. Their content 
will be indicated, however, in the Reference Outline which in-
troduces Chapter II. 
Recent scholarship has demonstrated that it is unwise to 
systematize rigorously Tertullian's views in De Anima because it 
results in a very artificial account of Tertullian 1 s ovm positio<:l. 
This thesis accepts this admonition, and as especially Chapters 
III and IV indicate, this speculative attempt has been eschewed 
3 
for a more critical approach wherever possible. 
4. The Work of Previous Investigators. 
For over a hundred years, scholars have labored with Ter-
tullian•s De Anima. Germany, France, England and recently Hol-
land and America have contributed to this work. But, with few 
exceptions, most of these studies are not readily available in 
the United States. Consequently, a good deal of this critical 
literature was unavailable for the preparation of this thesis. 
The most important single work on Tertullian's De Anima is 
the commentary and partial translation provided by Professor Jan 
Hendrik Waszink of the University of Leiden. This work, Quinti 
Seutimi Florentis Tertulliani De Anima: Edited with Introduction 
and Commentary (Amsterdam: J. M. Meulenhoff, 1947) is an exten-
sive revision of his earlier doctoral thesis, Tertullian De Ani-
ma, mit Einleitung, Ueberzetzung und Konnnentar (Amsterdam: H. ·.r. 
Paris, 1933). The 19L~7 edition has been invaluable in the prep-
aration of this thesis, although his dissertation has also been 
consulted. It is unlikely that any other work exists in the Eng· 
lish language of comparable scholarly accomplishments devoted to 
a subject in Patristic thought. This present thesis may be seen 
in part as an attempt to explore in coherent fashion the results 
of Waszink's researches, which are scattered through more than 
five hundred pages in his detailed and intricate commentary. 
Because Waszink's interests and competence are prLmarily philo-
logical rather than psychological, philosophical or theological, 
this thesis uses throughout the critical version of the text to 
4 
De An~a which he has provided, although his interpretations and 
comments are occasionally questioned. His excellent bibliogra-
phy of more than five hundred items is modestly supplemented in 
~ the bibliography appended to this thesis, which adds a few items 
) 
he overlooked and some -new material published after his studies. 
Because. Professor Waszink did not provide a complete trans-
lation of De Anima but instead preferred to give only 11 ••• the 
main lines of Tertullian's argument by a paraphrase of the con-
tents of each chapter, 112 the older and often inadequate transla-
tion by Peter Holmes in t h e Ante-Nicene Christian Library, Vol. 
XV (T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1870) has in general been used. 
However, some important citations from De Anima, after consulta-
tion with both Holmes and Waszink, have been translated anew for 
the purppse here. 
I ' Other works useful in the definition of the area to be stu-
~ied include the good introductory survey of the whole of Ter-
tullian's thought by Robert Roberts, The Theology of Tertullian 
(London: Epworth Press, 19~), the older but very important sys-
tematic examination of Tertullian's psychology and t heory of 
knowledge by Gerhard Esser, largely unknown to English-speaking 
students, Die Seelenlehre Tertullians (Paderborn: Ferd. Schonigh 
1893), and the initial works in the field by Augustus Neander, 
Antignostikas, Geist des Tertullianus (Berlin: Ferd. Dttmmler, 
~ 1. For an evaluation of Waszink's work, see Grant, Art.(l950). 
(References to sources in this thesis are generally indicated 
by abbreviations which are explained in the Bibliography. 
The author's name should be consulted.) 
2. Waszink, TDA, ix. 
- --
5 
1825) and Bishop John Kaye, Ecclesiastical History of the Second 
and Third Centuries Illustrated from the Writings of Tertullian 
(London: Francis and John Rivington, 1825). Footnotes and oc-
casionally the text of the individual chapters in the thesis pay 
deference to other literature in the appropriate place; further 
mention of them here would amount to an extendedrommentary on 
the whole bibliography of the thesis. 
However, two observations may be made before turning to the 
thesis proper. Little help was given to this investigation by 
the st~~dard histories of psychology, philosophy, theology and 
Church history. The only important exceptions to this generali-
zation are the latest editions of Ueberweg's history of philos-
ophy and Harnack's history of dogma, two incomparable sources. 
Second, indispensible help has been given in some very recent 
literature. The introduction and commentary to De Anima by Was-
ziru~ has been supplemented in a fine introductory survey by 
1 Ernest Evans, stimulating essays in the history of ideas pub-
lished recently by Professors Lovejoy and Boas, a few pages from 
the histories of medieval philosophy by Professors Gilson and 
Copleston, and a brief essay by Professor Ferm. Also, Evans has 
2 
promised a commentary on De Anima, although undoubtedly without 
knowing about Professor Waszink 1 s. All of these items listed 
here concentrate on t he treatise being examined in this thesis. 
Collectively, they suggest a renascence in Tertullian's thought. 
However, for many years to come, all future studies will take 
1. For full particulars on thexe work s, see bibliography. 
2. Evans, TAP, vii. 
6 
their point of departure and often their point of return from 
the researches by Professor Waszink. 1 
1. He has promised further studies in Tertullian's De Anima as 
"additions" to his work in the commentary. See Waszink, TDA, 
ix, fn. J. 
l 
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CHAPTER I 
THE BACKGROUND FOR DE Al"'{I:MA IN TERTULLIAN' S LIFE 
In order to become acquainted with the problems faced by 
Tertullian in De Anima, it may be helpful to introduce t he exami 
nation of that treatise by a glance at certain important influ-
ences which moulded and directed his interests. Specifically, 
this means studying Tertullian's legal training, his authori-
tarian view of the Christian tradition, his adherence to the 
heretical sect of Montanists, and his antipathy to the Gnostic 
move1nents in Christianity during the first and second centuries 
of the Christian era. 
'.J.-'hese subjects are important in themsebtes, but their in-
clusion in this thesis is 'justified by the specific fact that in 
order to interpret correctly the perennial problem of Tertul-
lian 1 s view of faith and reason, this background, if no more 
than in outline, is very important. Alth ough the problem of 
faith and reason does not properly arise in De Anima itself and 
could be avoided in this thesis, the interpretation of Tertul-
' 
lian's positions so frequently hinge on it so much that it will 
be examined continually in different contexts throughout this 
thesis. 
1. Legalism and Logic. 
In point of time, the first important influence on Tertul-
lian was his trainipg as a lawyer. Although he :makes no state-
ment to this effect, the tenor of his writings betrays his legal 
background. Also, later Church Fathers suggest that Tertullian 
I 
8 
was not only a lav.ryer but probably a famous one before his con-
~ersion to the Christian faith. 1 
Tertullian' s background as a la\~Jer is important to the in-
vestigation of De Anima because this is the source for his ter-
~inology as well as much of its meanings. His flights of noble 
(sometimes ignoble) rhetoric are best interpreted in light of 
his early training, as are his indifference to exclusively stric .. 
and rigorous argumentation when various courtroom pseudo-logical 
~rocedures accomplish his ends. His very important device for 
ruling out heretical beliefs was also learned from the Roman 
courts. 
i. Legal terms and methods.--Many of Tertullian's important 
terms in De Anima and other writing s were first introduced to 
him by his teachers in law. 2 The significance of this fact for 
Tertullian's theology has been explored by many scholars, and 
Harnack has proposed the theory, which has received wide accep-
tance, that most of the significant theological opinions formu-
lated 13y Tertullian are uni.ntelligible without reference to his 
terminology and to the legal context from which it Cfu'11e. Hence, 
his view that Tertullian's theology has a 11 juristic bias.u3 
Morgan claims to show that such legalism began as early as St. 
Paul and persisted at least to St. Anselm, giving 11 ••• a legal 
stamp to <Jhristian theological terminology for centuries. n4 
1. See Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History, II, ii, 5. 
2. See Morgan, IT, 69-76 for a discussion of the most important 
legal terms in Tertullian's writings. . 
3. Harnack, HOD, II, 257; IV, 145. See also Tixeront, HD, I, 3051 
Cf. Nygren, .AE, II, 131 and his 11 nomos 11 view of Tertullian. 4. Morgan, IT, 22-39. 
9 
Rashdall, however, claims that Tertullian was the one to intro-
duce legalism into Christianity, 1 and one must agree that there 
is a real difference between the rabbinical theology of Paul and 
4i' the Roman legal theology of Tertulliru1. 
But Harnack has gone so far as to say that "Tertullian did 
not, properly spea.l.dng, indulge in philosophical speculation, but 
applied the artificial language of the jurists,"2 and utterly 
disregarded any philosophical significance which his terminology 
3 
might have had. These strictures seem needlessly severe. The 
pronounced objections by Esser, Warfield, and Bethune-Baker to 
this aspect of the theory of Tertullian's legalism, to mention 
4 
only three scholars, must not be overlooked. They show defini~ 
ly, as will the next two chapters of this thesis, that Tertul-
lian's use of legal terms is not dict&ted by their legal mean-
ings. There is a difference between legal influences on his 
terminology and an exclusively legal meaning.5 For him, they 
have definite philosophical and theological significance. His-
torical accident is the explanation for the seeming legalism in 
much of his language, for Tertullian was the first vhristian to 
use many of these ostensibly legal terms in propounding a the• 
ology. Harnack's view at this point cannot receive unqualified 
acceptance. 
1. Rashdall, IA, 254. 
2. Harnack, HOD, IV, 1L1-6. 
3. Harnack, HOD, IV~ . J.45. Bethune-Baker, Art.(l90J), tones this 
dO\m to observe tmt "Tertullian •.r.ras a jurist first and a 
philosopher second." 
~· See Esser, ST, 59, Warfield, STA, 38-48, and Bethune-Baker, 
EHC, 122-123. 
5. See Bethune-Baker, EHC, 138. 
10 
To the second aspect of legalism in Tertullfan, h~s method, 
no one objects who has read Tertullian 1 s writings. That this 
legalistic method is important not only for .Tertullian 1 s method-
ology but for the whole Weste~1 tradition is seen in Harnack's 
statement: 
If we ••• perceive that many centuries afterv1ards, 
the philosophical-realistic method of handling the 
main problems was in Western scholasticism complet-
ly displaced by a formal-logical or legal method of 
treatment, there is nothing surpri sing in this; for 
the foundation of such a method of handling the 
problems was in fact laid by Tertullian. 
This method appears in two forms in Tertullian's writings. 
First and most important is his tendency to abandon logical ar-
gvmentation for appeals to authority, attacks on the character 
of his opponents, and other tactics all too common :i.n courtrooms 
The second place where this legalism asserts itself in Ter-
tullian's meth odology is in what is called his "prescription of 
the heretics."2 This method constitutes the subject and title 
of one of his other important treatises, De Praescriptionibus 
Adversus Haereticos, but in De Anima it generally becomes the 
fallacy of poisoning the well regarding certain philosophers and 
their doctrines. Specifically, this method me·ant. that " ••• the 
heretics may not appeal to the Christian Scriptures [since by 
being heretics they have already denied to themselves the right 
of Scriptural support], for these belong to the Christians alan~ 3 
This method not only allowed Tertullian to rule out of court 
1. Harnack, HOD, IV, 146. 
2. See Holmes, V~, II, l, fn.l to Tertullian 1 s treatise, De 
Praes. Haer., an.d also Gwatkin, ECH, 246-249 and Loisy-,-BCR, 
335-336. 
11 
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every attempt by heretics to defend their doctrines as orthodox 
but also ·would have allowed Tertullian and others who used this 
method to decide who was orthodox and ·who was not by the simple 
expedient of reserving exegetical pri~ileges in the Bible ex-
clusively to themselves. Suffice to say that the prescriptive 
method advocated by 'l'ertullian did not receive wide application 
outside his ovm writings. 
However, irrespective of the merits of his actual argumen- I 
tation, be does try to show that it is his opponents who are un-
reasonable thiru{ers. This is all the more baffling when in-
stances of formally correct reasoning are confronted side by 
side with illogical reasoning of every sort. One is easily tem 
ted to overloo~ completely Tertullian's attempt at logical con-
sistency because of his abject failure to achieve it. The ques-
tion of the cause for this failure is a difficult one to answer. 
Whether it is a basic incompetence on his part when dealing with 
abstruse questions, ·whether it results wholly from his commitmen 
to certain sets of assumptions, or whether it is · from his so-
1
1 
called irrationalism, it .," is ·;impossible to determine with precise 
clarity. It is probably some or all of these in each instance. 
However, it must be clear that the answer to Tertullian' s moti-
vation in his choice of first principles, why he defended cer-
tain doctrines and not others, cannot be answered by the claim · 
that he had a juristic bias, since he would presumably be 
equally illogical in defending any position. A later section of 
this chapter does indicate his motivating interests. A glance 
at the nature of his logical and illogical reasonings as they 
are found in De Anima, h<Jil ever, will be instructive at this paint 
ii. Tertullian 1 s use of logic.--The central portions of 
De Anima contain Tertullian's most extended analysis of philo-
! 
sophical and heretical theories to be found in the treatise. Th~ 
subjects are the Platonic doctrine of reminiscence, Greek metem-
psychosis in general, and the attendant problems concerning the 
trru1smigration of souls. Tertu~ian attacks these doctrines 
with all the force he can muster. His refutation is designed 
principally to show how unreasonable these views are, how they 
contradict all the facts of experience and are thus based on 
erroneous inferences, and hovv easily superior is his own view, 
in part perhaps because its truth does not depend solely on its 
derivation from experience but rather on its revealed character. 
A sample of this discussion may be reproduced here. 
The truth has ••• been well-nigh excluded by the 
philosophers thrcugh the poisons with which they 
have infected it ••• l 
Now,~. 1:. it matters not whether the question be 
started by the philosopher, by the heretic, or by 
the crowd. Those who pr~fess the truth care nothing 
about their opponents... · 
It is indeed manifest that dead men are formed from 
living ones; but it does not follow from that, that 
living men are formed from dead ones.j · 
Thus, that men are made alive after death, is a 
rather old statement. But what if it be rather 
a recent one also? The truth does not desire an-
tiquity, nor does falsehood shun novelty. This 
notable saying I hold4to be plainly false, though enabled by antiquity. 
1. De Anima, II, v; trans. Holmes, 1NT, II, 415. All references 
are to .1.ertullian 1 s writings, unless otherwise specified. 
2. De Anima, XX:V, j_; trans. Holmes, VllT, II, 468. 
3. De Anima, XX:VIII, iii; trans. Holmes, ~n, II, 477. 4. De Anima, LXIX, i; trans. Holmes, WT, II, 479· 
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l'ilany other pas s ae;es could be adduc ed from De Anima vrhich · 
would testify to Tertullian 1s claim and a t t empt to r eason loe;i-
cEl l y. 'l'he full extent of his eff orts can be seen only b y l a -
bor:Lou s ly tracing t h rough h is mEjor argmae11ts, v1hich as argm:1ent . , 
are invariably desig ned to prevail s olely on the basis of their 
claim to l ogic a l rig or. 
Vlhile Harnacl<: ob s erve d that 11'ertullian neveT' felt it incum-
bent u p on h i m to Pl"'G :p al~e a truly sy stematic statement of Chris-
1 
tian t h eology or philosophy, othe r scholars have p raised Ter-
tullian 1s contributions to t h e log ic of 8hristianity . Donaldson 
con'D:nented, 11 To [ Tertullj_an J .. , more than to most, is clue t h o or-
~e rly logical position of Christian t h ought, a nd even the very 
lane;uag e whereby the statement of tha t p ositi on i s l~endered p os-
sible, 11 2 and Bardenhewer added, 11 Te r tullian is a man of •.• cv,:u-a.v 
' and favorabl e logic . r) An imp artial examination of De Anima it-
self, hov1ever, reveals that De Anima faiPly bristles ·~vith loose 
reasoning and crucial logical errors, than..l.{s to the remarkable 
job of reconstructing s~rllogisms out of fragmentary enthymem.es 
· 1 ··r · k , d 1-vtlnc J. v•aszlll_r n as .one.' 
Illustrations of all the ma jor logic al fallacies are not 
b.ard to fiD.d in De Anima . There is a noticeable absence , how-
ever , of argume:q_!;1..m1 ad mysteri'LD!l where it might ce rtainly be e 
pected . To be g in, Tertullian f r e quentl·y a lters the arg1..rrr1ents 
1 . Harnaclr , HOD, II, 23L~ . 
2 . Donaldson, CLT, 21. 
3. BardenlJ.e\ver, PAT, 1 0 0 . Taking the same p o sj_tj_on, see Mac-
Kin..non, CC, LJ.67 and esp e c ially the statement in E sser, ST, 2 . 
L!· • VJaszink, TDA, esp e cially 191-l9LJ. , 131-l3L~ , lLt-7-lL~9, 1 80-183 • 
of his opponents i n order to make them more easily refutable , 
e . g . , a Platonic argmnent for the non-c oi'poreality of the soul 
is I'evised making it misrepre sent Plato as ·well as easily refu-
l 
table.- He occas ionally p erforms i l l e g i timate operations on 
prop ositions, e . g ., he makes the fallacy of negation in aif a 
b od-y- is inani mate, then it i s moved from the outside·, then if a 
body is not inanimate, it is not moved from the outside . 11 2 At 
one time, Tertullian infers from 11 some dreru!ls are not true, 11 the 
proposition n some dremns al''e t rue, 11 illeg itimat ely moving fr om 
no" to 11 I 11 prop osit:tons.3 The fallacy of figure of speech is 
illustrated when TertuJlian concludes that be c ause the title of 
treatises in p sych ology is not " On the lVlind, n but '' On the Soul, 11 
' h · · .._ "' t' l th · ~ · )_L m1 '"' ll ~-e prlorluY 01 -ne s ou_ ov er e mlnCL lS proven. ' 1 e la __ a c y 
of hypostatization is illustrated in his important reference to 
actually seeing Lazarus 1 s corp ox•eal s p irit in Abraham's b o som 
r::' 
a s a NT proof of the cor1)oreali t~; of the soul.__.~ The formal :fal -
lacy of app eal to authority is illustrated in opening statements 
to the treatise, and much of De Anima if not all of it is built 
on the g eneral a ppeal t o authority . 6 V!aszink :lnsists t hat Ter-
tullian ' s denial that the sou l is incorp oreal is achieved only 
by a circuln.I' argument. 7 Tertull ian definitely draws an i mper -
1.-De' Anina, VI, ii ; \Na szink , 'l1DA , 131~ fo r commentary . 
2 . This is an i ndirect quotation from De Anima, VI , i. 
3. De Anima, XLVI, iii. 
1.!-• De Anima, XIII, ii. See also De Jmima, XXXVII , iii. 
,S . De Anima , XI, ii and Luke XVI , X.."'{ll l. Also De Anima, VII. 
6. De Anima, II-IV . See"'li7a.Szinlk:, TDA , 337 on the appeal to 
au0hority . 
7 . V'Jaszir.Jr, rrDA, 131!- f inds the argmnent in De Anima, VI, is a 
"vicious c ircle." 
feet analogy between the phenomena of pregnancy, where one body 
inhabits another, and the pos sibility of two bodies occupying 
1 
the same place in space. The fallacy of poisoning the well 
occurs when he premptorily denies any validity to the arguments 
of the philosophers and heretics, the principle of "prescrip-
tion. r?- His most vddely used fallacies are equivocation, in-
stances of which are too ntunerous to ment ion. An outstanding 
and important instance of this is his view of t he relation of 
soul to bre ath, which will be outlined later. Equally pervasive 
is t h e argumentum ad hominem, vvhich will be seen in h i s attitude 
toward h eretics and philosophers i n Chap ter V. 
Harna ck has called all this "the method of legal ficti ons.,n 
Its most i mportant philosophical consequence is the looseness in 
the logical structure of t h e position expounded in De Anima. 
Equally i mportant, it leads to a general di s regard for the re-
quirements of reasonable coherent thought, of rational ity it-
self. This meth od, if it can be called a method, is undoubtedly 
the greatest single drawback to De Anima and the whole body of 
T~rtullian 1 s writings when regarded a's philosophical treatises. 4 
The effect of t h is meth od on h is philosophical position when 
compared to his Montanistic tendencies makes t h e latter look 
innocent. This slackness, however, ought not to be construed as 
"irrationalism" as the term is used in contemp orary philosophy. 5 
1. De Anima, VI, vii i -ix . 
2. See, for instance, Defnima, III, i ; XXXIV, i. 
~· Harnack , HOD, 4. Both Kaye, EH, 127 and Morgan, IT, 252 share this view. 5. Rational method i n philosophical theology is outlined by 
Bright man i h Ferrn (ed .), ER, 635. Irrationalism would be any 
_mat.ho..d_vffij ch cons .. cJ .. au.s.lY~ limit s _rat~ianal mathod_. 
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At this point in the analysis of Tertullian 1 s methods, such a 
judgment would be much too hasty and unfounded. There is no 
necessary relation between illogical argumentation and irra-
tionalism or anti-rationalism as a self-conscious aim. Further, 
illogicality ne ed not be derived from anti-rationalism, and it 
probably is not in Tertullian 1 s case. But since one cannot be 
rational without .. also being logical, the eventual decision re-
garding Tertullian's position on the nature of reason must take 
his illogicality into account. 
2. Christian Authority. 
Important as his legalism is, it is overshadowed by his 
Christianity. Tertullian, as all other third century Christian 
writers, hoped always to find approval and preferably actual 
authorization for all his doctrines, either directly by the 
Scriptures (the depositun1 fidei) or in the heritage of Christian 
literat ure which had accumulated b eginning with the Apostolic 
Fathe rs and especially developed by the Apologists and Irenaeus. 
Tertullian observe s in the opening passages to De Anima that all 
disputed doctrines must be reconciled by measuring them ad dei 
litteras, 1 to the Holy Scriptures, 2 God's inspired standard. 3 
This, with the Rule of Faith (regula fidei or symbolum) and the 
writings of the Fathers, bound together by the ever-present 
guidance of the Paraclete or Holy Spirit (which Tertullian does 
1. De Anima, II, v, in Waszink, TDA, 4, line 8. 
2. 'I'he translation of the above passage by Waszink, TDA, 97. 
3. Translation of the same passage by Holmes, 'NT, II, 415. 
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n ot distinguish c learly), const i t utes normative Christianity 
for Tertullian and the anvi l on v1h ich all d isputes ultima tely 
t be he..nm1ered out. This applie s not only in De Ani ma , but to 
all 'l'ertu1lian 1 s writ i n g s. 2 
i . Scrip t\lre and tradition. --The first chapters of De Anima 
leave no doubt that Tertullian re g ards the content of Scri p ture 
as his s p iritual and philo soph ical guide . Vlaszink has s one to 
g re a t leng ths t o show the extensive use of p T'oof ex s c l~iptura 
sacra throughtout De Anima.J Tertu11ian ' s favorite method is to 
establ i s h h is thesis, argue h is :!,; o s i t ion by exa111ining various 
areas of evid enc e and then t ie his conclusions tog ether with a 
referenc e or two to Sc rip ture .L:- He sa~: s p ointedly tha t De Anima 
11 
••• '~:rill i nterpret this investig ation [conc ernin~s the soul) in 
~ 
accord a n ce with the :-eules l a id d own by God . n_.~ In h is appe a l to 
t h e auth or i ty of the Scrip tures , Te i'tu11ian f orged no new paths; 
he f o1lo·wed i n the tradition of a ll other Christia n writer's whe 
he ins isted t hat there was a d ivine revelat ion of truth and t hat 
h e lmew what it was, n amely, t h e insp ired dhri stian Scrip tures . 
TePtullian 1 s interpretive method of using the Scrip tupe s 
is not p poperly a11e g oi'ical even though he introduced thfus te~n 
• .L ("1 " • ' • 1" ' t 6 " . J 1 " . . , 11 . 1: • lnt.JO vtlrlSlJl8.11 liJera··ure , Rno_ OCCaSlOil3. _ y CilO. a e g orlze :llS 
1 . De Anima , XLI , iv mentions s p -i r itu sanctu; De Anima, LV, v 
mentions p aracletus . Ac cording to Kaye, EH, 2~~they are 
not distingui shed . 
2 . Roberts , TT, 13-19, and Kaye , EH, 273 . 
3 . See 1Jaszink , TDA , lLJ-9, 159, 163 , 221 , 225 , 291.J. , 3L~7, L~38, and 
esp ecial l y 337 -338 on De Anima, XXI X, i . 
L. . Foi ' ex&llp1es, s ee Wa szink, TDA , 25L\. , 531 . 5. See De Anima , I, vi, tran s. 1Haszink, TDA, 9 6 . Cf . De ..A..ni ma , 
XXVI , i. 
6 . See '~Haszink ' s vi evv of fi gura in De Ani r9-a , XVII , iv, in TDA 
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Scriptural references. 1 He never used it as extensively as the 
2 Alexandrian school, however. Rather it is his endeavor to read 
the text literally which constitutes one of his basic claims to 
orthodoxy. In fact, here as in other places, Tertullian expli-
citly repudiates what he considers to be allegorical and 11 ra-
tionalizing " explanations, since only the heretics and. suppor-
ters of false doctrines need such liberties with the text. 3 
The classic example of this is his reference to the story(!) 
from Luke, XVI, xix-xxi, concerning Lazarus and the rich. man, 
wh ich Tertullian analyzes in De Anima , VII, i-ii as a major 
documentation ex scriptura sacra for his view of the soul as 
corporeal. 
Here we may conclude this discussion of the cor-
poreality of the soul, •. For Christian readers it 
is already too long, for t hese may find a con-
vincing proof in Holy Scripture, viz., the story 
of Lazarus and the rich man ••• However, it is said 
that this story should be interpreted allegorical-
ly (imaginem). But if all this did not really 
happen, why the~ should the n&~e of Lazarus have 
been mentioned ?LI- . 
This and other curiously 11 literal 11 readings of the text 
get Tertullian into many difficulties few of which he is con-
scious. 
The Scriptures which he used were ei tl~ r a version of the 
1. E..g. ;.:,s:ee his interpretation of the flesh as sinf'ul in the 
Pauline passages v~~ich he discusses in De Anima, XL. See 
also Morgan, IT, 117. 
2. Bethune-Baker, EHC, 52-53, Morgan, IT, 117, and Biggs, CPA, 
56-57. 
J. Waszink , TDA, 149, 151. 
4. A paraphrase of De Anima, VII, i-ii in Waszinlc, TDA, 146-147. 
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LXX or the Old Latin Bible, or both, since he wrote Greek as 
well as Latin. 2 In De Anima, there are only a few corruptions 
of the Scriptural text, 3 which speaks well at least for the ac-
curacy of Tertullian's references, although it indicates nothing 
about what he did with them. In passing, it may be noted that 
Tertullian seems to have been the first Christian writer who 
referred to the post-OT canon as the nnew testament, 114 which had 
. 5 
been organized only about thirty years before De Anima. 
The Rule of Faith does not appear in De Anima, but its in-
6 fluence must not be overlooked. The Rule was n ••• a brief ex-
pression in creedal form of all the fundamentals of the Church's 
entire teaching, u7 and 11 ••• pro:itided the test by which even the 
8 Scriptures were to be tr:l:ed.tt It is through this Rule that the 
tradition expresses part of its influence, for in Tertullian's 
other writings, he appeals to it rather than to Scripture, 9 and 
in fact establishes the true Scriptures by it. The same method 
of testing canonicity and orthodoxy can be found in Irenaeus and 
Origen, so Tertullian was following tradition as well as helping 
10 
to make it. 
1. Donaldson, CLT, 182, Kaye, EH, 291, and Goodspeed, HEGL, 220. 
2. Roberts and Donaldson (eds. ), ANF, III, 7. 
3. Kaye, EH, 289-290, Holmes, V'lT, II, 434, and Waszink, TDA, 197 
all note errors. See De Anima, XI, iii and the error on 
Isaiah, XLII, v (or .XLVII, xvi ?). 
4. Hagenbuch, TED, 4 refers to Adv. NJ:ar., IV, i. · 5. See Blackburn, MI, 34 on the N"T canon, dated circa A. D. 180. 
6. According to Danaldson, CLT, 96, it appears in De Virg. Vel., 
I, Adv. Prax., II, and De Praes. Haer. 
7. Neve, HCT, I, 63 quoting Seaburg, Dogmengeschichte, I, 211. 
8. Roberts, TT, 18. 
9· Kaye, EH, 274-283. 
0. Roberts, TT, 16, 236 and Warfield, STA, 33-34, 55. 
Roberts voices a general opinion when he says that the 
greatest limitation imposed on Tertullian's speculative thiP~ing 
1 
was the inelasticity of the Rule of Faith. 11The dnly specula-
tion that is legitimate is that which moved with the circle o~ 
2 
ideas centered in the Rule of Faith." Add to this Gilson's 
11 La foi est done une regula inflexible (regula fidei), et elle 
suffit."3 Even the teachings of the Paraclete had to fall with-
h. in the well-defined boundaries of the Rule.· This use of the 
In 
Rule and Scripture definitely tended to minimize Tertullian's 
" . own eyes the real contributions to theology and philosophy which 
he made; " ••• he would have been the last to claim for himself 
any credit as an original t hinker. 11 
5 
Tertullian' s thought in the Pat'ristic period, when seen in 
this light as definitely revelation-centered and limited, gives 
a new dimension to his ultimate significance in the history of 
philosophy, thahks to Professor Wolfson. If Wolfs~n's t h eory of 
medieval philosophy is accepted, viz., t h at the "common prin-
ciple" of all medieval thinkers was " •.• the belief t h at there is 
ore infallible source of truth, and that is revelation, and that 
revelation is embodied in Scripture, 116 then Tertullian may be 
included in the category of early medieval Christian philosopher , 
for he clearly recognized that the Scripture was the irrefutable 
1. Roberts, TT, 237 and Jung , PT, 19. 
2. Roberts, TT, 65, while ~fucKinnon, CC, 326 tru~es a different 
view here. 
3. Roberts, TT, 64. 4. Gilson, PMA, 97. 
5. Evans, TAP, 31. This would seem to be typical of all medieva l 
Christian philosoppy, according to Gilson, STh~, 446. 
Wolfson, PHI, II, 446. · j 6. 
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criterion of all discussion over conflicting viewpoints in 
Christian teachings. His priority in Latin medieval philosophy 
is further discussed in Chapter VI. 
ii. Ecstasy and special revelation.--In De Anima, a unique 
value seems to be accorded the reception of inspirations, which 
Tertullian calls 11 ecstasy. 11 This concept in De Anima is most 
'/ certainly derived from the LXX 'il.KCS"'t"~d"L~, for the phrase in 
Gene sis II, xxi ff.> which refers to 11 Adam 's deep sleep. ul In 
De Anima, this becomes ecstasis. 2 
Tertullian elaborates his conception of ecstasy in the con-
text of his theory of dreams. Dreams are defined with respect 
to the power whereby they operate which is called ecstasy. Ec-
stasy is to be understood as excessum sensus et amentiae instar, 
11 a withdrawing of sense - perception and an image of insanity. 113 
Ecstasy has two stages, a negative phase, excessus sensus and 
amentia instar, and a positive phase, accidentia spiritus sanc-
.:!?.1.' the addi-t;ion of the Holy Spirit.4 Ever since Adam, sleep 
and ecstasy have been related, and for.n1er resting the soul, the · 
latter activating the soul. 5 
1. Farrar, LF, 186. According to Waszink, TDA , 485, 
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2. 
is usually translated as excessus mentis and not amentia inst r. 
De Anima, XLV , iii, XI, iv. 
De Anima, XLV, iii, trans. Waszink, TDA, 480. ~: 
$· 
. 
De lnima, XI, iv. As Chapter IV points out, Tertullian is not 
able to give a consistent definition of ecstasy, for he 
speaks of in in De Anima, XLV, ii-iii as a power ~ich causes 
ordinary dreams, a natural state, yet here in XI, iv, it is 
an added something, obviously not the soul'spatural state. 
See Waszink, TDA, 481-482. . 
De Anima, XLV, iii • 
I 
Although Tertullian regards ecstasy as amentia, t he mind is 
l not shattered or anihilated; aliud est concutere, aliud movere, 
J aliud evertere, aliud agit are. 1 Further, the soul remembers 
these experience s. 
That, therefore, which memory supplied betokens 
soundness of mind; and that v1hich a sound mind 
ecstatically experiences whilst the memory remains 
unchecked, is a kind of madness. We are accor-
dingly not said to b e mad, but to dream, in that 
state; to be in full possession of our mental 
faculties .•• For although the power to exercise 
t hese faculties may be dimmed in us, it is still 
not extinguished; except t hat it may seem to be 
itself absent at the very time that the ecstasy 
is energizing in us i t s special manner, in such 
wise as to bring before us images of ~sound mind 
and of wisdom ••• ;2 they are reasonable i l lusions.3 
Tertull ian wrote a treatise of seven books on this subject, 
which will be ment i oned again in the next ch apter. It is gener-
ally believed t hat this doctrine of ecstasy was proposed mo st 
vigorous l y by the ~ontanists.4 
vnLereas the previous Christian writers all accepted t h is 
exp erience,5 none of t hem attempted to produce a contemporary 
instance of its exercise. But in De Ani ma, Tertullian does do 
just this. He re ports an instance where a member of his con-
gretation 11 sees 11 a corporeal spirit and thus empirically vali-
. 6 dates h i s v~ew of the soul as a body . However, about this 
time, f'611owing the criticisms of Clement of Alexandria, the 
De Anima, XLV, v. 
De Anima, XLV, v, trans. Holmes, \~, II, 513. 
Waszi~~ , TDA, 482. 
Gwatk in, ECH, 80 suggests that both Justin and Athenagoras 
accepted this view of ecstasy , at least in outline. See also 
Kaye , EH, 93 and Lawlor, Art.(l908 ), 483. 
See D~. Anima, I X, vii and Chapter II I . 
See v'Jasz~nk , TDA, 194, 197. 
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c laim to ecstatic visions became a mark defining fal se and 
1 heretica~ prophets. 
Biggs regards t h e concept of ecstasy in this period as co-
extensive with mysticism, 2 but Tertullian 1 s h i ghly equivocal 
and obscure view seems to have little if anything in conrrnon witb 
what later became Christian mysticism. 3 
Although orthodox 0hristianity did not produce specific in-
stances of the activity of the spirit as did Tertullian, it did 
claim that spiritual gifts, ch arismata,4 are a . continu ous accre-
tion in Christiani ty. Between t~is and ecstasy , Tertullian sug-
ge sts the difference of the " ••. endowment of prophecy which ac-
crues expressly from t he grace of God 11 and 11 ••• the occasional 
gifts of divination."j The basic innocence of Tertullian's con-
cept of ecstasy is support ed by the f act t hat in De Anima it ap-
pears infrequently, perhap s only twice, and then only as em-
pirical validation of viev1s already entertained. 6 That is to 
say, ecstasy doe*ot produce "new" doctrines in De Anima, but 
only supports old ones. 
The general presence of t h e Holy Spirit (or Paraclete) is 
quite important i n all Tertullian.' s writings, probably due to 
the influence in this direction given by the Johannine liter-
. 7 
ature during this time, tending to i nfu se all his writings witb 
I 
)/ / 
1 Cf. Gwatk in, ECH, 80 on f:l<.c:r""To<.<::r"lS and t h e heathen ~IXVTEI.O( , 
. · and the opposition to the latter even by Paul (I Cor., XIV, z •KXii.) 
See a lso Clement, St11omata, I, xvii and Jones, SMR, 40-L~l. 11 2~ Bi ggs, CPA, 99 , fn. 1. 
3. Cf. Farrar, LF, 193-194 and Wa szink, TDA, L~81. 
4 . De Anima, I X, i i i. · 
j. De Anima, XXII, i, trans. Holmes, V~ , I I, 462. 
6. See De Anima, I X, iv, XLV, iii, and Adv. Mar., r!, xxii. 
7 ~w.,.t:"P. H~ ~QJ) 
an "inspirational" tone. Not too impoDtant in the initial and 
most philosophical portions of De Anima, at the end of the trea-
tise, in the eschatological, chiliastic, and purgatorial por-
tions, the function of the Holy Spirit does assume some signi-
1 1 0 
ficance. Yet at no time do the doctrines imparted by the Holy 
Spirit suspend or supercede the traditional doctrines for Ter-
0 2 tullian; in fact, it scarcely even colored them. The Holy 
Spirit was not a theoretical instructor but a moral exhorter,3 
land his teachings were in t h e natur e of running footnotes to 
Christian doctrine, rather than changes in its text. It may 
also be pointed out that in De Anima, the term "revelationrr 
usually does not mean the charismata of · the Holy Spirit or the 
ecstatic inspirations in visions, but the depositum of Scrip-
ture.4 Tertullian wrote a Bible-centered philosophy, not an 
I ecstatically-derived mystical theology. Sti~l, each aspect of 
his criterion of Christian auth ority na1st be distinguished: the 
original deposit in Scripture, the guide by the inflexible Rule, 
and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. 
3. The Problem of Montanism. 
Tertullian's conceptio~f spiritual gifts, charismata, and 
the state of ecstasy lead to the examination of his Montanism. 
1. See Waszink, TDA, 563, 593 for discussion. 
2. Roberts, TT, 41, 65, Lawlor, Art.(l908), and Lovejoy, EHI, 
327 who all agree here. 
J See Kaye, EH, 23, 25 ahd Neve, HCT, I, 59, who also agree. 4-: E.g., :tn De Anima, IV, t he erroneous opinions of the philos6-
phers are overthrown by auctorit ate prophet~e, which accor-
ding to Waszink, TDA, 125, means not the Holy Spirit, ecstas~, 
but the Scriptures. He says: "Once more prophetia is equi-
:v--a.J.e.at i;.Q_,__g.(U:!,."i:.pt:t-lr~s_,a.-::> , ... a II 
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\mhereas the influence of his legalism and authoritarian view o~ 
Ghristianity are quite definit~, the influences of Montanism on 
his thought in De Anima are either c.lear--and unimportant--or, 
more generally, intangible, even though some have taken a dif-
ferent view. 
Montamsm was founded in Phrygia about A. D. 156, communi-
cated to the western empire about 177 and was flourishing t here 
1 
in 20.3 r; Ivlontanus , the founder, was taken by his immediate 
followers to be a manifestation of the Paraclete and in whom 
2 
alone the fullness of the Christian teachings were revealed. 
MacKinnon says that Montanus even claimed to be the Trinity.3 
Tertullian probably came under the influence of this sect 
through his contact in North Africa with Proclus, a Montanist 
u_ 
preacher.· 
i. The dates of Tertullian ' s schism and De Anima.-- The 
precise date of Tertullian 1 s defection to Montanism is very 
much a matter of controversy. Students in the field have dated 
it all the way from Lebreton and .Zeiller in 172-1775 to Gilson 
and Baumgart¢ner-Ueberweg in 213. 6 This is obviously matter a of> 
some importance, since De Anima cannot possibly be a Montanistic 
l. Gwatkin, ECH, 23~· 
2. Lawlor, Art.(l916), 828. See also Kaye , EH, 22 and Bethune-
Bake~, ECH, 76, 81. 
3. MacKinnon, CC, 318. 
h. Dodgson, TAP, xiii and MacKinnon, CC, 320. See Adv. Val., V. 5. Lebreton and Zeiller, HPC, II, 839 are alone at this extreme 
and are probably very wrong. 
6. Uebepweg-Baumgart~ner, GGP, II, 82, Gilson, PMA, 96 and Don-
aldson, CLT, 37 all take this date. If it is correct, accor-
ding tp Wasziru{'s dating of De Anima, it could have been writ -
ten as much as three years before 213, excluding it from Ter-
tullian' s lVlontanistic writings automatically. 
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treatise unless it was written after he had become a Montanist. 
Thus, one must ln1ow, in order to answer this que stion, (1) when 
Tertullian became a Montanist, and (2) when he wrote De Anima. 
1 The best date for (1) seems to be sometime before 210. The 
det e rmination of (2) is a story in i t s elf and of more importance 
here. 
The first important investigat ions into the date of De Ani-
ma were conducted by Kaye and Neander prior to 1825; they placed 
it at the turn of the third century or slightly thereafter. 2 
Their views were followed by Fuller3 and Coxe4 with slight varia 
tion and no new re search into the problem. Later, Bonwetsch 
placed it with much the same dates as did Harnack after him. 5 
6 7 Still later, Schaff and Roberts accepted previous opinions. 
The most thoroughgoing and recent investigation has been c on-
ducted by Waszink. He first dated t he tre atise between 210 and 
211, 8 but recently revised his view and now places De Anima be-
t we en the years 210 and 213. 9 
1. Roberts and Donal dson (eds.), ANF, III , 8 date Tertullian's 
Mcntanism from 203; Fuller, Art. ( 1887), 819 dates it between 
199-203; Donaldson, CLT, 171 observes t hat it may b e as 
"early" as 207 }d2.J4,o~sy, BCR, 357 put s it as approxim~tely 201. 
2. The proposed e:Pd:eiie by Kaye and Ne ander are found s1de by 
side in Roberts and Donaldson (eds.), ANF, III, 11. · 
3. Fuller, Art.(l911), 941 clai ms to follow Kaye and Bonwetsch; 
he ~s it 208-209. 
4. In Roberts and Donaldson ( eds. ) , III, 181, he only points out 
t hat it cannot be put prior to 203. 
5. Bonwetsch, GM , 186 suggests De Anima falls between 207-212, 
and more probably 208-209. Harnack , CAL, II, 296 dated De 
Anima between 208/9 to 213. In 1910, he chaged his mind and 
moved it up to 202/3 to 207/8, in his Art.(l9ll), 663. 
6. Schaff, HCC, II, 833 left it between 200-220. 
7. Roberts, TT, 93, 260 places i:C precisely at 211. 
8. Waszink, TDAE, 12. 
9· Waszink, TDA, 6°. 
27 
ii. Montanism in De Anima.--However, De Anima does not be-
come a full-blown Montanistic treati se simply because Tertullian 
was an adherent to !Jlontanism when he wrote it and even though it 
is pos sible to specify certain doctrines, e.g., ecstasy, as Mon-
tanistic. Some writers, e.g., Bardenhewer, Roberts and Donald-
son, and Roberts, do ·locate this treatise in Tertullian 1 s Mon-
1 
tanistic writings. However, all Roberts, for instance, is able 
to show is that the passage in De Anima, IX, iv, on the vision 
Jar the corporeal spirit, is Montanistic and that the sections 
which close the treatise refer to the activity of the Paraclete.~ 
I In t h e first case, Tertullian takes the vision only as evidence 
for a view already held on other grounds, and it is difficult to 
I see where the latter influences his philosophy and psychology at 
lall. 
Another passage, brought out by Holmes--he calls it " ••• a 
t:Ouch of Tertullian' s lVIontanism, u}- is found early in De Anima. 
Tertullian says: 
••• Certos nihil recipiendum quond non conspiret 
germanae ea ipso iam aevo pronatae propheticae 
paraturae. 
~nereas his doctrine of ecstasy is probably developed under the 
influence of Montanistic doctrines, this passage does not refer 
to the nNew Prophecy," as Mo11tanism is o:rten called, but, accor-
1. See Roberts and Donaldson (eds.), ANF, III, 11 and Barden-
hewer, PAT, 188. 
2. See Roberts, TT, 39-41. 
3. Holmes, WT, II, }+llf, fn. 4. 4. De Anima, II, iii in Waszi~~, TDA, 3, lines 25-27. 
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ding to Waszink, propheticae refers to the Christian Scriptures.r 
In h is Analysis of De Anima, Waszink mentions two instances 
of ~iiontnnistic doctrines, one of which is the vision of the cor-
2 
poreal soul, and the other has to do with the rigorous diet 
demanded by Montanus in his ascetic and puritan life, more or 
less reco~mended by Tertul l ian in De Anima. 3 The former has al-
ready been discussed and rendered innocuous and the latter is 
very incidental to the s.tructure of arguments in De Anima·; in-
deed, it is h ardly worthy of mention. 
Thus, outside the .doctrine of ecstasy, itself not too im-
port ant as a. philosophical method or criterion of truth in De 
Anima, nothing has been found which causes De Anima to be re-
garded as schismatic document with distinguishing ~funtanistic 
principles overriding orthodox Christian ones. 
In general, Tertullian never claimed to have had revela-
tions as did Montanus.4 Donaldson's view that Tertullian ac-
cepted Mont anus's distinction between the -rrv~ilt-J.or.·n K.o(, his 
followers, and the ordinary Christians5 is nowhere found in 
De Anima or even suggested. As far as this distinction between 
higher and lower Christians goes, in De Anima Tertullian de-
nounces it in the Valentinian psychology, for it was more Gnostic 
than orthodox; 6 Clement of Alexandria did recognize a s imilar 
1. See the partial translation of this passage in Waszink, TDA, c 7. 
2. Waszink, TDA, .16°, 166. 
J. Waszink , TDA, 20°, .509-.511. 
4. See Lawlor, Art.(l908), 486. 
,5. Donaldson, CLT, 166 and MacKinnon, CC, 318. However, Esser, 
ST, 161 anticipated this and denied it. 
6. Loisy, BCR, 3.56 calls the Montanists in general nnothing of 
the gnosticn but rather 11 illuminati. 11 
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di stinction,~ but even this did not make it orthodox. In what 
s ense, then, is Tertullian a Montanistic writer in De Anima? 
For Tertullian, Montanism was characterized by t wo basic 
!doctrines, both of which he had anticipated himself and both of 
v;hich were here reinforced. The first is that Montanism, rath er 
than other trends in Christianity of the second cent ul"Y, ".' ... reemed :' 
to give •.• as surance ••• that t he Holy Spirit ·was still teaching 
I 
I 
I 
2 in t h e Church . 11 Tertullian rejected t h e more radical Montan-
istic belief that the New Prophecy was " ••• superior to all that 
had preceded it [and t hat] its authority is superior to any canol 
of inspired writing s or ministry deriving from the apostles. 113 
As t he last section showed, Tertullian allowed no accretions to 
Christianity which did not recognize the boundary established by 
the Rule. This claim to novel and indispensable revelation by 
"orthodox" :Montanism Tertullian did not share; in this sense, 
11 Montanism was in truth to Tertullian lit tle more than a name. 11 4-
Even though t h e Church was not moving in this direction--
indeed, they were moving in the very opposite direction and 
l\'Iontanism is thus primarily a conservative reaction--still, most 
scholars ad!ni t that there was a good deal of sentiment t h r oughou:. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4-. 
See Clement, StDomata, VII, xi, 14 and Biggs, CPA, 86-100, es 
pecially 100, rn~ 3. 
Swete, HS, 79· Thus, Jones, SMP, titles his ch apter on rv~on­
tanism as "The Heturn to Prophecy, 11 f ollowing an observation 
made much earlier by Neander, AGT, 201 that t h is prophetic 
interest was a return to OT fo rms of religion, rather than an 
advance into the Christian "gnosis" advocated by Clement and 
appro~ed by Loisy, BCR, 296 as the meaning of Christianity. 
MacKinnon, CC, 317. 
Fuller, Art.(l887), 84-1, suggested earlier by Kaye, EH, 34-. 
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the Church supporting the Montanistic appeal to prophecy.l But 
the Ne·w Prophecy, as in fact all prophecies, laid claims as the 
sole judge of all truth and allowed no judgment on themselves 
out side their ovm criteria. This, as Jone s observes, had the 
effect of destroying the self-corrective tendencies asserting 
themselves in t he Ch~ch by making i mpossible any real criterion 
2 
of orthodoxy. For the Montanists, it meant that they were the 
sole possessors of the tradition; for Tertullian, it tended to 
make him indifferent to claims by philosophe r s for internal con-
sistency in reasoning and h i ghly critical of positions otrnr 
than his own. It amounted to reinforcing h i s authoritarian me-
thod of argument and at t h e s ame time allowed him to feel quite 
free in the use of any argmnents to defend hi s position, since 
the position was apriori correct, also a partial extension of 
his legalistic prescriptive rights. 
The second influence Montanism had on him was to reinforce 
his previous disposition toward purit; anism and ethical rigor. 
Here, "he was a Montanist in temper long before he accepted the 
3 
oracles of the New Prophecy." In fact, MacKinnon has any num-
ber of scholars in agreement with him as he says, "The character 
and temperament of the man ••• sufficiently explains why he be-
came a Montanist;"4 Tertullian possessed a natural " ••• incli-
5 
nation to the severe discipline of Montanus." This ethical 
1. See Kaye, EH, 14 -15, Swete, HS, 80-83, Lawlor, Art.(l916), 
831, MacKinnon, CC, 317 and Waszink, TDA, 166. 
2. Jones, SMP, 50. 
3. Gwatkin, ECH, 239 and Jones, S1~ , 51. 4. MacKinnon, CC, 323. 
5. Kaye, EH, 41. 
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rigor more than the interest in prophecy made Montanism a here-
1 
sy. Eventually Tertullian founded his 0\m sect, the 11 Tertul-
lianists," and continued his rigorous practices until his death. 
But these ethical views come out rath er dimly in De Anima, and 
will be dealt with later. 
It is important here to note only that these influences of 
Montanism were not new ones for Tertullian's theology; Lawlor 
and Bonv1etsch agree that in Tertullian' s acceptance of Mont an-
ism, "he found ••• only a new sanction fop opinions already form-
.ed. n2 Fuller vl'ent so far as to say that the overall inf'luence 
on Tertullian by distinctive Montanistic teachings which had no 
prior widespread usage in the Church was practically non-exis-
tent; ''· •• his theology, if developed by Montanism, is in sub-
stance t h at which the Church accepted."3 
4. Antignosticism and Philosophy. 
Tertullian clearly points out in the opening chapters to 
De Anima t"b.-8.t his initial pul~pose in writing this treatise is to 
destroy false philosophical views concerning the soul • 
••• I now turn to the other questions incidental 
to the subject [of the soul]; and (in my treatment 
of these) I shall evidrntly have mostly to contend 
with the philosophers.~ 
I However, he is not interested in the philo s ophers as such; he 
deals extensively with their views because they are patriarchs 
1. Barclay, EH, 3.5, Gwatkin, ECH, 81 and Jones, SMP, .54. 
2. L~wlor, Art.(l916), 831 and Bonwetsch, GM, 118-127. 
3. Fuller, Art.(l911), 9.52. See also Farrar, LF, 182 and Lawlor, 
Art.(l908), 483, Art.(l916), 830. 
~-· De Anima, I, i; trans. Holmes, WT, II, 410-411. 
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of her"e s y ( p atriarchis haereticoi'l.JJil ) . 1 
\"Jhatever noxious vap ours ••• exhaled from philosophy 
obscure the clear and ·wholes ome atmosph ere of truth, 
it will be for t h e Christian to c le a r bot1h b v shat-
tering to p ie ces the arguments which D.re dra~m from 
t h e p rinc i p les of things - -I mean those of the phi l os-
Ol'Jhcrs - -and by opp osing to them the max irn.s of heaven-
l y wisdom--that is , such as a re revealed b y the 
Lord ; in order that both the p itfal ls 'INherevrith 
philosophy captivates t h e h eat h en may be removed , 
a n d the means employed by heresy to shak e the faith 
of Ch ristians may be repressed.~ 
The s:i. gnificance of this antie;nosti c3 purpose in De Aniina 
is such tha t t r1e treatise c an11.ot be pro~Jerly interp r e ted in the 
hist ory of Christia n t h ought , p s y chology and philosophy vrithm)_t 
continual reference to this fact . Followinc:; t h e method laid 
d own by his prescription of heresy in earlier treatises, in De 
Anima Tertullian develop s most of his i mportant t heses in direct 
opp osition to doctrines defended b y heretics. Ag ain, Tertullian 
d oes not claim to be speculating on these top ics; the Christian 
is not 11 p er-.rnitted to g i ve his inquiries wider rang e tha n is 
comp atible with their solution ; foi' 'endless questions 1 the 
apostle forbids •.• u1!- It is the h e r etics who s peculate , confusin ;· 
truth witb. falsehood, Christian d octPine with p hilosoph i cal no-
tions . 1'ertullian 1 s a ppe a ls to t h e auth ority of the christian 
wr>iting s and the Rule of Faith are ma de the very center of h is 
doct :c"ine of truth b e cause h e fe l t his opponents h a d cleai•ly 
f a iled to do thi s v1hile p assing of f their• viev.rs a s orthodox . 
His att i tude toward t h e philosophers is clea rly described i 
1. De Anime., III, i, i n Was zin1c , rrDA, l~ , line 32. See t h e com.-
ment al~y and translation in 1JVaszinli: , TDA, llL!.-115 . 
2 . De Anima, III, iii, tran s . Holmes, \,~IT, II, l-1-17. 
3 . The---w0-rd comes from 1-"!eander ' s vrork titled Antignostikus. 
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the second chapter of De Anima, as he says: 
Of course v1e shall not deny that philosophers have 
sometimes thought the same things as ourselves ••• 
[but] if you take the philosophers, you would find 
them in more diversity than agreement ••• To the Chris-
tian, however, but few words are necessary for the 
clear understanding of the whole subject ••• no solu-
tion may be found by any man, but such as is learned 
from God •.• 1 
Thus does Tertullian repudiate pure pagan philosophic specula-
tion concerning the soul and reaffilYa the orthodoxy of his O\~ 
investigation. 
In a more famous treatise, De Praes. Haer., he is so con-
cerned with the philosophical lineage of the Christian Gnostic 
heresies that he writes with vitriolic enthusiaJSm: 
Indeed, heresies are themselves instigated by philos-
ophy •.• The same subject-matter is discussed over and 
over again by the heretics and the philosophers; the 
same argmnents are involved ••• Away with all attempts 
to produce a mottled Christianity of Stoic, Platonic 
and dialectical composition.2 
From these passages and others like them, Waszink draws the 
important conclusion: 
••• It is evident that the entire controversy with 
pagan philosophy is primarily subservient to the 
purpose of attacking the foundations of heresies; 
when analyzing the ideas expressed in De An~a, we 
should never lose sight of this fact ••• This work 
is not in the first place a scientific treatise 
but a refutation of heretical doctrines about the 
soul.3 
I!iost scholars agree that this is the primary purpose not 
only of De Anima but also of a good deal of Tertullian's wri-
1. 
2. 
3. 
De Anima·, II, :t; iv, .- vii', . trans. Holmes; · WT; II, 
De .Praes_, Haer., VII, trans. Holmes, V'lT, 8, 9· 
Waszink, TDA, 7°. Fuller, Art.(l887), 851 alone suggests tha'-' 
De Anima is re~lly against the philosophers and not heretics. 
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ting s,J. and that i t c onditioned his attitude toward philos ophe rs 
') 
t o a prof ound d egree. L 
True as this analysis is, it would g ive an inaccurate Die-
ture of De &."lima if Tertullian ' s at titude t oward and use of 
philosophy \iVere de scribed as g enerated s ole l y by a controversy 
wi th heresy . This would be an error comparable t o de sc ribing 
all his terminology as merely legalistic . As it <lill be seen 
throughout this thesis , the sot.1rces of Tertulli an ' s doctrines 
c an be established only by reference to non- Christian :::lll.ilos o-
phers , even though he c onsistently denied hi s particip at i on i n 
the development of thi s "mot tled Ch: ... isti2,nity . 11 
Furth er , an ant i gnost ic condenmation of philo s ophy , Yihile 
fre quently expi•e ssed in h is vrrit i n ,s s , is not unc onn.non t o other 
..., 
eaPly Ch ristian thinl<;:ers . ~ '::/hen it is remembered t ll.at the phi-
loso~9hy with iVhich Tertullian was directly a c quainted, typified 
-"' 1 • ), 1 • ., l • • J 1" Dl t • in the p erson oi Apu elus , ~.- vv.:n..Le c aJ.nn n g co oe !.. a onl c vras 
a ctually Eclectic , Esser's defens e of Tertullian 's c ondemnation 
of philosophy is understandable . He say s: 
'iVenn er den Gno sticismus aus der grie c .. l.ischen 
J?hiJ.oso·Dhie ablei tot, s o mti.sse n wir erwag en , dasz 
ilu1. dio- Spelrulatiori nur in d ei' P orm der g riech-
is:Chen Philosophie bek annt vmr .5 
Thus, Tertullian , reasonint; by tho falla c y of composition, con-
1. See Bardenh e vrer, PAT , 179 , Sc haff , I-ICC, II, 832, 1~ygren , AE , 
II, 120, Roberts , TT , 118 and Hasz i nk , TDAE , 10 . 
2 . Robex•ts , TT , 63 , Horgan , I T , 120-121, Harnac~.:: , HOD, II , 233. 
3 . Waszi nk , rrDA, ll) . 
L~- · Gl over, CR , 337 sho~;vs t h at it vvas Apuleius and not the more 
renowned ancient phi l os ophers viho actua lly g ave rise t o the 
obje ct ions vihich Tertullian voices in. De Anima and elsevihere . 
) . E s se r, ST , 8- 9 , 9- 16 . 
eluded from his own experiences supported by passages in the NT 
to the complete inc omparibility of all non-Christian specula-
tion with Christianity. Yet he was conveniently inconsistent 
when this corrupt phi lo s ophy offered views whi ch he could accept 
as congenial. His own extensive use of Stoic and Eclectic, as 
well as partial use of basic Platonic and Aristotelian concepts, 
indicates that his condemnat ion of philosophers as patriarchae 
haereticorum is really not as inclusive of all non-Christian 
philosophy as it at first suggests. He did not really oppose 
all non-Christian speculation in his oppositi on to philosophy, 
paradoxically as it may sound. For almost without exception, 
the critics agree that it is more accuPate to assert t hat when 
philosophy was useful, Tertullian used it; when he found it 
leading toward heretical opinions, he condemned it without 
t . 1 reserva 1on. 
Furthermore, it is impossible to study De Anima without 
realizing that despite the rejection of non-Bible centered specu 
lation, the limitation on Tertullian 1 s theories in De Anima 
really was not the Rule of Faith, but whatever was compatible 
with what he believed were true doctrines. As will be seen in 
a later chapter, the Christian heritage simply did not provide 
authoritative doctrinal answers to the views of the heretics 
concerning the soul and body, t heir source and nature, much less 
1. SeeRarnack, HOD, II, 23L~, Esser, ST, 10-11, Tixeront, IID, I, 
307, Schaff, HCC, II, 823, Roberts, TT, 65, Morgan, IT, 117, 
MacKinnon; CO, 434, DeWolf, RR.AR, 41-42; Lovejoy, EHI, 317, 
Copleston, HP, II , 23, Ferra, Art. ( 1950), 1L~7, and even Gilson 
PMA, 97-98 although he suggests a different view in RRT\1A. 
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al~gmi:lents for these ans·wers. Consequently , it was unavoidable 
that T'ertullian ferret out the ories and arguments from non-Chris 
t iar1 literature a nd spe culate, too, c all it what he will , in 
order to achieve a p osition which he could then p rop ose as he l d 
ouod ubiau~~d semper quod ab 011ll1ibus , 1 t he orthodox and true 
Christian viev-1, approved hy the Scriptures , tradition, Rule, and 
Holy Spirit 1 s teachin8 s. Unless it is admitted fi'om the onset 
t h at in s pite of his claims to the contrary , he s pe culated 
freely and used an argmnents whicb. he found agreablo , his ovm. 
doctrines cannot p ossib ly be acc ounted for . ~-}hile Harnac k 1 s 
vi ovv that Tortullian 1 s theology was 11 ••• t h e Rule of Faith fixed 
') 
and interpreted in an antignostic sense , w - and Roberts echoes 
that it wa s t h e 11 •• • exerc ise of re as on upon the fundsnental 
p ositions of the 1 Rule of Faith, 1 uJ Tertullian I s use of nima-
g ination, ll as Roberts puts it , L~ his s pe culative activit i es and 
his cullings from pagan literature , are not to be i g no r ed . 
Still, it is the antignostic fl.J.nction of his \i'lrit i ngs , s een in 
connection vdth his legalism and Cb.r~_st ian authoritarianis:n , 
t h at generates the p roble:t:!l of his viev1 of reason and at titude 
toward philos ophy . 
5. S1.}..TID.1lary: The Inf l uences on De .fl~nima from Ter-
tullian 1s Lifo and Interests. 
The conclusions of this chapter i ndicate t h at in the f our 
areas of his life and interests studied h ere, viz ., legalism, 
1 . See l'Teandor, GH, I, 509 . 
2 . Harnack , HOD , II , 311!-· 
3. Roberts, TT , 236 . 
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Christianity, Montanism, and antignosticism, Tertullian took 
important positions whi ch had an effect on his approach to De 
Anima and the doctrines which he expounds in it. 
From his legali sm, Tertullian developed a rhetorical style 
and familiarity with courtroom methods of handling practical 
legal problems. ~ben he turned to writing Christian literature, 
he made this method into a philosophical procedure involving the 
use of certain language, especially his choice of terms, and his 
prescriptive method of handling heretics in his writings . The 
effect of t hese seemed to be that of making him indifferent to 
strict logical argumentation and familiar with the fallacies of 
character attacks, and the like, even though he gives abundant 
testimony in De Anima that he is attempting to give logical and 
reasonable arguments for his position. 
I As a Christian of the third centUl"'Y, Tertullian insisted 
!that all argmaents which he used would be derived from authority 
or supported by authority. Authority consisted of three main 
sources for him: the Bible itself, the tradition of literature--
especially the Rule of Faith--and the pronouncements of the 
spirit, either ecstatic deliverances or the vague charismata of 
the Holy Spirit. The main effect of this Christian adherence 
by 11ertullian was to make him imp ose a lbmitation on his specu-
I lation, since nothing could be gained by going outside the tra-
dition of Christianity, and all would be lost. 
Although his concept of ecstasy is not too important ph~­
sophically as a source of new truth, it does lead to his Montan-
38 
/ ism. Rather than supplying him with new and novel insights into 
i Christianity, its practices and theories, he fottnd kindred 
thought to his own in this movement, which in fact had much in 
co1nmon with the generally accepted conservative thought in se-
cond century Christianity. The novel claims of the New Prophe cy 
!Tertullian in large part did not share. Yet it did reflect ten-
dencies in his own thought. These were a predilection toward 
puritanism in ethics and the belief tbat the Holy Spirit or 
Paraclete was still active in the Church. This latter tended to 
reinforce his preference for authority over argument, acquired 
initially in his legalism. 
Finally, De Anima itself is engendered by controversies 
with heretics and their philosophical sources. The significance 
of this is that it gives a clue to the interpretation of Tertul-
i 
lian' s antipathy to philosophy, his purpose in v1riting De Anima, 
and his appeals to Christian authority. De Anima is then seen 
to be occasioned by eristic purposes, to oppose philosophy be-
cause it cause s heterodoxy and confusion--ailithough Tertullian 
himself surreptitiously used selected non-Christian doctrines 
quite fre quently--and to be built around a supposed close ad-
herence to orthodox teachings. 
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CHAPTER II 
DE ANIMA AND THE OTHER WRIT DTGS OF TERTULLIAN 
It has already been indicated that De Anima does 
not stand completely apart from Tertullian's other writing s. 
!with some of them it has a very close relationship , and these 
may well be investigated. The relation of these treatise s and 
t heir doctrines to De Anima is clarified first by a brief sur-
vey of the contents of De Anim~ itself, which may be gained from 
studying the treatise in outline form. 
The value of relating De Anima to certain other writings 
will become apparent as this chapter is read, for it will soon 
be seen that De Anima is best interpreted within the wider con-
text of Tertullian's companion treatises, some dozen, of which 
six will be taken here. It will be learned, briefly, that the 
subjects mentioned i n the Re ference Outline have a place in the 
body of Tertullian' s v.,rritings, that many of his interests only 
mentioned in De Anima have othe r treatises as their s ource, and 
t hat many of t he leading ideas in De Anima have a fuller develop ~ 
lment elsewhere. All of this is useful background for the more 
systematic study of De Anima initiated in the ne xt chapter. 
1. A Reference Outline of De Anima . 
Bec au se the structure and content of De Anima is not knovrn 
to the majority of students in philosophy, an outline is sub-
mitted here which may be helpful .... in giving a brief and introduc-
tory sUI'vey of its contents. Also, it is helpful a s a :general 
:I 
'I 
I 
--~~i- ----------------- --
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sive summary of every part of it, it can serve this purpose also ' 
Throughout the thesis, references will be made to this Outline. 
I. Preface: The Arguments of the Philosophers Must be Contested 
(De Anima, I-III). 
1. The discussions of Socrates on the soul as recorded in 
the Phaedo are of no value (I). 
2. Although some truth is contained in the philosopher's 
arguments, they confuse true and false doctrines; these 
must be separated according to the divine revelation, 
thereby ending useless investigations forbidden by Holy 
Scripture (II). 
3. The pagan philo s ophers are dangerous because they are the l 
patriarchs of the heretics and lead both pagans and 1 
Christians astray (III). I 
The Nature of the Soul, Part I: Its Primary Faculties 
(De Anima, IV-XXII). 
1. The Beginning of the soul in God's breath (in De Censu 
Animae) was already discussed. Plato's view of the soul 
as unborn and uncreated is false (IV). 
2. The soul is a body. 
i. The Stoic arguments, as well as those of some ancient 
philosophers in favor of this doctrine are welcome (V 
ii. The Platonists offer four arguments which, when refu-1 
ted, are four arguments for this doctrine (VI). 
(1) The soul can be a body since it moves a body• 
(2) The corporeal soul can be perceived by incor-
poreal senses. 
(3 ) The soul is fed by substantial things. 
(4) Two bodies can be in the same place. 
iii. The doctrine is easily proved by Scripture in the I 
story of Lazarus (VII). 
Note: The soul, a unique ldnd of body, does not diffe 
from other bodies more than they differ from 
each other (VIII). · 
3. The soul also has a shape, color, three dimensions, 
which is proved by the vision of a soul as well as· by 
Genesis II, vii and other Scriptural passages (IX). 
I 
1. Of. this Outline with that by Waszink, TDA, 15°-20°; and 
chapter headings to De Anima provided by Holmes, WT, II, 
:, 9. 
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4. The soul is a unity. 
i. The soul does not differ from the life-breath. How- , 
ever it is not the same substance as the spiritus, · 
which is added to the soul as an accidentia (XI-XII) 
ii. The mind is a function of the soul, not a faculty · 1 
or separate agent as held by Aristotle, Anaxagoras, 
and the Valentinians (XII-XIII). -
iii. Although the mind has parts or subdivisions, it is 
better to speak of them as powers, as do Strate, 
Aenesidemus and Heraclitus (XIV). 
iv. The soul possesses a central organ located in the 
heart, as both philosophers and Scripture admit; but 
it is not separate from the soul (XV~. I 
v. The irrational 11part 11 of the soul is not natural to 
the soul 1 s substance; it originates with the devil. 
1 vi. There are also rational angers and desires, as Scrip 
ture shows (XVI). 
5. The senses are reliable. 
i. All so-called illusions have special causes not in 
the senses. The rejection of sense perception makes 
life impossible. Plato is inconsistent, whereas 
Scripture approves this doctrine (XVII). 
ii. Knowledge acquired through the mind is not of a 
highei' sort, for this disparages the sensual facul-
ties (as do Plato and Valentinus)(XVIII). 
6. Anticipation of Part III: Growth of the soul. 
i. The soul is complete at birth to the extent that 
even babies can thiru{. The contrary view of Aris-
totle is offset by Scripture (XIX). 
ii. The narticular evolution of individual souls and 
their differences are explained not because they are · 
made from v·arious distinct substances, but wholly 
by environmental accidentiae (XX). 
iii. The Valentinian p·sychology, which holds to tbree 
separate and discrete classes of men, is refuted. I 
They support their view by erroneous exegesis and a 
dmnial of the freedom of the will (XXI). 
7. The soul can now be def~d in summary of this section 
(XXII). 
I j iii.The Nature of the Soul, Part III: Its Origin (De Anima, 
- XXIII-XXXVIII). 
1 1. There are a number of erroneous views on the origin of 
the soul. 
i. The heretical views derive from Plato's doctrine of 
reminiscence (XXIII). 
ii. This doctrine, however, is erroneous (XXIV). 
(1) It implies a forgetting, but the soul is almost 
divine for Plato, hence it cannot forget. 
(2) The naturalia of the soul are supposed to in-
clude a knowledge of the Forms , but this is not j 
possible because naturalia are never forgotten. 
---=--=-=-='*~==== 
iii . 
==============================~~-=-~-~~ (3 ) Ti me c annot c ause f o r getfulne ss . 
(LL) 'I'he b ody ca n n ot c au se f o r getfulne s s . 
(5; ) We r e Plat o corre c t , children would rememb er th . 
Fo r-.ms ri1ost c learl y . 
(6 ) It is st r ange that Pl a to a lone p o ssesses t hi s 
p ower of rmn .. i.ni s c enc e i f it is true . 
The t r ue view is qui te diffel..,ent . 
( l ) 'l1h e embryo i s an animat e b e i ng , and vari ous 
other vie~:~i s are refuted b y c ommon s ens e a nd 
Scripture (x:;s- XXVI ). 
(2 ) The s ou l an d body are b orn toget he r as c an be 
prov ed b y r e a s on , co:r:-r:non sense ai1d Sc rj_~ tv .. re 
(XXVII) . 
2 . Th e Doctri ne s of m.etem:r s y c hosJ..s must be refuted . 
J .. . Pyt hago r a s is t he author' of this e r rol.., (:;-CXVIII ). 
i i . By analysis of the d oct:rinc it c an be refuted . 
(l ) Th~ dead d o proceed from the l ivin g , but not 
conver s e l y (XXIX ) . 
( 2 ) The p opulation of the eart h has i n c reas ed , i n -
d icat i n g t hat t he n1.11nber of s ouls i s not coll.-
st ant ( :x.xx ) • 
(3 ) Other details of this vievv , "I'Yhen examine d , can 
a l s o be I'e fute d (.x::ccr ) . 
iii . Empedocles 1 s similar v iews on me tens omatosi s mus t 
a l s o b e r e fut ed . (XX:XI I ) 
i v . rn1e v i ew adv anc e d b y Plat o and here ti cs t hat trans-
mi g r at i on is t o b e r egarded a s a p ost - mo r t em punish 
ment is complet e l y u nf ou nded (X ..XXI I I ). 
v . Si mila r argl:rrnent s adv anc ed by h eretic s ( Si mon l\'Iag -
nus a n.d Carpocrat e s ) a:r'e ililp o ss i b l e . 
( 1 ) Si mon Nia gnv .. s ' s form of Pyt hag ore a n me temp s y -
ch o s is i s unf ounded (XXXI V). 
( 2) Carn ocrat e s ' s e r r one ous e x e g e s i s in I:Iat thevr V, 
x...-"'CVi i s ref ut ed by a better exee;e s i s (XX.,\..'iJ-r . 
IV . 'I'hc l~at t1re of the Soul, Part III : Its GT•owth and Li fe - I-I:l s-
to1..,Y (De An i ma , :;cc~VI-LVIII , viii ) . 
1 . ' At---:-che--moment of c on c e p tion , as a resul t of the mixtu Pe 
of s ou l an d body , s ex i s detei'li1ined (JCC]C""VI ) . 
2 . The embr:;ro is a l ivi n G; be i n c; on c e fe r til ization i s com-
p l ete . The soul and body n ow g row i n a paralle l fashion 
a lthou c;h in vary i n g mam 'l8I'S U:.::.ZXVII ) . 
3 . P·uberty i s attained at f ourteen years f cr b oth s oul a n d 
b o d-..r . At t h i s p o i Et , evil de si res ente r the s oul n o t i n 
a c c;I'd v;-i t h i ts - nature ( XXXVIII ) . 
L!-• Unnatur a l ne ss, s in and evil mus t be exrunined . 
i . At b i rth the devil at t a ck s the e.ou l a n d c onquers 
p agans b u t is v1 a rde d off by Chri st i a n bapti sm (LJCITX 
ii . Evil d oe s n ot attach itself t o the f J.. esr1 ~ -vvhich i s 
only anc illary, but to t he s o 1....1 .. l ( XL ) . 
iii. Original sin exists besides that provoked by the 
devil. However, the original good is never corrup-
ted completely and can reappear after• baptism (XLI). 
5. Anticipation: The topic of death as treated by Epicurus 
is opposed by the more accurate doctrine of Seneca (XLII). 
6. Sleep. 
i. Sleep is natural and refers only to the body. Sleep 
also h as a symbolic value (XLIII). 
ii. Souls do not leave bodies during sleep, despite the 
claim of Hermotimus (XLIV). 
7. Dreams. 
i. Dreams testify to the activity of the soul in sleep 
and are a kind of ecstasy (XLV). 
ii. There are various kinds of prophetic dreams (XLVI). 
iii. Dreams have one or a combination of causes: demons, 
God, the self-activity of the soul, or ecstasy (XLVII). 
iv. Dreams are also influenced by a number of external 
phenomena, such as time of night, season of the year 
bodily position, diet, etc. (XLVIII). 
v. All persons dream by nature (XLIX). 
8. Death. 
i. No one has physical immortality, not even baptised 
Christians ( L) • 
ii. The soul does not remain in the body as both Plato 
and Democritus, by ingenious arguments, suggest (LI). 
iii. All death is unnatural (LII). 
iv. The soul leaves the body by degrees, as testified 
by the prophecies of the dying (LIII). 
9· Eschatology. · 
i. The theories of the Stoics, Plato and others as to 
the abode of departed souls are unreasonable (LIV). 
ii. All souls enter hell until the fleshly resurrection. 1 (1) Martyrs are an exception; they go straight to 
Paradise (LV). (2) No souls roam the earth after bodily death (LVI). 
(3) No souls return to this earth after death (LVII) 
iii. Rewards and punishments are meted out in this period 
(LVIII ,i-viii). I 
v. Epilogue. All the problems of the soul have been discussed 
and natural curiosity is now satisfied concerning them 
(LVIII, ix). 
2. De Anima and Six Other Treatises by 'I1ertullian. 
I A discussion of the place of De Anima in Tertullian's wri-
ltings without a complete examination of the corp:p;s of his 
I 
e 
an aperqu· into his system from the embeddedness of De Anima in 
certain other treatises. The more extensive task of developing 
Tertullian 1 s whole philosophical theology has been attempted 
with some success by D1Ales in his Theologie de Tertullien and 
also by Roberts in his The Theology of Tertullian, and much 
earlier in Neander's Antignostikus, Geist der Tertullianus. 1 
In this present thesis, however, t he more limited task of re-
lating contemporary treatises by Tertullian to De Anima will be 
undertaken. By consulting the preceding Reference Outline, the 
~ following pages of this chapter will give a fairly clear idea 
lof Tertullian 1 s whole system in De Anima, especially in its 
psychological and epistemological tendencies. 2 
Neander was the first to point out that De Anima is closely 
related to De Censu Animae, De Testimonio Animae and De Carne 
Christi.3 Fuller also reported this relationship.4 Waszink, 
however, was the first to show that Adversus Hermogenem is reallV 
the initial treatise in a group of three, the other two being 
!!De Censu Animae and then De Anima itself,5 which follow directly! 
! 
1. 
2. 
J. 
h:. s. 
For a full list of general works on Tertullian's system, see 
the bibliography in Waszink, TDA, 597-620, and cf. the one 
gppended to this thesis. 
'l'ertullian's psychology as a whole is well treated, if a bit 
speculatively, by Esser, ST. A more recent but much briefer 
treatment is by De Vries, BPT. The monograph by Hauschild, 
Tertullians Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie (Frankfort a. 
M., HH)O) was unfortunately tmavailable. 
Neander, AG, l.j47, ~-77. 
Fuller, Art.(l887), 850 and Art.(l911), 949. 
1jiiaszink, TDA, 7°. 
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TT ' ) / ~ from it. The lost 
I 
(rUger and Kaye as 
treatise, ep~... EK<S"t:;<S"w~, mentioned by both ! 
related to De Anima, is difficult to place 1 
in proper order here. De Resurrectione Carnis also deals with 
these same topics, although no investigator shows any immediate 
2 
relation between it and De Anima. 
Besides these six treatises, a close relation between De 
Anima and both Adversus Praxeam and Adversus Marcionem exists. 
Many passages in De Anima~e either drruvn from or refer to argu-
. 3 
~ents in these two treatises. However, to add these two works 
to this present examination is to undertake too large a task; 
also, some of this has already been done by other students in 
jthe field.4 Also, there are a number of lost treatises by Ter-
jtullian which undoubtedly dealt with the smae topics as the ones 
!under discussion here, if judged by their titles: On the Sub-
1 5 /mission of the Soul, On the Flesh and the Soul, and On Fate. 
Jit is also possible to relate De Praescriptionibus Adversus 
IHaereticos to De Anima, but this has been d6ne sufficiently in 
1the last chapter. His treatise Adversos Valentinianos, drawn 
1. KrUger, HEC, 276 and Kaye, ER, 7. 
2. Waszink, TDA, ,5° observes that De Anima is quoted in only one 
other treatise of Tertullian's, De Res. Car. He does mention 
De Resurrectione mortuorum as related to De Anima, but this 
is either lost, not by 2ertullian, or an error; Waszink him-
self does not mention it again. 
5. See Roberts and Donaldson: ( eds. ) , AlW, III, 12 and Goodspeed, 
EECL, 219. . . 4· For De Anima and Adv. Marc., see Esser, ST, 39-43; for De 
Anima and Adv. Prax., see ~vans, TT, passim. For the chron~ 
ology of these treatises, see Waszi nk, TDA, 346 and his Intro . 
duction, Harnack, CAL, II, 256-302 and Goodspeed, HECL, 215-2 ,. 
3. See Waszink, TDA, 5°, 7°. 
..!.. 
mostly from the ~~itings of Irenaeus, could be discussed in 
connection with De Anima, as the Reference Outline indicates. 
However, this is a minor point and will be taken up sufficiently 
in a more appropriate context in a later chapter. 
i. Adversus Hermogenem.and anti-mater~~lism.--As Tertullian 
points out in the opening words to De Anima, the purpose of this 
treatise is to continue the discussion on the soul initiated 
2 
with Hermogenes in an earlier treatise. Tertullian had reached 
some important conclusions in this treatise, Adv. Herm., and 
they are presupposed throughout De Anima. Esser lists four main 
points SUimllarizing Adv. Herm.3 
First, the soul does not come from pre-existent or inde-
pendently existing matter and is not itself material. The soul 
comes from God, as the correct interpretation of Genesis, II, vf 
says: 
And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the 
ground; and breathed into his nostrils~the breath 
of life; and man became a living soul. · 
Second, nei tre r the soul nor matter are eternal substances 
with God; they are not causa sui but dependent on God's free 
creation.5 Hatch has said relevant ly that Tertullian's Adv. 
Herm. is the most important early Christian treatise against 
metaphysical dualism. 6 
Third, contraries cannot ·be joined so as to exist in one 
1. See Wasziru{, TDA, 281-296 who documents this relation closely. 
2. See the first two lines of De Anima, I, i. 
3· Cf. Esser, ST, 36-37 with Waszink, TDA, 8°. 4· Gen. II, vii appears in Adv. Herm., XXVI. Holmes, VIJT, II, 
92 uses the Auth. Vers. -5. See Adv. Herm., II, XVII-XXII, XXXIII-XXXVI. 
o. na"Gcn, .tu-.L, .J..'-j O . 
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being . Tl1.ere:fore , t he b_ody , which Hermogene s c laimed as made 
out of matte::> and intrinsica l l y evil, could hardly be joined to 
t h e s oul, r;hich coming :lT•om God i s good, to foi'r.l man . Eermoger~E 
is p rove d vrrong regarcUng the n a t u ral evil of m8_tter b y the ex-
perience of the s oul in the b ody . 1 Furthermore, the 11 ground 11 
n entioned in Genesis II , vii is not independent 11material sub-
st ance u at a.ll, but i s cree.ted earthy matter . 2 
Fourth , anything v:hich is not of the sub stance of t h e soul , 
such as evil , c annot be c oexistent vvith it and must ther efore be 
? 
diffei·ent and extrinsic to its nature .-' 
These four po ints, establish ed some two to eight y eaT'S be -
fore the v1ri ting of De Anima}!- a r e v e Py imp ortant in the struc-
ture of the argmnent in that treat ise . 'rhey re p resent a nUJ.nber 
of the views vrhich 'i.' ertullj_an defended against the heretical 
mi sinterp r etati ons of Christian do ctrine . E s pecially i mportant 
is Tertullian 1 s fl a t deni a l of a l l mate Pialisms as he undePsto od 
them; in Hermogene s 1 s materialism, TeJ•tu llian finds his first 
op:~J onent in De Anima . 
ii. De Censu Animae as the __ bas :i.:_~ o£: De Anima . --F'o l l ov:ins 
the compo sition of Adv . He r m., and p receding t hat of pe AnimB;, , 
Tertullian l:'.rrote an imp ort ant treatise \Vhi ch unfortunately has 
been lost, titled De Censu Animae, 11 0n the Ori ginal Substance of 
the Soul . rr5 r hie. treatise is the mo st imp ort ant companion p i e c e 
1 . Adv . .lllerm., VII- XVI . 
2 . Ac-rv:-lrcrm., XXII - XXVI . 
3 • ACJ_v • 1·1e r rr1. , XXA.'lJI • _. 
l l-• Good s-peed, l-illCL , 216 dates Adv . 1-lcpm . betv1een 198 - 212, but 
;_'faszii1.k , TDA, 8 ° puts it betneen 205 - 206 . 
) . 'rranslation of the title by Waszink , TDA , 12°, 8 2 . 
_] 
t D An . 1 th h o e J.ma, even oug present knowledge of its contents is 
limited to fragments reconstructed from Tertullian 1 s other wri-
tings. All the doctrines in De Anima dapend on it very heavily, 
and Tertullian speak s of De Anima as the continuation of the 
arguments in their finer points, which had been broadly outlined 
against Hermogenes in De Censu Animae. 2 Waszink has observed 
I 
that: 
To understand De Anima fully we ought to have access 
to De censu animae <adversus Hermogenem ,., not only 
because this work induced Tert.[sicJ to occupy him-
self with psychological problems, but also because 
he continually assumes that the readers of De anima 
are acquainted with it. He ref ers to it no less 
than nine times, and frequently cuts short a dis-
cussion of highly important subjects because on 
these he had in the earlier tr~atise already said 
every~hing there was to say ••• j 
He has also reconstructed the remains of this treatise and the 
results of his labors may be smmnarized in three points.4 
First, Her.mogenes's reading of Genesis,II, vii, that the 
11living soul 11 of man is a created substance and must therefore 
be material, is repudiated. Tertullian reads this passage in 
I
, the traditional manner, viz., that God 11breathed 11 or created 
life in the soul from himself and not from matter. 5 
Second, the soul is closely united to God, as is indicated 
by the fact that it is Hi.s "breath" which first activated it. 
1
1. 
I 2. 
IJ. 
4-5. 
Esser, sT, 299 observed this a long time ago. 
De Anima, I, i reads: De solo censu animae ••• congressus Her-
mogeni ••• nunc ad reliquas conversus quaestiones plurimum. 
Waszink, TDA, 7°. 
See Waszink , TDA, 7°-14°. 
Waszink, TDA, 12°. Hermogenes conception of matter is very 
obscure, for when the soul issues from it, it is good; when 
the body is mater~l, it is evil. Waszink suggests if fol-
lows Plato's T6 & 1t' ~~.... p ov ; see his TDA, 8°-9° . 
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Even though it is born with hereditary sin, which Hermogenes 
took to mean again that it was of material origin, the original 
fact of its source cannot be altered. Also, this "breath" is 
not part of God's 11 spirit, 11 since it would then be only an acci-
den~~of the soul rather than the agency of its very activity 
(since God cannot fragment himself into h is creation, as Her-
mogenes properly argued, but wrongly construed to mean that the 
soul must be independent of God, having its source in pre-exis-
tenti matter). 1 
Third, the soul may be described in terms of its character-
istics. These include the freedom of the will, t h e ability to 
prophesy, immol"tality, rationality, ability to sin, passivity, 
2 
as well as beginning in time and springing from God. 
These three points are practically a sunm1ary of the philo-
sophical and theological p sychology presented in De Anim~. The 
distinction between God's flatus and ~itus may seem like 
sophistic hair-splitting, which it probably is, and another in-
1 -
stance of Tertullian 1 s literal-realistic reading of the Scrip-
tural text. However, for him this was a very important dis-
tinction. Unless it is made, Hermogenes and the materialists 
will carry the field in their erroneous interpretation of Genesif 
II, vii and achieve t he destruction of Christian p sychology 
which insists on the uni t·y of God but also on the close relation 
~ of the soul to its creator. In De Anima, this is one of the 
1. See Neander, AGT, 459-460 and Waszink, TDA, 12°-13°. 
2. Waszink, TDA, 1) 0 • 
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Ivery first points introduced as part of Tertullian's psychology, 
I • i 1 PJld ~t s merely copied out from this earlier treatise. The 
I 
list and exposition of the faculties of the soul was also copied 
out from De Censu Animae and expanded into the most important 
chapters in De Anima. 2 
As his sources for De Censu Animae, Tertullian drew on the 
~ writings of Irenaeus and Soranus, and also possibly on some 
views of rhilo, although this latter is rather obscure. 3 Al-
though it finds no place in De Anima, Esser points out that in 
De Censu Animae Tertullian had refuted Marcion ·' s theories re-
garding the soul as well as Her.mogenes's.4 
iii. De Testimonio ~nimae and the concept of nature.--This 
short treatise is not very important except as a literary piece 
in which Tertullian presents conclusions culled from his other 
writings in order to argue for the status of the soul as Chris-
tian irrespective of whether a person professes Christianity 
lopenly or not.a' all. He establishes this in part by arguments 
!which are little more than rhetorical devices, 5 and need not be 
examined here. Niore important arguments are used, however, in 
the claim that the soul is naturally Christian which depend upon 
his important concept of nature. 6 
Tertullian's concep~ of nature as deve loped in his wri-
tings has been the object of an extensive survey by Professor 
11. Waszink, TDA, 10°-13°. 
2. Waszink, TDA, 13°. 
3. Waszink , TDA, 14°. On Irenaeus and Soranus, See Chapts. V-VI 
4· Esser, ST, 39-l~3· 
5. See Roberts, TT, 150 for comments on these arguments. 
6. Most important here are De Test. An., V-VI. 
Lovejoy, but the essence of it can be found in his own De Test. 
An. There are a number of senses in which 11nature 11 is employed 
by Tert ullian, but the most important is the so-called natural-
e istic or "cormnon-sense"f>ne. Now, i n the case of the soul, why 
is it naturally Christ ian? Tertullian would answer that because 
! 
it was created by God and h ad its nature implanted in it by Him, 
and because God is the One God of the Christians and all creatio • 
is willed by Him, therefore the soul is naturally Christian, and 
no divine revelation is necessary to point out this fact. In 
Lovejoy's hands, this becomes a kind of 11 primitivism, 111 so that 
the 11 true 11 is also the "old,"' the 11 original, 11 which is known by 
all men simply upon reflection--the Roman consen~~s gentium or 
2 Stoic sensus communis. In De Anima, this becomes, surprisingly 
enough, a subordinate criterion of truth to Scriptural author-
i t y, for early in that treatise, Tertullian says that the "sim-
ple 11 ( simplex)3 problems may be solved without recourse to Scrip-
l ture~~ Thus, by knowing a thing's nature, one knows it truly ; 
conversly, by nature, certain truths are known; and one c an 
know the natur e of many things by simple reflection, for such 
know1rdge is i mplanted in each man by his creator. 
-
The development of this appeal to natural knowledge will be 
furth er explicated in Chapter III, but it is found very neatly 
1. For definition of this term as used by Lovejoy and Boas, see 
Boas's article,''Primitivism," inRunes (ed.), DP, 2.50. 
2. Lovejoy, EHI, 308. 
3. De Anima, II, v, in Waszink, TDA, 4, line 9· 4· See particularly De Anima, II, on the interrelations of na-
ture and Scripture as criteria of truth. 
-
here in De __ Te~\~, which i:s thererore another v a llfable in-
troductory treatise to De Anima . 
iv . De Hesurrectione Carnis .--De Anima does not deal 1:vith 
t h e com:9lete cycle of human life, s ince it stop s with t h e af -
firmation of a future life and does not examine the re s urre c tion 
of the body, both of which Christian esch atology freely a c ce pted 
a n d d i scussed . The latter do ctrine ie. well defended , hovvever , 
i n t h e p resent treatise , as its t i tle indicates, and it is there 
f ore clo sely relat e d to De Anima as its log ical supplement . 
Tertul lian ' s pre c ise purp ose in the treatise is t o defend 
the doctrin e of the re surr~ctidn of t h e body a g a i nst the hereti -
cal viev1 s "irhich denied any value to the body , imp lying t h at its 
resur>J."'ecti on -\vould be foolish when it is of no use eveE in this 
life . In orde r to confirm hi s vievi , Tertullian shor~ s t h at t he 
conc e::) t of the vrhole man require s equal and e ternal 1.mion of 
both b ody and s oul . 1 He argues t hat t i1e fl e sh in God 1 s si c:ht is 
e x cellent, primar i ly be c ause Christ, God t s Son , himself became 
2 The heretical attitude wh:i_ch d esired on t he bas i s of a man. 
a f undament a lly non- Christian met aphy sical d istinction bebveen 
matter an d s p irit to bifurcate fl e s h from s oul , is d isp rove d by 
3 t ' ~ Sc rip ture and contrary o na~ure . · r ertullian does not inter-
p i•et St . Paul ' s cautions a g ainst the fleshly life as i mplying 
an intrinsic evil to the flesh , but rather as p ointing out that 
l . De Res . Car . , I . 
2 . De Res . Ca r . , V- X. 
J . De Res . C a 1.., . , X:v - XVII . 
)_ ~ . De Res . Ca r., x~rii-XXXIV. 
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purely sensual desires and fleshly pursuits incompletely express 
%an's whole nature. 1 Especially relevant to De Anima, Tertullia 
lob serves in conclusion that while a substance, in this case the 
flesh, may and does undergo changes, it cannot be annihilated or 
destroyed. Hence death, apparently the destruction of the body, 
2 is merely a tempprary change in its condition. In De Anima, th 
same principle is assumed to hold for another substance--and a 
more important one--, the soul itself. 
II ' ) / 
·.v. 11~ p L E:K. <S To<-~e.w~ --It is faflBJly certain that this trea-
tise was written in Greek and t hat it consisted of seven books.3 
Beyond t h at, little is knovm about it, for it is another one of 
Tertullian's lost treatises. It has been suggested that it was 
\definitely Montanistic, perhaps an apology for the sect in part~ 
Goodspeed dates it about 202-207, 5 making it precede De Anima by 
about five to ten years. 
1 
The treati s e is mentioned here because if it were available 
it would undoubtedly clarify Tertullian's concept of ecstasy, 
which appears in De Anima , and also give more gr ound upon which 
to evaluate the genera l significance of t he concept. The sub-
j ect is mentioned in the later portions of De Anima, and may or 
lt ' ) / 6 may not refer directly to E:pt.. E-K6To<6E:C.O>· 
vi . .. J)e Carne Christi a·-Corporealism, Sensationalism and 
Irrationalism.--In this treatise, Tertullian endeavors to refute 
1. De Res. Car., XLVI. 
2. De Res. Car., LV. 
J. Waszink, TDA, 5° and Krtlger, HEC, 276. 
h. Roberts and Donaldson@ds.), ANF, III, - 13. 5. Goodspeed, HECL, 216. 
6. Cf. Waszink, TD.AE, 9 and TD.A, 5° on De Anima, XLVII, iv. 
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the heretical views of Marcion, Apelles, Basilides and Valen-
tinus regarding the nature of Christ's humanity. 1 All these 
heretics took a docetic view of Christ's incarnation, passion 
and resurrection. Docetism, a view proposed as early as the 
fi1~st century, held that Christ, as the Son of God, was too di-
2 
vine to suffer agony and deat11. Throughout the first, second 
and third centuries, this view was vigorously opposed by the 
orthodox and Tertullian in this present treatise, where he gives 
one of the last refutat i ons of it. In order to oppose this 
heresy, Tertullian proved that the flesh of Christ was real,3 
that it is not intrinsically evil as Gnosticism held,4 and final 
ly that the proper reading of the Scriptures leaves no doubt as 
Ito the record of his true humanity.;; 
II 
This treatise is thus a goodfxample of Tertullian's anti-
gnosticism, for here he catalogues the heretical errors and un-
dertakes to refute them all in so far as they touch on his sub-
jects. During the course of this refutation his temper gets the 
better of him, and early in the treati se he c~esout in his most 
famous of all passages that orthodoxy is true on the face of it 
simply because i t is so absurd to ordinary ways of thought. 
The Son of God was crucified; I am not ashamed be-
cause men must needs be ashamed (of it). And the · 
Son of God died; it is by all means to be believed, 
because it is absurd [ineptum]. And he was buried, 
L Holmes, 1NT, II, 163. 
2. See the Goodspeed article, 11Docetism, 11 in Ferm ( ed.), ER, 232 
3. De Car. Chr., III, XV-XVI, XXII, IX. 
4. De Car. Chr., IV. 
5. De Car. Chr:·, XV, XXII, XXV. 
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and rose again; the fact is certain, because it 
is impossible [ certum quia impossibile est J.l 
However, he regains his composure and continues with a fairly 
1
closely reasoned account and observes in closing that he has 
shovv.n by Scriptural proof ex abundanti2 what is heretical and 
wherein the true view lies. 
The primary significance of this treatise for the under-
standingpf De Anima is in the exposition here of the important 
concept of the corporeality of all real things, which is par-
tially developed for his Christology. In contradictiP~ the here 
tics, Tertullian asserts t hat Christ's flesh and soul are both 
substances. and both corporeal , the former visible and the latter 
invisible.3 The soul, a body, is " ••• some new sort of body, 
Jdifferent from the one we have in common [and]~ •• one of which we 
should have quite a different notion. 114 The soul is nclothed 11 
in the flesh of the body, but is not itself fleshly.5 It is im~ 
portant to observe that Tertullian neither clearly differentiate 
nor identifies "corporeality" with 11materiality 11 or 11 fleshly,u 
which naturally generates some confusion as to his exact meaning 
He does seem to suggest that substantial reality means "corpore-
ality.11 · In any event, Christ, the perfect man, is able by the 
reality of his soul to take up the sin on man's soul, which had 
been perpetuated from Adam through the flesh,9 and Sain for man 
l. De Car. Chr., V, in Minge (ed.), PCC, II,806 B, trans. Holmes, 
WT, II, 173-:174. 
·2. De Car. Chr.; xx:v. 
J. De Car. Ohr., IX-XI, XIII . 
4- I5'6""Car. Ohr., XI , trans. Holmes, WT, II, 189. 5. Tie Car. Chr., XI . 
lb }A ; _~_,.._ iJ~lT'__ Y \TT 
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salvation. Here, in De Car. Chr., Tertullian shows clearly why 
he took the realistic-n1aterialistic view of the soul in De Anima 
in a wholly different context. 
A second important doctrine in De Anima, Tertullian's sen-
sationalism, is also expounded in De Car. Chr. Tertullian ob-
viously adopts this position because he finds that the primary 
proofs of the real humanity and real resurrection of Christ are 
the frequent passages found in the NT which assert having seen, 
heard or touched Christ in his physical presence. The clas s ic 
example is, of course, John XX, xxiv-xxx, where Thomas, who, 
doubting mere reports of the resurrection, proved to his satis-
faction by tactiilie and visual evidence that Christ had in fact 
been resurrected. Tertullian quotes this ih De Anima. 2 He also 
mentions similar incidents from the NT here in De Car. Chr., 3 
and once again, the motivation for a philosophic doctrine in De 
Anima is uncovered, since sense-data are the only proof whereby 
!
the existence of a fleshly body could be conceived, and the 
fl eshly body of Christ both before and after the resurrection is 
an object of Christian belief. The study of Da. CB.r,:~ .Chr.is thus 
helpful in examining some basic concepts in De Anima, for it 
dle;a.rly shows the Christian apologetic motivation for these 
doctrines; it was from the attempt to elucidate an orthodox and 
antignostic Christological doctrine that most of Tertullian's 
1. De Car. Chr., X. 
2. See the many references to sense perception in the NT in 
De An~a, XVIII, xiii-xiv. 
J. In De Car. Chr., V he mentions Luke, Y~IV, xlix; in De Car. 
Chr., XIII he mentions John VI, li; there are many more in 
De tar. Chr. XV. -
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psychological and metaphysical concepts were evolved. 
The passage quoted earlier from De Car. Chr., V, prorsus 
lcredibile est, quia ineptum, ••• certum est, quia impossibile est~ 
is usually surmnarized in the shorter and more shocking, credo 
quia absurdum est. It is well first to note that Tertullian 
never said this succinct phrase, an error made all too frequen-
!tly in histories. 1 The real problem, however, is to decide 
whether it truthfully suggests his position, and what position 
his own words suggest. 
This statement in De Car. Chr., V, seems for most critics 
to open and close the problem of faith and reason in philosophic 
methodology in Tertullian. The weaJ:th of critical literature 
and interpretation on the point, mainly proof-texted from this 
passage, is too great even in recent literature to be adequately 
discus sed here. The most important recent int er•pretations are 
those by Professor Gilson2 and Professor DeWolt. 3 The older 
views of Bishop Kaye4 and Gerhard Esser5 are also useful. Re-
,-
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cently Professors Boas and Lovejoy have contributed their talent~ 
. 6 
to give a very clarifying examination of the top1c. Every 
historian of doctrine has a few words to pass on thiB topic, 7 
1. Illingworth, RR, 1, Cushman, BHP, I, 13, Schaff, HCC, II, 
823, Winn in Runes (ed.), DP, 316 and Brightman in Ferm (ed.) 
ER, 636, do not suggest that this is merely a poor paraphrase 
of De Car. Chr., V, as do De Wolf, RRAR, L~3 and Gilson, PMA,9· ~. 
2. See Gi~son, RRMA, 5-11. 
3· See DeWolf, RRAR, 40-43· 
~. Kave, EH, xxix-xxxi. Roberts, TT, 75-78 follows closely. 5. Se~ Esser, ST, 11-23. 
6. See Boas, EPI, 121 and Lovejoy, EHI, 308-338. · 
7. E.g., the valuable treatment by MacKinnon, CC, 467-471. 
and every examination of tke pr~blem of faith and reason takes 
Tertullian as the most famous and outspoken example of the ex-
treme right wing, which Gilson has called "the Tertullian fami-
ly,"1 who demand complete intellectual submission, the sacri- I 
ficium intellectus as Jung has called it, 2 before the authority 
of tradition and the complete adequacy of the Christian reve-
lation to solve all problems. 3 
The passage quoted above from De Car. Chr. is more than a 
mere vituperative outburst and emotional appeal to paradox, if 
the history of its interpretation is accorded full weight. It 
is traditional to view this statement as Tertullian's declara-
tion of irrationalism,4 rejection of rational methods in the-
ology and philosophy no mattel"' how "rational methods 11 be de-
fined, and a complete opposition to any attempt which would 
take those 11 absurd" doctrines and make them palatable to the 
intellect. At least this is how the tradition interprets the 
credo of Tertullian. Unfortunately, t h is anti-rational state-
ment in an antignostic context has ended most evaluations of 
1. Gilson, RID5A, 5-11. 
2. This may be an important interpretation of this passage. 
Jung, PT, 19-26 gives the first extensive survey of it and 
explains it in psychoanalytic concepts. Boas, EPI, 121 and 
1 even DeWolf, RRAR, 71-73 elaborate the same theme. 
3. Gilson, RRMA, 5 finds that Tertullian is the first of many 
who accept the "absolute conviction of the self-sufficiency 
of Christian revelation" in the solution of all problems. 
4. Gilson, RRMA, 5 calls him an "extrem(~ st" and in PMA, 97, an 
11 anti-rationaliste. 11 DeWolf, RRAR, 20, speaking of those 
who 11distrust reason, 11 mentions ~eertullian as an ''irrational-
ist" on 4o-4J-. Ferre, FR, 242 discusses "antirationalism," 
and includes Tertullian in one of his three groups here. 
Boas, EPI, 121 and Lovejoy, EHI, 315 tone this down a bit and 
suggest that Tertullian's position is one of "anti-intellect-
ualism. 11 
I 
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~is concept of reason. It has also been brought into other con-
texts to account for his perhaps unintentional illogical reason-
ings, criticism of philosophy, and legalism by claiming that 
these are based on a systematic irrationalism in theology and 
philosophy, which makes all rigorous coherence irrelevant to him 
This problem t~~en as a whole has already received some 
clarification in the last chapter, where it has been observed 
that certain influences and commitments worked together to make 
Tertullian admit into his defense of Christianity a number of 
procedures which are inimical to rational method. From this ex-
amination, it was concluded that: (1) Tertullian is often il-
logical, (2) he disliked philosophy and philosophers as the 
source of heresy, {3) he was explicitly disinclined to specula-
tive thought because he claimed to ach ieve orthodoxy by a strict 
observance of the Rule of Faith and literal Scriptural exegesis, 
although (4) he implicitly was forced to speculate and did so 
quite willingly, but never recognized his actions as such. 
Also, (5) he claimed to establish true views by variously ap-
pealing to Scriptural authority, the Rule, the New Prophecy, ec-
static visions of others, or the general revelation enjoined by 
the Paraclete, and (6) he was preemptive with his opponents and 
their arguments, frequently as a matter of principle. However, 
no one of these views nor their combination was taken as sug-
gesting a conscious and exclusive method of irrationalism on 
Tertullian's part, and especially not in De Anima. The present 
context in De Car. Chr., if reasonably interpreted, does not 
6o 
compel a revision of this vkew; it only provides a provoking 
challenge to it. 
As the last chapt er observed, few critics deny that Ter-
~ullian is often very lucid, quite logical, and obviously claim-
[ng greater rationality for his doctrines than the competing 
1 
ones. This appeal to rationality works hand in hand with the 
appeal to the Scriptures, for as will be seen in De Anima, the 
author of the Scriptures and the creator of the universe is a 
~ational God. This does not deny that Tertullian often acts as 
if his doctrines could be defended by :.many .-1Iletho-ds' and needed 
~o special appeal to reasonableness--this is for philosophers, 
not Christians--but were in fact irrational or ineptum. 2 These 
are admittedly strong words. However, they must be seen in the 
light of the context in this treatise in which they appear. To 
isolate them from De Car. Chr., IV-VI, is to miss completely 
Tertullian' s irony, satire, rhetorical eloquence ,\and appeal to 
authority. They cannot, without better reasons than are offered, 
~e taken to explain inconsistencies elsewhere in Tertullian's 
theories. 
His statement was of course influenced by St. Paul's words, 
"For the foolislmess of God is wiser than men,"3 and he used it 
for the same purpose as did Paul. Both were defending orthodoxy 
· 1. See further DeWolf, RR...4.R, ~2, Ferm, Art.(l950), 147 and Caple 
stone, HP, II, 23. But see especially Tertullian's own claim 
to logical rigor and reasonableness in Adv. Mar., V, i, which 
Roberts, TT, 76 ff. has carefully examined. 
2. Roberts, TT, 76 insists, uTertullian would be the last to be-
lieve in a literal sense that a thing is true because it· is 
absurd.n However, he did seem to say just this in De Ca.r.Chr 
3. Cf. I Cor., I, xxv-xxvii and Casserly, CP, 21. 
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over the doctrines of the incarnation, passion and resurrection. 
They are affirmed as true in spite of their repugnance to reason 
when literally interpreted. This credo of Tertullian, interpre-
ted as annihilating rational philosophy, was for him the most 
outspoken way to refute what he considered to be absurd heretical 
views. Because of this, Esser is also correct when he says t hat 
to regard Tertullian on the basis of t his statement as " ••• ein 
, 
Fiend [gegen J der Philosophie •• , ist ein falsche Beschuldigung.11 "" 
Still, Tertullian delighted in tr1e dichotomy of Chri s tian reve-
lation and philosophic reason when he thought ±t would serve his 
antignostic purposes. He was unable to accept Christianity as 
" ••• the evolution of n atural philosophy and Judaism, 112 as did 
Justin and Clement and many later Chri stians, because of what 
this implied to him, i.e., the production of a "mottled Chris-
tianity." 
I It is also an incorr ect historical interpretation to find 
that in this passage Tertullian i s suggesting a kindred doctrine 
to that of the High Scholastic period advocated variously by 
. Sige r de Brabant and William of Occam, namely, the so-called 
Theory of the Double Truth. Tertullian did not conceive of con-
flicting truths which this later theory recognizes. For h im, a 
t h ing is either true or false, although his position here on the 
absurdity of his truths may be on the path leading in more 
sophisticated thinkers to a doctrine of conflicting philosophic 
1. Kellner-Esser, TA, II, 300. 
2. Donaldson, CLT, 40. 
and theological truth, as Gilson and Brightman thiru{,l for pre-
cisely what Tertulllan's criterion of truth is in any given in-
stance becomes a complex and obs.cure problem. 
It is unnecessary to dwell on the fact that paradox has no 
peculiar aura of truth about it; quite the opposite, paradoxes 
2 
suggest some kind of error. Tertullian is quite "irrational 1' 
in this appeal to paradox, if it is an appeal to paradox and not 
just a jest at the absurdity of heretical doctrines which truly 
are paradoxical and therefore false on his viewt 3 But would it 
not be more accurate to say that here he is "illogical" and "in-
consistent" with other statements, and reserve the descriptive 
term, 11 irrational, 11 for a wider usage which takes into account 
all the argumentation which he uses in all his treatises? 
Against this interpretation, it has been argued that there is an 
animus which moves through all his writings, revealing him to be 
" ••• zu eng und fanatisch" to be reasonable, and consequently he 
is an irrationalist.~- But surely this isn1sufficient proof of 
Tertullian's irrationalism, since he does not establish truths 
by pa~adox even once in De Anima, but he does consistently ap-
peal to nature, the sensus connnunis or reason it self. How can 
this be reconciled with the assertion that he is an 11 irr~tional-
ist?" Also, this view would seem to overemphasize the relevance 
of motivation in choosing certain arguments to their truth. It 
1. See Brightman, "Reason in Religion, 11 in Ferm (ed.), ER, 636-
637 and Gilson, RRMA, 57 ff. and PMA, 562-568, 651-655. 
2. See Roberts, TT, 75-76 on paradox in Tertullia.n. 
~· Harnack, Art. (1906), 143. 
3-· This possibility should not be overlooked in the haste to · 
pronounce Tertullian an irrationalist. See Roberts, TT, 75-7E 
also takes h i m out of the context of his time. It can hardly be 
suggested that any third century Chri stian interpretation of 
Chri stological doctrines, if measured by contenporary concepts 
of reason, was reasonable. The tradition, from St. Paul and 
Tertullian through St. Thomas to Professor Gilson, has never 
found the credibility of these doctrines to demand or depend on 
1 
their reasonableness. Consquently, reason and what was later 
to become ;:Articles of Faith are independent: the latter has al-
ways been impervious to the fo~ner. Furt h ermore, Galloway sug -
gests quite accurately that no early Christian thinker clearly 
realized the problem of faith and reason, since none of them had 
adequate concepts of what the function of faith is and what the 
2 
method of reasonableness is. It is only after the influence of 
Greek modes of thought during and after St. Augustine's time--
witness the movement from fides quaerens intelleqtum to credo ut 
intelligam--tbat the problem became progressively clearer. 
Tertullian's words here in De Car. Chr . can now be seen as es-
sentially a throwback to certain Pauline methods of reasoning, 
and an opposition to the p rogressive emancipation of reason from 
authority (not faith) other than itself. Tertullian was still 
commi~d to belief in doctrines whose truth was established by 
3 
an authority other than reason. 
1. See Gilson, RID~A, 97-99 and his deference to Thomistic auth or ' -
tarianism. 
2. Galloway , FRR, 16-17. 
3. See Benjamin, "Authoritarianism," in Runes (ed.), DP, 29 and 
t he better article by Line in Ferm ( ed.), ER, 48 on "Authori-
ty." Brightman, POR, does not examine the historical re-
lation between authority and reason; see POR, Chapt. II, §6. 
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One might argue in a completely different vein that Ter-
tullian's credo ought to be evaluated as a step forward in epis-1 
temology because it helped to make self-conscious t he confl ict I 
[between criteria of truth which had se ldom before been cl ea!!j:y 
drawn within Christianity. Could one suggest that Tertullixn 
really aided in the clarification of the problem of authori ty, 
reason, .and faith so t hat f aith is reasonable commitment and not 
a form of knowledge, a viewpoint which emerged only after the 
long struggle t h rough Augustine, An selm, Aquinas, Occam and Kant~ 
Thus, the legitimate assertion that Tertullian is an ir-
rationalist includes t h e following: (1) He was often illogica l 
and slack in his reasoning , (2) occasionally he openly denounced 
philosophy and speculat ive reasoning as the cause of heresy, 
(3) he opposed heretical doctrines by appealing to the authority 
of t he Scripture s which were true becau se t hey came from God and 
were untrammeled by human hypotheses, (4) In De Car. Chr., V, 
which seems 2to be the crucial passage for his critics, Tertul-
lian claims truth for his position on the basis of its absurdity 
an appeal perhaps to paradox, (5) he tended to delight in the 
conflict of reason with revealed doctrines which were true on 
65 1 
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I 
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are too many passages whe1.,e Tertullian does not establish the 
truth of doctrines by appealing to faith, authority, paradox, 
or absurdity, which cannot be ignored, (2) he invoked philosophy 
and philosophers when he thought it was useful, (3) authori-
tarianism is not irrationalism any more than an illogical argu-
ment is irrationalism, although today it is not "reasonable" to 
appeal to authority other than reason itself, {L~) De Car. Chr., 
, is an isolated passage and must be interpreted in its eon-
(.S ) his own temperament and modes of expeession must not 
e given overmuch weight in establishing his method of argument 
and crj_terion ofJtruth, and (6) no Christian of t he first, second 
or third century h ad any self-conscious concept of reason, faith 
or their relation, although some thinkers were more in the line 
of progressive development than was Tertullian. Suffice to say 
!here that Tertullian should not be called an irrationalist on 
the basis of De Car. Chr. , V, or his other methods, unless one 
explicitly recognizes the necessary qualifications for a correct 
usage here. 
3. Summary: Other Writings of Tertulliah 
as an Introduction to De Anima. 
De Anima is pres ented by Tertullian as an apologetic trea-
tise dealing with Christian psychology. It is divided into 
three major portions. The first deals with the structure and 
organization of parts of the soul, and the examination and refu-
tation of various views of other thinkers. The second presents 
the genetic or dy:n:amic aspect of the soul, so that the reader 
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sees it in the process of growth, starting with birth, pubei'ty, 
sleep and death. Between these two sections is the third part, 
dealing with the heretical doctrines concerning the origin and 
evolution of the soul, especially transmigration. 
De Anima can be shown to be related to a number of Tertul-
lian's other treatises. Ones such as Adv. Mar., Adv. Prax., 
Adv. Val., and De Praes. Haer._, could be discussed but are not 
because it is too large a task or they are discussed eleswhere 
and are very incidental. There are some lost treatises which 
also would be valuable in the explanation of aspects of De Anima 
The following treatises are related to De · Anima, however, 
! !because they explain motivating forces in Tertullian, the re-
lation of his ideas to other treatises, and the location of ful-
ler expositions of ideas mentioned in De Anima. 
' · -. Adv. Herm. is the first of three treatises which were writ-
by Tertullian to oppose the views of Hermogenes. In this trea-
tise, Tertullian repudiated a numb er of forms of materialism, 
rejected metaphysical dualism (God and matter) and denied the 
int~sic evil of matter and the flesh. 
In De Censu Animae, he continued the topic and developed 
his psychology in general, starting by reinterpreting Genesis 
II, vii in the traditional manner, thereby maintining the close 
relation of man to God, his source • . Finally, he sketched in 
outline almost every one of his ideas concerning the character-
istics of the soul which were then carried over into De Anima 
and explained more fully there. 
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De Test. An. introduces the important concept of nature in 
Tertullian, which in De Anima joins with the authority of Chris-
tianity to become a part of his criterion of truth. 
Although Tertullian stops short of the resurrec t ion of the 
body in his treatment of eschatology and Christian doctrine in 
De Anima , he continues t h e topic and further approves the value 
of the body in De Res. Car. 
-rr '\ ) ~ A lost treatise written in Greek , IIE:p'- (:-KcSTOI.<S~OJS, would prob 
ably be helpful in understandilbg Tertullian's doctrine of ecstasy 
in De Anima and its overall significance for his philosophy. 
The mo s t i mportant treatise out side the trilogy of those 
against Hermogenes is De Car. Chr. Ndlt only does it introduce 
the motivating influences for Tertullian's doctrine of metaphysi 
cal corporealism and hi s .epistemological sensationalism, but it 
also presents him in an antignostic context which must lead to 
the analysis of the irrationalism which he supposedly adopts. 
iJVhile 11irrationalism11 is recognized in certain limi ted senses as 
a valid description of Tertullian' s methods, it is really a very 
complicated problem and has ramificat i ons in his logical methods 
his apologetic or antignostic purposes, his authoritarianism, 
and the limitations which accompanied his era in the development 
l of this problem. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE SYSTE1~TIC PHILOSOPHY IN DE ANIMA: 
TERMINOLOGY, RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY. 
The next two chapters on the analysis of De Anima continue 
from suggestions put forth regarding the syst.ematic content of 
the treatise in the preceding introductory material. For this 
purpose, the treatise may be conveniently analyzed in terms of 
Tertullian1 s basic metaphysical terminology, what will be called 
his "rational psychology" which focuses attention on his first 
~ajor interest in the treatise, and his epistemology in so far 
as it has not been done in Chapters I-II. The second chapter 
deals with his philosophical anthropology and genetic psychology 
which focus attention on his second major interest in the trea-
tise, his ethics whlch indicates some of the significance of all 
the foregoing topics for the practical life, and a summary of 
both chapters. 
1. The Basic Terms. 
From the brief discussions by many writers, of which the 
the ones by Bethune-Baker and Neve may be taken as representa-
tive,1 it is apparent that Tertullian's use of Greek terms in 
2 
translation, many of which were from Irenaeus or the NT, estab-
lished the standard usages for these te1~s in later Latin the-
ology, especially in trinitarian and Christology controversies. 
However, this influence did not come from De Anima alone among 
I. See the references in Chapter I on Tertullian's legalism. 
Cf. Bethune-Baker, EHC, 138-143, 232-236 and Neve, HCT, I, 95 
2. Bethune-Baker, EHC, 232. 
Tertullian's writings, and is thus beyond the scope of this 
thesis to ·explpre· fully. But it will be seen t h at while Ter-
tullian did not c oncern himself with the more profound onto-
logical or any cosmological problems in De Anima, his facility 
'
with metaphysical terminology certainly went beyond a mere jur-
istic usage and his dependence on previous writers did not pre-
vent speculation on his own part in solving his problems. This 
topic has been the object of thorough research by Hatch, Har-
, . 
nacll:, Esser, Strong , Bethune-Baker, Evans, Waszink, and ..... ovejoy . 
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Despite some disagreements among them, a summary of their:researc 1es 
may be given briefly. 1 I 
i. Substantia.--Substance is Tertullian's most important 
concept. He introduces the term in De Anima primarily in con-
nection with his definition of the soul as "a simple and l.mi-
2 
form substance" (simplicem et uniformem substantiae), "a sim-
ple substance" (substantia simplicem). 3 
) / (. / 
Substantia comes from the Greek oV<SLo<. and VTTO<S"CO(..~LS , 
which together in Tertullian's translation mean "an individual 
) / c../, 
real thing . 11 Ov<:S Lo<. refers back to 'V /\ Y"{, , whereby substance 
originally denoted the material part of a thing in an object of 
(. I" 
sensible lmowledge. Substance is also related to VitOKEL~E..vtlV, 
the primeval subst r atum which asslunes various forms and from 
1. This discussion is based on Harnack, HOD, II, 257, 275, IV, 
lL\-4, Harch, IGI, 269-278, Esser, ST, 77, 57058, 65-68, \Vas-
zink, TDA, 175, 192, Bethune-Baker, EHC, 138, 140-141, 232, 
235-236, Strong, Art. ( 1902), IVlorgan, IT, SS-56, Evans, TAP, 
38-44, 331 and Robinson, CE, 249· 
2. De Anima, XI, vi, in Waszink , TDA, 15, line 31. 
3. De Anima, XXII, ii, in Waszink, TDA, 31, line 8. 
which all t hings are made. There is nothing "spiritual" or "non-+ 
material" about substance as Tertullian uses it, since real in-
dividuality or particularity is p ossible only if a thing is 
e "firm," and has at its essence a core of real being. "Substance , 
(/\ 1 / 
is thus related to VI\~ t hrough the translation of OV<5\.CX. , to 
( / ( / 
vno<ST<i-<S'lS and to uncKE:ltJ.~voV. A substance is a "concrete 
existent thing ." 
Tertullian would also hold to a plurality of substances 
characterized by different natures. But each concrete existent 
t h ing can have but one substance. Thus, the Trinity is one sub-
stance with three modes (for.mae) of existence. 
As t he last chapter showed, in Adv. Herrn., Te r tullian denie,, 
that the soul sprang from matter. But if the soul is not .ma-
terial, yet is a substance, vn~at kind of substance is it? This 
is a problem to which no clear-cut answer can be given. It can-
not be denied that Tertullian was opposed to all concepts of 
subst ance which connoted something not real or concrete, as did 
to him the Platonic concepts of t he immaterial soul. However, 
his antignosticism also forbade him holding to the material ori-
gin of the soul. He threaded his way between this Scylla and 
Charybdis by developing the doctrine of the corporeal soul. 
1 ii. Corpus.--Tertullian observes in De Anima that 11 the 
2 
soul is a body" (corpus anima), and is defined as a 11body11 
1. References to this discussion may be found in the last chap-
ter on Adv. Herm., De Car. Chr., and De Res. Car. Secondary 
sources are Hatch, IGI, 20, Esser, ST, 65-67, I<:nudson, DOR, 
97; Ueberweg-Baumgartener, GGP, II, 85-86 and Copleston, HP, 
II, 24. 
I ~ DA Anima V vi :i.n_1Laszink. TDA. 7 line 1. 
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(Definimus animam ••• cor~oralem).l Tfle last chapter indicated 
1 corporeal. But the differenc~ 
between corporeality and materiali~y is never made clear in _D_e I 
that for Tertullian all reality is 
Anima, and no analysis of the actual textual material can clari-
fy this difficulty. In De Anima, Tertullian never identifies 
2 
corpus and materia, and h e continually differentiates between 
anima and materia. Yet he recognizes the existence of incor-
poreal substances as held by Plato, but never indic ates what is 
innnaterial yet substantial about corporeality. 
Copleston's solution that by the term coruus Tertullian 
meant simply "substance" seems to get at the essence of what 
Tertullian is aiming at in the argument. But it fails to accoun 
for the fact that in De Anima Platonic incorporeal substances 
3 
are also recognized, which precludes this solution or else 
ma~es Tertullian very inconsistent. Tertullian seems to argue 
against Plato not that incorporeal substances do not exist, but 
that if the soul were one, its unity and immortality would be 
inconceivable, along with other difficulties (cf. Reference Out-
line). 
Practically alone among the commentators, Esser asserts 
..(.o~ 
pointedly that 11 [Tertullian] ••• das Wort K5'rper niemals synonym 
1\ 
mit Materie gebraucht, 114 indicating that the corporeal soul is 
neither carnal nor physical nor material; its nbody 11 is of a 
~ 1. De AnLffia, XXII, ii, in Waszink, TDA, 31, line 7. 
2. De Anima, III, iv reads: anima non ex materia vindicamus, in 
Waszink, TDA, 5, line 15. 
3. See De Anima, IV-VIII. Yet it is difficult to deny that Cop-
leston seems here to have the point of the matter. 4. Esser, ST, 67, and the excellent discussion in 65-67. 
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different k ind. However, the soul, if not made out of matter, 
yet is knovm to have properties of figure, color and extension, 
1 
usually associated solely with material substances. It seems 
proper to say th~because Tertullian at no time explicitly e-
quates the corporeal soul to a material soul, the doctrine of 
corporeality, which lies at the heart of his metaphysics, is a 
highly obscure and perhaps ultimately unintelligible concept. 
While more will be said about the specific constitution of the 
soul as a body a bit later, it does not clarify the relation of 
corp~s to anima, substantia and materia. 
If one must account for it, it could be surmised that the 
!idea of corporeal reality results in part from a basic naive 
)realism, an aid in interpreting certain passages in Scripture, 
a realistic concept of baptism, original sin and immortality, 
as well as certain philosophic influences which came to bear on 
Tertullian, to be discussed in Chapter V. 
Thus, corpus remains m~defined in De Anima when used in 
connection with the soul as a body. It is very close to "sub-
stance,11 and apparently close to "matter" also; beyond this, the 
doctrine becomes completely opaque. 
iii. Natura.--As a term and concept, "nature" is used in a 
variety of ways, but they may be reduced to two basic ones for 
l. De Anima, IX. 
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2. This discussion is based on passages in Esser, ST, 58-59, 
Harnack, HOD,I~44, II, 257, and particularly the great con-
troversy over the relation between substantia and natura in 
De Anima, IX, vi and XXXII, viii which has occupied Strong, 
Art;(1902), Bethune-Baker, Art.(l903), EHC, 138, 14-0-141, 
232-233, Evans, TAP, 38-40 and Waszin..lr, TDA, 175, 192, 230, 
~~~ -~~~ ].~~-~ ==================================================~======== 
' o/ ., EP- / 
I the convenience of discus sian, the di~t inct :Lon between t h e e p i s -
lter;w log ical me aning of n atur e and its at t enda nt relations to the 
con c ept of reason, a n d t h e met aphys ica l meruJ.ing of the te rm in 
conn_e c tion v:ri th ·sub st anc e . The second of these two n ill be ex-
amined here . 
Hatura is not equivalent t o sl;_bstantia, desp i te different 
op i nions on t he subject . "Nature 11 deno t e s the tot ali t y of at -
t ributes Ylhi c h any substanc e has , as opp osed to any one attri -
but e or p rop erty (p rop rietas) , rihich v a rious s t,_bstances might 
have i n c onrr.1on . It is auit e po ssible for a n y substanti a to have 
c ertain propi'ietate~ in colm!lorJ. with othe r subst ant ia; each ma y 
be a like i n one o r more pron rietates . But t he s um total of the 
attrib-u.tes , t he natura, is not the same f or any t wo d i fferent 
sub stant ia, such a s the hu_man and a nimal s oul . Thus , t h e s oul 
has the attr>ibute of invisibility , which i s natural to it , yet 
it i s a c orporeal substanc e a long with other corp ore al sub s t anc e 
v1hi ch have t he attr>ibute of visibility •1 
The terril f or " a ttribute 11 used in De Ani ma is ·usual l y na-
r 
tur_§-l ia O I ' sub_stan~i v~-' the latter a ne olog i sm of Tertullian' s .c: 
They are qu alitie s or fac u l tie s inb erent in the nature of the 
soul . rj:ePtull j_ an includ es suc :b_ nfact,_lt ie s n a s s leep , de s ire , 
menory , a ncJ. many others ; h e does not g i ve a c omplete list of 
t h el'i1, although he g ives a number of partial lists. 3 
Hot all the .attrib ut es of the soul ax•e n atura l i n the sense 
l • De .l~nima. , VI I I , :1_ - i i , IX , i , XI X , i i . 
2 . 1Jfa szinl~ , TDA, 282 . 
D A~ • - ~- v -rT v'T'1\ TII~ 3 . Se e , e . g . , ~--l·_u~J ' i ... n . ..L. _, _,_·,.__,-'-'-,_ v _ 1. . 
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of being properties of its original substance, as will be seen 
in the case o~ irrationality, evil, bodily death, and hunger, 
which are all added qualities of varying kinds and therefore 
1 
of "second" nature. A number of strictly unnatural properties 
or accidentia are also fotu1d along with the soul, the most im-
portant of which in De Anima is irrational desire, or lust. 2 
Howeve:e pervasive these accidentia may be, they are not part of 
the soul's natura. Thus, Tertullian distinguishes natural attri 
butes or properties and non-natural properties, occasionally 
termed accidentia. 3 
The significance of a difference between substance and ac-
cidents is found in De Anima only with reference to rational 
p sychology, and the problems of what constitute substances and 
natures in other particular beings is nowhere considered. 
Substances whose n atures are not identica l cannot perma-
nently combine, and by this argQment, Tertullian denies the p os-
sibility of the sniritus of God being part of man's soul and 
also affirms that breath (flatus) and the soul are as one and 
not two substances in man,4 also recalling his denial of Her-
mogenes's view of the relation of the good soul with an evil 
body. 
Therefore, in the term natura, Tertullian in De Anima 
brings together many meanings and other terms, namely proprie-
e tas, acci_c:lentia, naturalia, substantivus. However, with the 
exception of his doctrine of the soul, Tertullian did not give 
1. De Anima, XVI, i and LII, iv respectively. 
2. De Anima, XXXVII I , iii.. L~. See De Anima, XI, X. 
'{ ~ p p De An j ma.... .Xl~. _iy__. 
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a nv indi c ,.,_:,cion or"' l..,l. s 'Tl. e1.".; o_f' ·lc}J.e re 1 a-'- · 01 "" • 1 • 
.., o -~ - ' v "v:L 1 OI "G.t1ese vel"'r.1S, 
perha~ps nevei' had a clear idea of accidents in relation to soul 
substance , as this and t he next cbaptei' viill observe. 
2 . Rational Psyc hology : Corp oreali sm and Ira:mortali t y . 
':f.le:-etullian 1 s main interest in his psychologi c al treatises, 
of vvhi ch De Anima is the most import ant, is to show that the 
soul is a unitai'y substanc e created by God not out of any mat -
ter, that it does not transmi grate and is not mortal . These al''e 
the general t op ics termed here as Tertullian 's rational psycho±-
ogy . The limitations of Tertullian a s e. philosopher are seen in 
t h e fact that he presented these vievvs with contradictions and 
vihat appear at times to be absurd arguments . Granted t hat fev1 
philosophers h ave attempted the same tasli: and manag ed to avoid 
all errors and inconsistencies, still Tertullian 1 s vievrs v1ere no 
even ennobled by the g reat vision on these top ics f ound in, say , 
the Christian Platonists of Alexandria . 
1.'1hile many of these basic theories in his psychology v.rere 
treated in other works , notably t he ones mentioned in Chapte r 
II , in De Anima they reach their best systematic expression. 
And as the Refe ren c e Outline shows, this OX}-:J os:Lti on is r; iven in 
a developmental or genetic appx·oach to the soul . In do ing this, 
Tertullia.n dis custled a number of topics ·whi ch we1.,e not t oo im-
p ort ant to him, as they r,;ere pe ripheral subjects not found in 
Sc ripture o :e the tpacU tion. These , whi ch constitute a g ood deal 
of the running argmnent in De Anima, vrill not be stressed in 
and the soul is nourished by food, a corporeal substance, not by 
1 
such incorpore al elements as nplato 1 s flowers of speech. 11 
Fourth, t wo bodies can be in the same place at the same 
time, as is evidenced in the reality of birth itself, for preg-
nant women carry one body within t hemselves, and often more, 
' 2 
e. g . , in t wins. 
Tertullian concluded t hese arguments for Christian readers 
by referring to the s t ory of Lazarus and t h e rich man. · Also, 
the purgatorial after-life demands a k ind of soul capable of 
3 
punishment t here, he tells us, for only corporeal bodies can 
r eceive punishment. 
From here he moves on to examining the properties of this 
corporeal soul. · The greatest difficulty which the doct r ine 
mu s t overcome is, of course, that the soul is invisible. 4 How-
ever, · he counters t his with observing t hat it is the nature of 
the s oul to have the property of invisibility, for all sub-
stance s need not h ave the same properties while yet remaining 
5 corporeal. This fact attests to the glory of God's creation, 
which includes its variety . 6 The soul i s also invisible because 
t h e nature of othe r substance s make t hem incapable of apprehen-
ding it, jus t as the owl never sees in daytime.7 
The decisive proof comes once again ex scriptura sacra, for 
1. De Anima, VI, vi, trans. Waszink, TDA, 131. 
2. De Anima, VI, viii-ix. 
3. De Anima, VII, i-iv~ r h is is a dire instance of Tertullian' s 
literalism. See Waszink, TDA,l5°, 147, 148, 151. 4. See Waszink, TDA, 159. 
5. De Anima, VIII, i-ii, I X, i, XI X, ii. 
6. De Anima, VIII, i. 7. Cf. Rev., VI, ix. 
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I 
I 
the following sections. 
The view that the soul is an active, simple, and unitary 
substance, and i mmortal, is t he most important doctrine his 
e rational psychology proposes. The great problem VTill be to re-
llate it to the other view of the soul as a corporeal substance. 
j_. The arguments fox• corporeal i til• --Tertullian outlines 
four basic arguments for holding t hat the soul is a corporeal 
substance, which he finds to be supported by both Stoic and 
Christian writers. They are all aimed at the Platonists which 
deny the corporeality of the soul. All these arguments are 
carefully reconstructed by Waszink, and there is no need here 
for repeating his work , and the briefest possible swmnary of 
them will suffice; they are not good arg~unents, and the unreason 
able is not made reasonable by prolixity. Unfortunately, Ter-
tullian did not recognize this. 
First, the soul must be a body b ecause it can be moved by 
1 
outside forces, i.e., ecstasy , and can move other bodies, i.e., 
2 
its own fleshly body. This could not be done if it were an in-
corporeal sub stance. 3 
Second, the body can perceive incorporeal elements such as 
!light and sound, and yet itself is obviously corporeal. 
fore, incorporeal elements such as thought and reasoning can be 
perceived by a corporeal soul. 4 
Third, the corporeal body is nourished by corporeal objects 
1. See Chapter I on ecstasy. 
2. De Anima; VI, ii. . 
3. De Anima, VI, iii. 4. De Anima, VI, v. 
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the invisibility of the soul was affirmed by St. John. In ec-
stasy he beheld the souls of three martyrs, 1 for the soul which 
may be invisible to the flesh--perhaps there are even exceptions 
hereg-is visible to the spirit. 3 
After showing that the soul has the shape of a body, which 
will be discussed in the next chapter, Tertullian adds that as 
all bodies, the soul also has color, and this color is lucida et 
aerii coloris,4 rendered as "ethereal transparent [color],".5 or 
. 6 
"airy color.u He notices t h at in this direction lies immater-
ialism, so he finishes hastily saying that it only appears to 
have air as its substance, for it is actually of a thin and sub-
tle material nature, 7 which Rashdall called a 11 subtle kind of 
body118 and Williams' a "quasi-material substance. 11 9 
That the soul has these properties, Tertullian demonstrates 
finally by referring to the oft-mentioned vision, when a soul 
was actually seen to be as described above during an ecstatic 
experience by a woman parishioner, possibly a Montanist. 
As this discussion indicates, Tertullian 1 s concept of cor-
poreality borde rs on what anywhere else would be termed without 
hesitation asfaterialism. However, it is not materialism as 
Tertullian understood it; this was the doctrine, again, of such 
Gnostics as Hermogenes.10 
1. De Anima, VIII, v~ IX, i x . Cf. Reve l ation, VI, ix. 
2. Waszirik, TDA, 161, says: 11 ••• it TSOy no means certain that 
the soul is really invisible to the flesh under every circum-
stance." 
3·. De Anima, VIII, v. 7. De Anima, IX, v. 
4• De Anima, IX, v. 8. Rashdall, IA, 253. 
5. Translation by Holmes, 'vVT, II, L!23. 9. Williams, IFO, 234. 
6. Translation by Waszink, TDA, 163.10. See Esser, ST, 49· 
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One p roblem suJP.Hari ze s the v.rhole d i f fi c ulty 1'Ji t h the a r gu-
ment advance d by Tertul l ian he re : Is the soul p erc e p tible by 
se n se or not? The answ·er is , unf ortunately , t h at it seeras to 
d e p end on h is context. In De ~nima, the soul ' s corp oreality is 
d emonstrated b y t h e a1leo;ed fact that it is se en and touched in 
a vision, but in De Car . Chr ., its i nvisibility is a p roof f o r 
i ts ilmnor-i:;ality •1 Now the soul c annot be both i nvi sible and 
v isible, sensible and n on-sensible. Esser ' s sugge stion , fol -
l owing Tertulli an 1 s own words , that it is p os s i ble t o see the 
soul with ll geistig en 112 e y es is of no help , f o r the prob l em is 
not what vm mi ght see in the next v1orld but what in fa c t we d o 
se e in this uorld . Can the soul be s e en as corp oreal here and 
n o\': ? At least, Tertullian d oe s not claim t hat i t c an be ex-
p erienc ed a s corp oreal . Yet the ansvver is obviou s that it can 
be neither experienced nor p ei•ceived as c orp oreal , and his am-
big uity indi c ates t h at b.e h a d different objects in mind in De 
Anima than i n De CEtr . Ch r. 
The fact that this vie'n of the soul as corporeal is con-
fiT•ro.ed on l y by strang e interp ret a t i ons of Scripture, insupp o r -
tab l e arguments self - evidently i l log ical, and an unverifiable 
vision must necessarily leave the reader disappointed . '.'D.1.en he 
s p eaks of the po s sible visibility of the s oul under c ertain c on-
ditions in order to furt h er v a lida te his theory , and y et re cog -
__ nizes t hat this expe rience h as never occurred, t h is a ppeal to 
ignorance is one of the weakest s p ot s in the whole treatise . 
There is no small amount of mirth in Waszink's observation that 
i Tertullian's theo1~r of corpor~al bmnateriality is highly unique 
Jin t he history of philosophy. Yet, as Esser pointed out, the 
I concept of the soul as corporeal was very influential on all of 
JTertullian's subsequent ideas in rational psychology, and all 
! these, including especially the Christian doctrine of immortal-
ity, were developed in consonance with it as much as possible. 2 
I
IHowever, Esser's view reverses the true order. 
ilnterested in the concept of the corporeal soul 
Tertullian was 
primarily be-
cause it could be used as an ultimate ground for arguments on 
immortality, and in the process, the theory of the corporeal 
soul was made to fit this prior consideration. 
It is also important to remember that in the corporeality 
1
1 
of the soul as well as the body, Tertullian thought he had a II 
j potent and conclusive anti-docetic argument, since now the A6yosJI 
I 3 i· 
could be more easily affirmed as a real substance. The doctrinl '' 
eould also fit into his interests 1:!1 the 0hristian view of resu !
1 
1rection;4 at least it is not incompatible with it. 
I 
! realism for the moment ignored, 
However, all these possibilities aside, and his basic naive 
I it is probable that the primary 
justification for the theory of the corporeal soul was its abil-
ity, so Tertullian thought, to refute heretical views which en- I 
dangered Christian irrrrnortali ty. The first main ai•gument for im-
1 , ~1-.-E--s_s_e_r-,~S~T, 49· 
3. Lebreton and Zeiller, HPC, II, 834 suggest this. Esser, ST, 
2. VJaszinlk, TDA, 177 and also 161. 
1 
I 
ll.j-2 seems to agree. Cf. Adv. Prax., VII and~~ar_. _qp.r.,XII 
4. Glover, CR, 346 suggests this. I 
I 
So 
ll 1 
Jmortality is the traditional Platonic one of the indivisible sub-
l stance necessarily being immortal. The examination of this argu 
ment includes Tertullian's views on the unity, powers and ra-
l tionality of the soul. 
~~ ii. __ The_ qrst a~ent for immor~ality: the unity of the 
j' soul. --Tertullian does not introduce his :material on the unity 
I and simplicity of the soul as overt arguments for its imrnortal-
i ty. Hmv·eve r , Waszi!"l.k1 and Esser2 agree that the argument for 
1  the ro ul' s unity is primarily for i rrrrnortality, and Tertullian 
1
. I -
i 
ihimself organizes his arguments in such a fashion trzt any other 
1i conclusion is unlikely. This and the next section, however, 
1
are really sbmewhat indecisive on the whole in both logic and 
J evidence ·when taken as arguments for immortality. Esser has 
observed, 11 Zusarnrnenhangende Beweise fUr die Unsterblic1L1-cei t Eler 
Seele bietet Tertullian nicht."3 He also suggested that the 
following arguments for the unity of t he soul which Tertullian 
! advances are unique in Christian philosophy, and that they are 
superior even to Plato and Aristotle here. The significance of 
his view is somewhat undermined when, as Chapter V will show, 
1most of the se 
!had an avowed 
!original with 
arguments were taken from various thinkers who 
affinity with the Stoics, and were not really 
Tertullian at all. 
II 
Tertullian begins by observing that against the claims of 
certain philosophers (Galen and Aristotle)4 who want to separate 
1. Waszink , TDA, 209 in his paraphrase of De Anima, XIV, i. 
2. Esser, ST, 82, 88. 
J. Esser, ST, 84. 
1~. Waszink, TDA, 183, 186, and not Tertullian, specifies them. 
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the life-breath from the soul, it must be asserted here that 
1 
spiritus and anima are inseparable. The opposition has proceed 
·' ed mainly by implying that since some animals do not breathe 
or do not have organs of respiration, the soul and breath must 
be different entities. However, Tertullian replies that it is 
not valid to reason from the nature of animals to the na ture of 
man, 2 nor is it true that all respiration is perceptible3 or 
that all respiratory organs are perceptible.4 
He continues by saying that because "to breathe" is proper 
for anything "to live, 11 breathing and living are syno:nomous and 
inseparable, 5 just as not-breathing is proper to the not-living. 
This means that there are not two substances, breath and soul, 
but one. He does suggest that " •.• they may [have been] ••• sub-
6 
stances which have grown together, 11 but it is much better to 
speak of the soul as the substance and the breath as an attri-
bute in the sense of a function or operation. 7 However, the 
soul may be called spiritus quite justly by reason of its pri-
mary function of breathing. 8 
We claim this operation for the soul, which we 
acknowledge to be an indivisible simple substance, 
and therefore we must call it spirit in a defin-
itive sense--not because of its condition, but 
of its action; not in respect of its nature, but 
of its operation; because it respires, and not 
1. De Anima, X, viii. 
2. De Anima, X, i-iii. 
J. De Anima , X, vii. 
5. De Anima, vii-viii. 
6, De Anima, X, ix, trans. Waszink , TDA, 181. 
7•· De Anima, X, ix. Holmes, WT, II, ~-33 translates distinguit 
substantias opera as 11 operation. 11 
8. De Anima, X, ix, XI, i. 4. De Anima, X, v. 
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because it is spirit in any special sense. 1 
I 
I Hermogenes had claimed that the special spiritus added to 
I 
the soul after it was created is really a spirit natural to it.2 
e Tertullian replies that this spiritus, as with Adam, is an acci-
Jdens and not naturalia of the sub stantiafr corporeal sou1. 3 
~~ Neither the spirit of God nor that of the devil are naturally 
!planted in the soul; both are post-natal additions; si solam, et 
il simplicem et uniformem substantiae nomine, atgue ita non aliunde 
lspirantem quam ex substantiae suae sorte.4 j 
e 
I The same problem is faced when Tertullian examines the mind 
1
1 (~, animus' vov~): is it another substance or a divisible part 
of the soul?;; Again Tertullian asserts that mind is nothing 
I 
more than a faculty or power (suggesttun animae) of the soul; ' 
it is quite analagous to the relation of spiritus to anima. 
1 Mind is primarily the active, impelling power of the soul 
and is not outside the soul as a separate agent or substance. 6 
Yet the mj_nd, as the soul, must be passible in order to allow 
for the reception of sense data. 7 In fact, both must be active 
or passive together since they are one substance; Aristotle's 
8 
1concept of active agent intellect thus cannot be accepted. He 
1. 
2. 
J. 
4-;;. 
6. 
7. 
I 
IJ 
De Anima, XI, i, trans. Holmes, \i:'T, II, 1.~33. 
Cf. Adv. Herm., XXXIII with De Anima, XI, ii. 
De .Anima, XI, iii-v. See also Waszink, TDA, 197. 
De Anima, XI, vi. 
De Anima, XXI, i. It is interesting to note here that, ac-
cording to Waszink, TDA, 2Ql., the translation of tifxv1 by 
anima was effected by Apuleius only about a half-century be-
fore Tertullian wrote De Anima. 
De Anima, XII, vi. Esser, ST, 102-103 observed: 111 Anima' be-
zeichnet die Einheit der Substanz, der 1 an.imus' ist ihr Werk-
zeug, nicht ihr vorgesetzt." 
De Anima, XXI, iii. 8. De Anima, XII, v, XVIII, vii • 
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concludes: Hos aut em animm:1 ·ita clici l~].US animae concretum, non ut 
b . !- • 1' d t b ' t . ~f' . . 1 su s-can-~_,1a a lllin, se u sus-can J.ae oi_ l CJ.tun. 
Of t h e t wo, mind and soul, the latter is the s uperior, jus t 
as t he substance is more i mport ant t han the a t tributes, t h e sub-
2 j ect mor 0 t h an t h e funct ions. Te rtu llian appeals to common 
sense as further suppOl"t for his p osition and says that because 
men often r efer to t h e whole man a s a 11 s ou l 11 a nd seldom as a 
11mincl, 11 and Scripture does the s arne , t h e soul is cle arly more 
important than t h e mind . 11 So vve l'ilay b e ce r tain that soul is 
mox•e irnport ant, inde e d, and t h at it s substan ce forxnsa unity , 
which u ses the mind as an instrurnont. 113 
By t h ese argumentr.'l f or the unity and s implicity of the soul . 
t hat is, t hat breatl:.. and mind are not separate substances, Ter-
tulli an establ ishes the view t hat the sou l is not sep arable , mul ~ 
t i p l e , or d issolub l e , b u -;:; lilce any real unity, i s inde structible.L 
However, t h e unity of the soul is not fully e s tablish ed unt il it 
so-c 8.llecl "faculties 11 are s een to be activities of t h e one sub -
s tance . .4.gainst the division of the soul into p o.rts (partes) by 
Plato, Zeno an d others, Tertullian t akes an Aristotelian vievf .5 
Such divisions ••• ought not to b e re garded so much 
:r;arts of t h e soul, as 1:) 0\Vers, or faculties, or 
operations t hereof •.• For they are n ot p ortion s 
or org anic p arts of the s oEl' s sub stan ce, but 
f unctions of t h e soul--such a s those of moti on, 
of action, of thought, and Vlhatsoevei' oth0rs 
--------1 . De Anima, XII, vi . "1Se, h owever, say t h at t h e mind and soul 
coalesce, not as sep a l"a te subst ances, but the o:o.e a s t h e f'tm-
d amental ftmction of t h e oth el''. 11 
2 . De Anima, XIII, i. 
J. De .A.l!.ima , XI I I, i ii, trans. Viaszink, TDA, 2 06 . Cf. Iilatt. X, :;c...--z\ili 
LJ. . De Anima, XIV , i . 
r.:: De .it.l'"li ma . XIV. i i • 
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they divide in this manner; such, likewise, as 
the five senses themselves ••• l 
All these parts ought to be called faculties (ingenia), powers 
? / 2 (efficaciae, ~vEpy~l~l), or operations (opera) of the one soul 
substance. 
Tertullian further insists that all these powers are in-
herent in the soul at birth and are not acquired or added by ex-
perience, nor can they be increased in substance, 3 although they 
can function more smoothly. 
As one of his arguments against Platonic, Pythagorean and 
Empedoclean transmigration, he considers the faculty or power of 
memory. He observed that while the soul has the power of memory 
this is similar to the other faculties of mind. However, the 
soul notoriously has far from an infallible memory. This Ter-
tullian takes to be proof of the fact t h at the soul did not come 
from God's spiritus, which would make it divine. If it were 
divine, it could not err in recollection, which in fact it does! 
However, while the soul often does forget what it has learned, 
it never forgets what is natural to it, i.e., to exercise its 
faculties and powers. More contemporary language would say that 
these natural functions are instincts or inherent activities of 
the soul, whereas the unique content and behavioral expressions 
of the 11 soul 11 are influenced by various contingencies. This is 
1. De Anima, XIV, iii, trans. Holmes, WT, II, 439· 
2. De Anima, XIV, iii. See Waszink, TDA, 215. 
3. De Anima, XIX, i, XX, i. 
~-· De Anima, XXIV, i-iii. Tertullian pokes insults at Plato, 
whom he--claims invests the soul with practically divine 
p owers in his theory of recollection. 
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,I 
I 
I 
1also t he primary example of the difference between naturalia and 
1 
accidentia. 
Actually , where a s Tertullian has a lot to say about breatll, J 
mind, senses, etc., h e has practically nothing to say systema-
tic ally about memory. It is not possible even to s ay with con-
jfide.nce t hat he regarded it as a function of the s oul com.parab le 
i 
to t h e others. Waszink suggests only t h at it is part of t he 
naturalia of the sou1. 2 
One problemr occurs in connection with the last section 
which i mperils his whole ar gument. Tertullian has made the dis-
~tinction of substance, nature, attributes or povvers, and ac-
1 cid~nt s. The first instance of an attribute or power of the 
soul is its respiration.· This is tPuly part of its nature, and 
J is thus insepaPable from its substance. But hovr far is the sub-
l ject separable from its functions? If the soul exists after 
respiration has ceased, then it must be highly separable, for 
resp iration without a body is inconceivable. The complex prob-
lem of the separabilfty of the agent from its actions did not 
occur to Tertullian. 
Two more topics must be dealt wit h to insure the unity of 
the soul, and Tertullian now turns to those philosophers who 
have held that the "supreme principle of vitality and intelli-
jgence,n "the ruling power of 3 ' t / the soul, 11 "t"O Y)TE-~OVIK.OV , and 
1- -----
1
1. 
2. 
3· 
De Anima, XXIV, iv-vii. 
Waszink, TDA, 313. 
De Anima, XV, i, reads: .•• smmnus in anima gradus vitalis et 
sap ientialis, quod ~T~~OV\KOY appellant; trans. iiolmes, WT, 
J.I, L\40. 
I 
I 
1 
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the irrational part of the soul as not really functions of a 
single substance as he himself holds. 
Regarding the ruling part of the soul, he claims that most 
philosophers, in their denial of this principle, have affirmed 
it by locating it in another faculty, or have denied the soul 
1 T ~ 
altogether. his principle has been affirmed in Holy Scripture 
as residing in that "most precious part of our body,"3 which as 
Epicurus observed correctly is the heart.4 This does not mean 
that the blood is the 11 seat 11 of the soul, howevev: 
\ ( / 
But Tertullian's emphasis on To YJYE-t"tOVIKOV, 'aas ... fiihren-., 
der Seelenteil, 11 .5 is wholly misleading in De Anima; the func-
tion of this concept is negligible to the interest in the trea-
tise. He probably considered the problem at length because it 
was found so fully treated by the physicians, one of whom was 
Soranus, Tertullian's guide for this portion of De Anima as 
elsewhere (as Chapter V will discuss later).6 
The problem of Tertullian's concept of reason (ratio) in 
De Anima is a difficult one, and is invariably complicated in 
critical literature by the prior observation of the position 
which he takes in De Car. Chr. and De Praes. Haer., which sup-
posedly argue for his irrationalism, making any concept of 
reas on ancillary, subordinate, or sheerly contradictory to his 
11. 
1 a. 
2. 
4· 
De Anima, XV, i-ii. 
De Anima, XV, iv, trans. Holmes, WT , II, 441. 
Tertullian suggests Prov., XXIV, xxii; Matt., IX, iv; Rom.,X,x 
Waszink, TDA, 541 cautions that Tertullian does not regard 
the blood as the soul or even as the "seat" of the soul; his 
view is less obviously materialistic than this position. 
;;. Esser, ST, 114-117. 
6. Waszlnk, TDA, 219. 
87 
overwhelmingly 11 obviousn irrationalism. Only Lovejoy and Boas 
l do not co~~it this error. The last chapter indicated that this 
position ought not to be held because it contradicts passages in 
De Anima, or at least, if. not contradicting them, renders their 
interpretation incompatible with his other writings. This prob-
lem is caught up in Tertullian 1 s analysis of irrationality, and 
only by understanding his prior c oncept of the soul as rational 
(rationale) can his exclusion of irrationality be intelligible. 
The basic passages and their translation are as follows: 
Naturale enim rationale credendum est, quod 
animae a primordia sit ingenitum, a rationali 
videlicet auctore.2 
For it is the rational element of the soul 
which it is believed to be innately in its ori-
gin from its Author, Himself manife stly rational. 
Definimus animam ••• rationalem.3 
We define t h e soul as rational. 
Quid enim nfin rationale, quod deus iussu quoque 
edideri t ••• 
~what is not rational which God himself also 
sends forth ':by his conrrnand? 
Credimus enim, si quid est natura# rationale 
alioguod otus dei esse.$ 
For we bel eve that if nature is anything, it 
is a reasonable work of God. 
From these, it is clear that Tertullian in De Anima felt 
t hat (1) God is rational, (2) all his creation is rational, 
(3) nature is rational, and (4) the human soul, a part of nature 
1. It is gratifying to observe that the most recent writers all 
agree that the place and function of reason in Tertullian has 
been sadly underestimated. Foremost among these are Lovejoy, 
EHI, 317, and Boas, EPI, 19. Copleston, HP, II, 24, Ferm, 
Art. ( 1950), 14 7 and DeWolf, RRAR, L~2 all move ih this direc-
tion, although none of them really analy ze these texts. 
2. De Anima, XVI, i, in Waszi~~ , TDA, 20, lines 11-13. 
3. De Anima, XXII, ii, in Waszink, TDA, 31, lines 7, 9· 
~-· De Anima, XVI, i; in Waszink , TDA, 20, lines 13-14. 
5. ne-Anima, XLIII, vii, in Waszink, TDA, 59, lines 24-25. 
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which itself is created completely and wholly by God, is innatel , 
rational. The general significance of this concept of reason in 
De Anima will be traced in the next section on epistemology, but 
upon these passages turns the refutation of Tertullian's syste-
matic epistemological and metaphysical irrationalism or anti-
rationalism, and his exclusively legalistic, apologetic and anti 
gnostic interests and limitations. 
Concerning the rational and irrational parts of the soul, 
Tertullian makes a different distinction than the one of sub-
stance and functions. 1 The soul is not divided into any parts 
--even rational and irrational as Plato holds--for the soul is 
by nature rational. However, the fact that irrationality does 
exist cannot be denied. But it is not part of the nature of the 
soul, which proceeds from a wholly rational creator. Tertul-
lian' s conclusion,isthat irrationality is in the nature of an 
2 
added quality, a "second nature. 11 Irrationale autem posterius 
est, ut quod acciderit ex serpentis instinctu ••• 3 
The irrational element ••• we must understand to 
have accrued later, as having proceeded from the 
instigation of the serpent--the very first achieve-
ment of the (first) transgression--which thence-
forth became inherent in the soul, and grew with 
its growth assuming the manner by this time of a 
natural development, happening a~ it did immedia-
tely at the beginning of nature.~ 
Therefore, irrationality does not proceed from God nor is it a 
part of the soul's substance or n ature, but is from the devil 
1. De Anima, XVI, i. 
2. Waszink, TD.A, 230. 
J. De Anima, XVI; i, in Waszink, TDA, 20, lines 1.5-16. 4· De Anima, XVI, i, trans. Holmes, ~~' II, 442-443· 
I 
who first instigated sin. 
The solution to the problem of irrationality and its rela-
tion to the earlier view that the soul is a corporeal substance 
and that irrationality is u second nat"t1I'e" to the soul, does not 
solve the problem of the relation of reason and irrationality at 
all. But for Tertullian's purposes, it is sufficient since it 
obviat e s further discussion since the unity of the soul is pre-
served. 
As has been the case before, Tertullian 1 s reasoning which 
establishes his position is suspect. Apparently, the soul is 
rational because God, its creator, is rational. Tertullian pre-
sumably holds to the view that the effects cannot be less than 
the cause, at least the creation of God cam1ot be inferior to 
his rational interests. But how God is knovm to be rational, 
how n atural and moral evil are possible with this kind of God 
who is wholly rational and who imparts this rationality to his 
creatures, is an obscure n1ystery in De Anima, unless the theory 
of the devil as God's adversary is accepted. One easily in-
clines to the view that for Tertullian, this emphasis on ra-
tionality was in part rhetorical and sophistic device to predi-
cate every possible attribute of God which might add to his 
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glory, without his ever really attempting to understand the prob l 
lems of the relation of God, the soul, and reason, error and evi1 • 
However, the main object of this protracted analysis was to 
! illustrate Tertullian's first argmaent for immortality. The sou 
is established as a corporeal and substantial and unified en-
I 
I 
tity, that much is clear. But does Tertullian draw the conclu-
sion that these lead to immortality?1 No. Instead (cf. Refer-
ence Outline), following a stumnary list of all the faculties of 
~ the soul which he has established (De Anima, XXII), he turns to 
his genetic psychology . Much Ja ter in the argument, some twen-
ty-five chapters, Tertullian does observe that the immortality 
of the soul has been established by the argument for its indi-
visibility. But he actually begs the question, for he says, 
Cert·e.rum anima indi visibilis, u·t imm.ortalis ••• 2 This, taken 
with the earlier passages, suggests that it is the Platonic 
arguments in the Phaedo which Tertullian is surreptitiously re-
constructing.3 
V~at conclusion can be made in spite of this incompleteness 
of De Anima itself? Tertullian has obviously been following in 
outline the basic argument for i~nortality by first establishing 
the soul as a substance and a unity, which makes it indissoluble 
But in preference to the Platonic arguments for indissolubility 
of the soul from its immateriality, Tertullian took Stoic argu-
ments that if anything is a real substance, and to be real is to 
be corporeal, then, since no substance is corruptLble, that sub-
stance, . if .. the soul, is immortal. 
Only one criticism need be made here, for it is sufficient 
r:-lt will be recalled that in connection with De Censu Animae, 
it was observed that Tertullian often terminated important 
arguments in De Anima because he had given their conclusions 
in the earlier work. The present case is a disastrous in-
stance of this, for as Waszink, TDA, 7°, 297 observes on De 
Anima, XXII, ii, "thus, •.• we do not kno-v"l the grounds on which 
Tert.· defended the immortality of the soul." 
2. De Anima, LI, v, in Waszink, TDA, 69, lines 22-23. · 
i ~..a aJso De Anima VII v X i x:r:v. i. and cf. Phaedo. 80 B 
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I 
I 
I 
-lito strike at the heart of Tertullian 1 s position. Ferm is cer-
tainly wrong when he says that "How a soul could be both corpor-
eal and indivisible did not seem to bother him, 111 for the last 
section indicates that it did concern him. His extensive argu-
ments against all the major philosophers of antiquity, especial-
lly Plato, are unjustly overlooked by Farm's statement. But what 
Ferm really indicates, and correctly, by his statement is that 
in sni te of 'l1ertullian 1 s elaborate and frequently sophistic and 
,illogical arguments, he has not established his position that a 
corp oreal substance is indivisibleand therefore immortal, nor 
has he established his thesis in the first place that experience 
reveals the soul to be corporeal. In his second argument for 
immortality, it is doubtful w~her Tertullian is on much better 
!grounds, for here he also fails to e~tablish his position. 
I 
J1 iii. The second argument for irmnortality: the activity of 
the soul.--The actual course of the argument in De Anima, as men 
tioned above, leads into genetic psychology. However, the logic 
of Tertullian's position requires that the examination be turned 
to a later portion of the treatise which deals with his second 
argument for immortality from the activity of the soul. 
I The soul is an active substance, i.e., its nature is expre& 
i 
sed in activity, and this activity is found in two areas of 
phenomena: knovling (discussed in the next section) and .dreaming, 
the latter of which is the real proof for the continual activity 
of the soul, 2 and the second method of proving the imn10rtality 
1. Ferm, Aft• (19.50), 1l1B and also Copleston, HP, II, 2.5. 
2. See De Anima, XLIII, v, XLIV, iii. 
I 
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e . 
of the soul, ·which may have some very remote affinity to a basic 
1 Aristotelian argument for immortality.-
Tertullian initiates his exa~ination of dreams and death 
by discussing sleep in general. He opposes the definitions of 
sleep as supernatural or beyond comprehension, a weariness of 
the soul, a cooling of the animal spirits, or a separation of 
2 
the soul and its spirit. Sleep must be defined as a s~spension 
of t he bodily activity~~ while the soul remains active, as was 
held by the Stoics. 
Superest, si forte, cum Stoicis resolutionem sen-
sualis vigoris somnum dete~inemus, quia corporis 
s olius quietam procuret, non et animae.3 
Tertullian continues that sleep is. a natural activity of th~ 
soul, hence it is rational and the work of God.4 Sleep is salu-
tory and he althy, for during sleep the body recuperates its 
lost energles. Sleep is indispensible for health and life. 5 
Sleep may also be included in the group of natural functions 
with drinking and eating . The argument ex scriptura sacra is 
that Adam showed how closely related sleeping, eating and drink-
ing are when he slept even before he ate and drank in Genesis 
II, xxi.6 In a way, the temporal priority of sleep here ma.kes 
it even more natural than those activities which followed it. 7 
He next devotes a good deal of effort to combatting the 
1. See Aristotle, De Anima, III, v, 430 a 24. Essel", ST, 56-87 I 
seems to believe that this is really a Platonic argument, too 
2. De Anima, XLIII,i-iv, xii. 
~: De Anima, XLIII; v, in Waszink, TDA, 59, lines 12-14. De Anima, XLIII, vii. 
s. De Anima, XLIII, viii. 
6. De Anima, XLIII~ ix. ... 
·' 468. 
· 7. De Anima, XLIII, ix. See waszink, TDA~ 
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~iew that sleep is a separation of the soul and the body, and 
that it is p ossible for the soul to wander about while the body 
is sleeping. The legend of Her.motimus, who supposedly did this, 
1 
must be erroneous. Waszink suggests at this point that Tertul-
lian argues as he does because if it were p ossible for the soul 
to leave the body before death, there would be little signifi-
cance to the Ch~i$tian view of the resurrection of the flesh.2 
This conclusion is supported further by 'rertullian r s own 
~rords that sleep is the image of death (imaginem mortis )3 and a 
symbol of the resurrection.4 The activity of the soul, which 
cannot be suspended by sleep, confirms the view that the soul, 
does not and cannot cease to live, i.e., to be active.5 
.Animam enim ut semper mobilem et semper exer-
ci tam nunquam succidere~l:-eti__, ___ alienae _scilicet 
a statu imrnortalitatis; nihil enim immortale 
finem operib sui admittit, somnus autem finis 
est operis. 
Through sleep, the soul learns to anticipate death;"[sleep ] ••• 
for the soul serves as a preparati on for its 'future absence' 
after death (from the body J. u7 
The 11motion of the soul" to which Tertullian refers are 
dreams. He finds ifro:t from the existence of dre:ams, the immor-
1. De Anima, XLIV, iii. Tertullian takes great pains to refute 
tri'is tale of Hermotimus of Klazomenae, whose body was cre·-
mated while his soul was (supposedly ) absent during sleep. 
2. See Waszink , TDA, 474. 
3. De Anima , XLIII, x, xii, LVIII, iii. 4. De Anima, XLIII, xi. 
,5. De Anima, XLIII, v, · xii. 
6. De Anima, XLIII, v. "For the soul, a l ways in motion and aJ::-
ways in motion and always agitated, never succumbs to rest, 
which is obviously a condition foreigh to inrrnortality: for 
nothing immortal allows an end to its operation and sleep is 
an end of operation."' 
======lj=j...,~:=IW.~a3:i-MB::i&..--:~.:l-'Bk,, !1!-DA _)_~_7_1_ ..l'ln n"" Anima.., ,..XLll..l xi i 
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tality of the soul may be inferred. 1 Dreams are defined in De 
Anima as incidents of sleep (accidentibus somnis) and excitments 
of the soul (iactionibus animae). 2 There are no exceptions to 
the ability to dream. " .•• The inability to dream ••• is a vitium 
animae, which by no means can belong to the nature of the soul."~ 
The suggestions that children do not dream is not supported by 
11 the facts·. 4 Dreams operate by the power of the ecstasis ever 
since the time of Adam.5 
The analysis actually continues into the various types and 
causes o~ dreams (cf. Reference Outline), but it is not neces-
sary to follow here, and instead the analysis can move ahead to 
t h e topic of death. Death also introduces the concept of free 
will, which will be treated more carefully in the next chapter. 
Tertullian observes with evident satisfaction that the 
problem of death is .the final subject which needs. to be discus-
6 
sed in relation to the general topic of the soul. First, he 
examines the famous saying of Epicurus that death does not per-
tain to men because Quod enim dissolvitur ••• sensu caret; quod 
sensu caret, nih~~--~d nos. 7 He replies t hat this view, and the 
one of Seneca that Post mortem ••• omnia finiuntur, etiam i psa, 8 
confuse the~ruth with sophisms, although he does agree with 
1. De Anima, XLV, i. 
2 . De .Anima, XLV, i, in Waszinlc, TD.A, 62, lines 1-2. 
3. Waszink, TDA, 515, commentary on De Anima, XLIX. See also 
De Anima, XLIX, iii and Wasziru{, TD.A, 518. 4. De Anima, XLIX, i. 
5. De Anima, XI,V, iii. 
6. De Anima, L, i, XLVI, i, XLII, i, iii. 
7. De Anima, XLII, i, in Waszink, TDA, 58, lines 5-8. 
8. De Anima, XLII, ii, in Waszink , TDA, 58, lines 2-3. 
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Seneca and reads him (illegitimately)l as meaning that the 11 end 11 
of death is in bodily resurrection. 
Tertullian defnies death as the separation of the body and 
soul (disiunctio corporis animaeque; 2 discretio corporis animae-
que; 3 separatio: carnis atgue anirnae). L~ He insists that death 
is not natural, i.e., according to the nature of the soul as CI'e-
ated by God, but natural according to " ••• faults and circum-
stances which seem to have been •.• inseparable to us from our 
very birth, 115 again, the "second nature" of the soul. Man was 
not directly appointed to 
I 
die as a condition of his creation (i~ 
mortem directo institutus fuisset). 6 l ~~~--~~~~~~--~~~~~----
It can be shown that death r e sulted from the first man's 
use of his free will. And the choice made by Adam and Eve as 
•s 
free agents is just binding on their successors as is the real-
A 
ity of the effects of this act. 7 Tertullian argues from the 
other side that the intimate relationship betwe en the two sub-
stances, soul and body, which are born and live together in har-
mony, was not designed by nature to be sundered. 8 Hence, when 
Christians accept death as the debt to nature (mortem naturae 
debitum), 9 they mean that it is the result of the exercise of 
! 1. Although Seneca does depart from the traditional view of 
immortality as held by the Stoics, according to Zeller, HE, 
222-226, Tertullian's inference is not faithful to Seneca's 
meaning. Wasziru{, TDA, 459-460 does not observe this. 
2. De fu1ima, Y~II, ii, in Waszink, TDA, 38, line 19• 
3. De Anima, LI, i, in Waszink, TDA, 68-69, lines 32-1. 4· De Anima, LII, i, in Waszink, TDA, 70, line 11. 
5. De Aniia, LII, ii, trans. Holmes, WT, II, 525. 
6. De Anima, LII, ii, in Waszink, TDA, 70, lines 19-20. 
7. De Anima, L, ii, LII, ii. See also Waszink, TDA, 536. 
8. De Anima, LII, iii. 
9. De Anima. Ll ii, in Wasziru{, TDA, 67, line 25. 
1 
their free will within the contract established by God, and not 
ordained from the first. 1 Thus, irrationalism and death are fo 
Tertullian acts of "second nature" for the soul and not part of 
its·· primordial substance. 
He concludes his discussion by countering certain legenda 
and philosophic theories. After death, no soul remains in its 
body, for t he meaning or function of death is the separation of 
2 
body and soul. This is in no wise contradicted as Democritus 
supposed by the phenomena of hair and nails growing in the dead 
3 body, nor by a dead body failing to corrupt, which can be ex-
plained on a wholly natural basis. The inexplicable movements 
of dead Christians must not be interpreted as contradicting the 
fact that the soul leaves the body at death. These unnatural 
events must be attribted to miracles which do not affect the 
)t 
natural order of the soul's separation from the body. T The 
treatises closes with Tertullian's observation: 
Ad omnem, ut arbitror, humanam super anima opini-
onem ex _do~_!;rine f.:J:9-ei._copgressi iusta·e dumtaxat . 
ac necessariae curiositati satisfecimus; enormi 
autem et otiosae taStum deerit discere quantum 
libuerit inquirere. 
In this fashion Tertullian ends his second argument for im 
mortality from the uninterrupted activity of the soul. Certain-
ly , the principle upon which this argmnent is based is superior 
to tho previous one, for activity is a better predicate of sub-
1. Tertullian here refers to Gen., II, xvii, III, xix. 
2. De Anima, LI, i. Waszink, TDA, 526 translates QP.US asttfunc-
tion." 
3• De Anima, LI, vi-viii. Waszink, TDA, 533 has collected in-
stances-of this phenomenon which seems to bother Tertullian. 
De Anima, LI, ii-iv. 
ELAnim.a _, Was.z.i!l..k_ 
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stance than is body even these many centuries after Tertullian. 
But once again, his argument f alls short of the major point 
which it must establish. 
If the soul were always no:t · ofily ~ experienced · as active, but1 
could also be inferred as active when it is not experienced, the 
preceding argument for immortality wotild be on firmer ground. 
Tertullian thiru{s he has done this, but actually he has confused 
experience and inference. He overlooks the problem of how it is 
possible to admit the existence of two distinct states, sleep 
and consciousness, and iiifer that what is experienced in the latr-
ter is the same entity and activity vnLich is experienced in the 
former. The concept of the unconscious or subconscious self 
l did not occur to him, and by failing to be precise in his em-
piricism, h e was able to bridge the gap and obscure the exper-
iental difference between consciousness (experienced) and un-
consciousness (inferred). For, as some thinkers hold, if what 
I 
is not experienced is not conscious, then what is 11 exr:er ienced 11 
in sleep is certainly not 11 experiencedu in the same way as is 
waking conscious life. 
But even given the proof of the activity of the unconscious 
self, this is no proof of the unity of the self nor of the con-
tinual activity of the conscious self. Of course, Tertullian 
has no concept of self-awareness in either the Augustinian or 
1 Cartesian sense. But also, for him no distinction between 
1. Esser, ST , 1~_6-147 writes that personal identity is dranteec 
by self-consc i ousness for Tertullian. If this is so, "lt is 
not apparent in De Anima at all, any ·more than is the distinc ~ 
=====#====klll +;_m.G.- ~t-W.<iMn:l -G QU~usne.ss_and ~,e,lhc.on.s..c.i.o.us.nA s !'I 
selves or even of conscious states was possible if this distinc-
tion would mitigate against inm1ortality. Tertullian's assertior 
that sle ep was wholly natural and even rational was designed to 
remove any possible objections to the nocturnal dream activities 
of the soul as being other than of one piece with conscious ac-
tivity in thinking, etc. 
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Unfortunately, anothe r criticism mus t be made of Tertulliar 's 
argument for t he activity of the s oul. As Chapter I observed, 
he claims that ecstasy is an accidentia of the s01l, and not na-
t~rally part of it. However, here he has claimed that the power 
whereby the mind is active during sleep is it s own internal ec-
static energy . As Waszink has observed, Tertullian apparentl¥ 
did not notice that he had given an inconsistent account of the 
concept of ecstasy and because of this did not show that the 
nocturnal activity of the soul is a self-activity, thus greatly 
weakening his argument a s outlined above. 1 
3. Epistemology. 
Problems regarding how the soul l~ows anything, including 
itself, were certainly not viewed as of primary importance in 
De Anima, except in so far as answers to these problems could be 
included in the wider refutat ion of heretical epistemological 
theories. Tertullian replied to the heretics because the Chris-
tian doctrines of resurrection and Christology were in danger; 
but his replies constitute an unsystematic and incomplete epis-
temology . 
1. Waszi~~ , TDA, 481-482. 
i. Tertullian's view of nature and common-sense.--The last 
section has observed frequent appeals to nature or common sense 
whi ch Tertullian makes in his arguments for the superiority of 
the soul over the mind, the definition of sleep , etc., as the 
criteria whereby these views are to be judged. This is very im-
portant and joins with the quotations adduced regarding the ra-
tionality of the soul by nature to continue the examination of 
ITertullian's irrationalism in epistemology. 
Permeating De Anima is the uncritical emphasis on the na-
tural power of the soul to find unmistakably true answers to al-
l 
most any problem; the soul (naturally Christian) needs no specia 
guide to truth because truth is na.turally.,;: accessible to it, al-
though in a sustained inquiry concerning the difficult topic of 
the soul revelation does help Chri~ian readers. In De Anima, 
II, v, Tertullian observes th~ simple problems can be solved 
in psychology without the aid of Scripture, and he invariably 
quotes Scripture only for his Christian readers; others must ac-
cept his logical arguments. This may be one reason why argu-
ments ex scriptura sacra follow and do not precede the logical 
arguments (cf. Reference Outline). The power for this natural 
knowledge is common sense, the sensus communis. Seldom termed 
as such in De Anima, it still approximates the view as held 
throughout Stoicism. 
The scope and meaning of the sensus communis in De Anima in 
general is confusing; the indication is th~ the concept is used 
1. See the sympathetic account of the anima naturaliter chris-
tiana in ~~cKinnon, CC, 470-471. 
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inconsistently. The definite meaning of the term itself is not 
altogether clear from De Anima, although Waszink's translation 
J of publico sensu as 11 conmion sense ••• which God has deigned to en-
1 dow the ro ul, tt does i mply a universal endowment of mankind en-
abling the discernment of certain perva sive and indubitable 
truths. It is to be noted that Tertullian seldom appeals to 
rea son (ratio) when he wishes to object t ·o some erronaous belief . 
instead, h e appeals to common sense, 2 which seems to be as good 
if not better than reason. 
At this point, one wonders what the relation of common 
I 
sen se is t o Christian authority as the criterion of truth and 
what the relation of common sense is to n ature as rational. 
Regarding the first, the comments of Gerhard Esser, hereto-
fore ignored or inade quately presented, are worthy of mention. 
Esser suggests that Tertullian recogni zed two sources ru~d cri-
teria of truth , reason and revelation, which relate respectively 
3 to na tura l and supernatural knowledge. He criticizes Haus-
child 's view, widely held by others, that Tertull ian recognized 
1 only the supernat ural knowledge in the Chrsitian t radition as 
va l id 1mowl edge,4 essentially t h e argument of Gilson. 5 Esser 
categorically denies the view, accompanied with many references 
1. See the references to Tertullian's use of t his concept in De 
Anima. i n Waszink , TDA, 163, 173, 175, 183, 206, 207, 337, 
455, 454 , L1B8, 513. 
2. Wa.szink, TDA, 97,translation of De Anima, II, i. 
3. Esser; ST, 16. 
~- · Esser, ST, ·17. 5. See Gilson, RID~, 8, 11. 
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from Tertullian's writings,l t hat Tertullian held t h e natural 
knowledge of God and nature to conflict with the revealed know-
ledge of God and nature. 11 The world of outer experience and in-
ner consc i ousness--the psychological and c osmological facts--are 
2 the basis of our natural knowledge of God.u However, Te rtullia ~ 
do e s maintain a distinction between knowledge arrived at by na-
ture and by authority . 3 Christianity possesses the "higher" and 
completer knowledge; it is the work of grace, mightier t han all 
nature, the act of the Holy Spirit. 4- It reveals the God beyond 
Jnatural knowedge. 5 Tertullian does not deny natural or philo-
sophical knowledge, either, but as ever y philosopher from Philo 
to Spinoza, ins isted that t hey were not capable of answering t he 
greatest questions, viz., how shall man be saved, 1·vh o created 
6 
the universe, etc., f or which revelat ion had be en provided. 
~bile Ess er's analysis is correct, t here can be no real 
'doubt t hat Tertul lian preferred an enlightened Christian reason 
to an unenlightened worldly reason i n all matters, even though 
7 he does not reject the latter. "Ch ristianity is to him ••• the 
true philo s mphy as distinguished f rom the false philosophy of 
Greece and Rome, and a revel ation from God as distinct from the 
8 
wisdom of men. 11 Still, the two, Christ ianity and true n atural 
1. Esser, sT, 16 lists Adv. Mar., I, x, II, iii, v; De Test. An. 
V, VI and De Anima, II, XIV, XXVI. 
2. Esser, ST, 172. 
3. He refers to De Anima, XI and Adv. 1·/Iar., V, vii. 
4• Esser, ST, 20-21. Cf. Adv. Ma~xx. 
_5. Esser, ST, 23. 
6. See Wolfson , PHI, I I , 470. 
7. See Boa s, EPI, 89. 
8 . Fuller, Art.(l887), 836. Cf. Esser, ST, 13-14 . 
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' reason, can exist together in harmony. Again, no "double truth" 
is even i magined. I 
Regarding the second question, it has been the object of an 
~ excellent analysis by Profes s or Lovejoy, corroberated by the 
work of Professor Boas, and mirroring critical observations b y 
1 
many previous students in De Anima, th at Tertullian's view of 
nature in the epistemological meaning of the term, is a basic 
part of his concept of truth, common sense and reason, and it is 
ultimately very difficult to point to any doctrine which if ar-
rived at naturally, is denied by Christian authority. Lovejoy 
observes that the passages in De Car. Chi'., which were discussed 
in the last chapter, mislead many cr:i.tics of Tertullian and caus~ 
them to 11 ••• obscure the other side of his doctrine, (viz.), the 
possession by every man of a rational f aculty, with t h e invari-
ant deliverances of which it is clearly impled that all other 
1 legitimate beliefs must conform. 11 Thus , in actual practice, 
nature is as much a ''norm" for Tertullian as is Christ ian au-
~ thority.-
The major clue which is given on the relation of nature and 
Christian revelation is that both natural knowledge and Chris-
tianity are nrevelations 11 implanted in man, the first innately 
and the second in t he Bible. Thus, returning to the first chap -
ter where it was pointed out that Tertullian held to the con-
~ tinual accretion of charismata, or a continual revelation , it is 
1. Lovejoy, EHI, 316. 
2. Glover, CR, 315 comrnented: "Nature is the original authority 
side by side ••• with the inspired word of God." 
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seen t hat Christianity is gradually providing the supplement to 
1 
nature by unfolding a more complete knowledge of God. 
The relation of nature to r ea son is the last point to be 
clarified, for nature is co~non sense, the natural knowledge of 
man (whatever unaided 11natural knowledge 11 really is~. Roberts 
observes, with quotations to back him up, t hat the two terms, 
"nature" and 11 reason, 11 are used 11 ••• interchangeably , and [ Ter-
tu.llian] pas ses imperceptibly from the one to the other. 112 This 
is one possible conclusion from the quotations listed in the 
preceding section on natui'al rationalit~y. The identity of na-
ture and reason in Tertullian is suggested by Lovejoy, who de-
scribes the "rational faculty 11 which man has innately as 11 ••• the 
acceptance of 'nature' as the norm of truth ••• in vnLich it stands 
for the organ or the content of a universal, intuitive and in-
. 3 
fallible knowledge. 11 However, 11 reasonn is now seen not to be 
at all what contemporary thinkers would mean by rationality, 
for no appeal to the so-called ''natural processes of thought 11 
would be regarded as sufficient (even though perhaps a necessary 
criterion of truth. For Tertullian, wi t h his amalgam of Stoic 
and Christian ideas~, to be reasonable meant to conform to com-
mon sense, a power which was given to men in the very structure 
of their souls by the Creator, the same Creator who later gave 
t h em Christianity. 
1. See Lovejoy~ EHI, 318-323. 
2. Robe~ts, TT, 221. 
3. Lovejoy, EHI, 316, 317. 
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ii. Sense perception and othe r epistemolo§bal topics.--
Equally fundamental and a bit more explicit in De Anima is Ter-
tullian's defense of sense perception as the primary source of 
knowledge concerning t h e external 'I.'Iorld . The emphasis on t h is 
theory seems clearly to be one of providing a defense of the 
testimony of the Apostles to Christ's resurrection; Tertullian 
1 
even admits this himself. It is because ot t his fact that it 
is unwise to over-emphasize t he philosophical significance of 
2 
his 11 sensationalism. 11 
Of course, in view of the di s cussion just concluded and al-
s o referring to Chapters I-II, it is ultimately permissible to 
spealr of De Anima as propoUnding only a 11 ••• part ial sensational-
istic theory of knowledge, 11 for at points of apparent conflict 
with Christian doctrine, e. g ., trinitarian theology, sense per-
ception is al way s under the guide of 11 ••• a supernatural doctrine 
' 
of revej.ation.u3 When the statements in Scripture seem to be 
contradicted by t he obvious conclusi ons of t he sensus communis 
and of sense perception, one assumes tha t Tertull ian either 
reexamines these conclusions or else discards them. It can only 
be restated that it was p recisely at the point of the Christolo-
gical doctrines that Tertullian vacillated between discarding 
nature and reason as criteria and appealing solely to Christian 
authority which propose s absurd but true doctrines. Or he might 
1. De Anima, XII, xiii. 
2. Esser, ST, 149. Throughout this thesis, the term, 11 sensa-
tionalismn refers to Tertullian epistemology as described 
in the f-ollowing pages. 
3. Rees, A~t.(l931), 389. He and Hagenbuch, THD, I, 150 agree 
that Ter tullian 1 s doctrine of sensational ism is ''the key to 
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try to make these doctrines reasonable and natural with the use 
1 
of 11 analogies of natural processes,n as his discussion on 
sleep and death wall used to illustrate resurrection. 
As elsewhere in De Anima, Tertullian begins his doctrine by 
attac1~ing the opposition. Sensation, i.e., the use :: of the 
senses in perception, has been unduly impugned by the heretics 
2 
and some philosophers, especially Plato. On the contrary, t he 
five senses are perfectly reliable and truly report the external 
world. 3 
The basic criticisms come from the Sceptics, who suggest 
that hallucinations are an instance of the unreliability of the 
senses. However, the errors of perception here are due to what 
Tertullian calls "insanity," a mental cause of error, and not 
4 
sensual. In all other instances where external objects are 
different than they are reported to be by our senses, Tertullian 
constructs an ingenious argument. 
The cause of error in each instance of imperfect perception 
is the object perceived, not the sense. For instance, when an 
oar seems bent in water, it is the water which has altered the 
light rays, sending forth a refracted image which is the cause 
of the error, instead of the eye failing to accomodate the 
··I 
I 
proper stimulus. For what the eye sees is exactly wbat it sh ouli 
1. See also Lovejoy, EHI, 317-318 where Tertullian 1 s plight in 
his self-constructed dilemma is discussed. 
2. De Anima, XVII; i. 
3. De Anima, XVII, x. 
L~. De Anima, XVII, ix. Waszink, TDA, 581 observes that " •.• Tert 
only denies the reality of what the apparition was thought to 
represent, not the existence ••• and perception of the phantom1' 
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see, i.e., there is a special cause for what in a different 
situation, e.g., an oar out of water, would be an erroneous 
perception. This example is typical of so-called deceptions in 
1 
sensation. 
In this way, then, there\cannot occur an illusion 
in our senses without an adequate cause. Now if 
special causes, (such as we have indicated), mis-
lead our senses, and (through the senses) our 
opinions also, then we must no longer ascribe the 
deceptions to the senses, which follow the specific 
causes of the illusion, nor to the opinions we 
form; for t hese are occasioned and controlled by 
our senses, which only follow the causes.2 
Christians, Tertullian piously asserts, have no right to 
doubt t h e perceptions of their senses, for if they did that, the r ~ 
would be reason for doubting the truths· concerning Christ's 
earthly existence which have been primarily verified through the 
testimony of the senses.3 
Tertullian should have held that anything which is experi-
enced is really in cons ciousness, but that a corresponding ob-
jective referent with independent existence beyond the mind it-
self, is not thereby proven. The fact that illusions exist can-
not be denied, although the Sceptics before Tertullian had cer-
tainly over-emphasized their i mportance; but the qualification 
that illusion has a 11 cause 11 and is therefore not really illu-
sion, is wholly misleading. The significant fact is that illu-
sions exist, and, whatever the cause, every internal state (con-
sciousness) need not really conform to external states (a sys-
tem of which defines "objective reality"). But this way of 
1. De Anima, XVII, v-x. 
2. De Anima, XVII, viii, trans. Holmes, V~ , II, 447. 
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I 
viewing illusions would have defeated his whole purpose, which 
was that of refusing to allow heretics or philosophers to make 
mere hallucinatory illusions out of basic Christian experiences. 
These illusmry sense perceptions are further explained away 
by Tertullian as he destroys the 11 faculty of opinbn, 11 the Epi-
~ 1 2 
curean 6o~~, which might argue against the unity of the soul, 
and then identifies its contents with those of the senses in 
which there can be no error. Illusory opinions disappear with 
illusory sense perceptions. But Tertullian has confused his 
view of opinio with Oo ~o<, 3 confused a distinction between an 
opinion as judgment and opinion as judging; he accidentall y and 
illegitimately discards the latter in his concern about the for-
mer. 
Follmwing this negative account, Tertullian 1 s positive doc-
trine of sensationalism is built arotund attacking the urrr1atural 
separation of sense and intellect in Platonism, which disparages 
both sensation and the natural unity of the soul and body, ther 
by also criticizing the Christian doctrine of the value of bo-
dily resurrection. This emphasis on the tunity of sense and in-
tellect, of body and mind, will appear in the next section on 
genetic p sychology, but it can also be · :seen in the present in-
stance. 
The separation of sensation from intellection which some 
philosophers have effected must be revised, Tertullian says. He 
11. De Anima, XVII, iv. 2. Waszimk, TDA, 244• 
3. Waszink, TDA, 2l~3-2L0+. 
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observes that the difference between the sense and intellect is 
not that of inadequacy and adequacy, but that of two different 
!operations of the soul with respect to two different orders of 
I 1 
objects. The objects of sensation are visible, tangible; the 
objects of intellection are invisible, intangible. 2 In the ac_. 
tual process of acquiring lcnowledge, the two faculties are not 
separated. It is only from abstract thought that they can be 
regarded as two unique and discrete powers. As Waszink obser-
ves, 11Tert. is afraid of separating sense-perception and mental 
act i vity. 113 
However, his position get:s ::-!more complicated. Regarding the 
differences of the objects of sense and intellect, it was said 
that it lies in their respptive corporalia and spiritualia . 
From this Tertullian concludes that the objects of the intellect 
may be considered more noble than those of sense, but that this 
does not imply an inequality of the respective faculties.4 Yet 
because the mind does pertain to spiritual objects, it is in a 
5 
sense higher than the senses. However, it is more important to 
observe that since all intellection depends on the prior act of 
sensation, this aspect of sensible priority argues even more 
cogently for its superiority over the mind. Tertullian thus 
grants a position of superiority and inferiority to each faculty 
in turn. The importance of the whole discussion, however, is 
1. De Anima, XVIII, vi, x . 
2. De Anima, XVIII, vii. 
3. !5e Anima, XVIII, vii and the conunent s by ~Vaszink , TDA, 138. 
L_ . De _iinima, XVIII, xi . 
s. De Anima, XVIII, x, XXIV, vii. 
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caught in Holmes's translation of t he closing passage: "Our 
present subject concerns the soul, and the point is to prevent 
the insidious ascription of a superiority to the intellect or 
understanding. 111 
From this discussion, Tertullian concludes to the following 
regarding the relation of sense and intellect: 
••• neque pre~ferendum sensui intellectum (per 
quod enim quid constat, inferius ipso est) neque 
separantdum a sensu {per quod enim quid e~t, cum 
ipse est).2 
One of the characteristics of the soul as a substance is 
t hat its natural faculties are not increased, but are part of 
its initial substance. Therefore, when some claim that the in-
tellectus is added to the child, for instance, as it grows older 
they are wrong. These powers do not follow one another genetica -
ly but are inseparable from birth.3 
Regardi ng his sensationalism, it need only be emphasized 
that when discussing the actual dynamic process of knowing and 
pe rceiving , Tertullian holds to a reciprocal relation of sense 
and mind as both functions of one soul. It is against the 
n ••• gnos tische T r en nun g des sensus vom intellectus 114 that 
he is constantly fi ghting, and consequently, his epistemology is 
1. De :Anima, XJ!III, xi, trans. Holmes, WT, II, L!-53, italics ad-
aed. For the confusion which Tertullian actually makes 
here, but which the above s~aary tr~es to avoid, see Waszink 
TDA, 254-255, 261-2p4, 266-267. 
2. De Anima, XVIII, xiii: "Neither is the intellect to be pre-
ferred to the senses as being superior to that t h rough which 
it exi sts, nor is it separable from the senses since that 
through which a thing is, is inseparably joined to it." 
3. De Anima, XIX, i. 4. Esser, ST, 148 . See also Lovejoy, EHI, 325-326. 
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centered around this one point in the knowledge process, 11 ••• eilln 
Moment, namlich die Zusa:mmengehorigkeit der sensitivem und inte1 
1 
lektiven,rr whereas their independence and difference is i gnored 
On this latter topic, the closing passages in De Anima are in-
teresting. Here Tertullian suggests a new vi ew regarding the 
sense and intellect. 
1Fv'hen death is completed, th¢re is reason to believe that 
the soul, now removed from the body, has a clearer vision as it 
passes from images to truths (ab imaginibus ad veritates). 2 
This must not be construed to mean that the body has been the 
charnel house of the soul as did Plato; the body is the temple 
of God.3 This does mean that the soul at death is " •.• by the 
L1 
very release [from the body] cleansed and purified, 11 rand that 
in this pure state it is ready to pass on to its appointed 
5 loq.ging place. 'rhis may be another instance of Tertul l ian' s 
itPl"'imitivism, 11 for this pure state of the soul after death is 
identical with its original pre~Fall state. 6 
Besides the vision at death, dreams are also a source of 
knowledge. Tertullian observes that most dreams which report 
true states of affairs come from God (although there are excep-
tions),? and proceed to men by means of the activity of the 
r.-Esser, ST, lli-9. See his excellent discussion on Tertullian 1 s 
e~istemology in ST, 141-182. 
2. De Anima, LIII, vi. 
J. De Anima, LIII, v. Tertullian compares Plato's Cratylus 400 C 
or Gorgia; L~93 A to I Cor. III, xvi and II Cor. VI, xvi. 
4. Holmes, W , II, 529. 
5. De Anima , LIII, vi. 
6. On .epistemological primitivism in Tertullian, see Boas, EPI, 
19, 89, and Lovejoy, EHI, 308-315. 
7. De Anima, XLVII, i. 
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Holy Spi rit. 1 In these latter dreams, there is undoubtedly 
truth on occasion, even thought sense perception is denied to 
2 
the soul during ecstasy. Many instances of ancient lor e sub-
stantiate the factualit y of 3 true dre runs; however, the 
oracles of pagans cannot be endorsed by Christians.4 
It has b een observed before t hat personal revelation in the 
form of ecstasy is difficult to evaluate in t h i s treatise, and 
its epistemological significance is limited to a fe w isolated 
statements, the mos t important of which is the vision of the 
corporeal body in De Anima, I X, viii. · Eve n in t h is famous in-
stance, it is probably true t hat the v i s i on was instanced to 
validate t he t heory , not vice-versa. 
When Tertullian actually turns to considering how the mind 
i s able to assimilate knowledge, he attacks the traditional 
,.. 
problem of Ari stotle 1 s active and passive vov~. He admits t h e 
necessity of distinct functions of t ,he soul wh ich activate and 
receive t h e sense impressions, but rle concludes that t here can 
be no ultimate separation of activities and passivities of the 
soul, the contrar y of the view from Plato and Aristotle dovvn to 
Averroes. This ar~~ent for the i mraortal active intellect 
sugges+s 
:tlili:!i: l;s : f an identity of t he soul, or part of it, with God, and 
Tertullian remains adamant in his denial on these grounds. .5 
1. De Anima, XLVII, ii refers to Joel, II, xxviii here. 
2. De Ariinia, XLVI ~ 111.; 
3. De Anima, XLVI; iii-xi. 
~ . De Anima, XLVI, xii-xii i . 5. See Jaeger; ARI, 49 on the Pl atonism in Aristotle, De Anima , 
III, v, 430 & 20-2.5 . Esser, ST, 97; 1.57 discusses ~~rtul­
lian's opposition to this view and its anticipation of the 
later Sch olastic movement away from Averroes i n Aquinas. 
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One final point may be observed regarding the relation of 
mind to its objects. Waszink finds upon analysis that in one 
place, Tertullian seems to insist that the objects of knowledge 
41t i rather than the knowledge of the objects are actually in the 
mind, " •.• an error fre quently found in philosophical treatises 
I 1 
· of all periods." However, the~ext is so vague that to accuse 
Tertullian of this gross error is unnecessary. Waszink is on 
better ground, however, when he observes th~t a few passages 
later, Tertullian, in his desire to effect the union of sense 
and intellect argues that 11 ••• the soul, when perceiving corporea 
things, is intellectualis primarily, because to perceive is to 
understand--probably the most contorted argument ever thought 
2 
out by Tert. 11 Unfortunately, this is Tertullian's position, 
again from the desire to unite and equalize sense and intellect. 
But outside of these two exceptions, his view of the relation 
of sense and intellect is basically, as Esser said, 11wahr, aber 
inadequat. n3 
Even though De Anima is Tertullian's most syst ematic pre-
sentation of rational p sychology and epistemology, upon analysis 
it is shown to be very fragmentary, and its exposition constan- I 
tly falls short of the real problems. But as Chapter VI will i~ 
dicate, ·when compared to previous Christian writing, a different 
evaluation is in order. 
More than a century ago, Ka7lB observed in reference to a 
1. vVaszinlc, TDA, 262, conrrnenting on De Anima, XVIII, vi. 
2. Waszink, TDA, 263-264. See also Esser, ST, 149 . 
3· Esser, ST, 153. 
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slightly different context, 
We may thin_~ Tertullian's reasoning incorrect,-
and deny that his solution of the difficulties ••• 
is satisfactory: where indeed are we to look 
for a satisfactory solution?l 
Just as Tertullian' s rational psychology seems to be based 
on two incompatible theses, the corporeal soul and the immortal 
soul, his epistemology includes two ultimately incompatible 
theses, the doctrines of common sense-nature-reason and the con-
cept of authority-revelation. However, the epistemology is even 
less systematic and speculative than the rational psychology, 
possibly because it vvent already too far afield from Tertul-
. 2 lian's interes~s. 
1. Kaye, EH, ·315. 
2. See Esser, ST, 149, 156. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE SYSTEMATIC PHILOSOPHY Til DE ANIMA (continued): 
GENETIC PSYCHOLOGY, ETHICS AND SID&flARY 
This chapter concentrates on a nTh~ber of topics organized 
around the theory of traducianism and the problem of sin. Tra-
ducianism is broken up into what is hePe called Tertullian's 
:rgenetic psychology, 11 his theoJ>y of the origin and gro·wth of 
man, and into ethics, \'lhich deals with the principles of origi-
nal sin, natural depravity and free will. The Chris t ian doc-
trines which provided t h e basic impetus to the development of 
Tertullian's genetic psychology will also become clearer. The 
summary of these two chapters will indicate how all these doc-
trines in De Anima coalesce for Tertullian in one more or less 
harmonious whole. 
1. Genetic Psychology. 
In De Anima, Tertullian traces the history of the soul (cf. 
Reference Outline) from its origin in t h e principles which he 
outlined in Adv. Berm. and De Cens'l:t:._~,Piil!_~, to its death and 
purgatorial life prior to resurrection, the latter topic being 
examined in De Res. Car. The actual order of the treatise 
starts with the source of the soul, a continuation against Her-
mogenes. It has been postponed until t h is part, since it is 
more closely allied to genetic p sychology than to arguments for 
immortality or epistemology. 
i. Tse origin of the soul.--Tertullian defines the soul 
genetically as nfrom the breath of God" (ex flatu dei). This 
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definition h e derives from ·what he insists is the correct read-
ing of Genesis II, ii: 
And the Lord God f ormed man of the dust of 
the ground, and b~eathed into his nostril¢s 
the breath of life; and man became a living 
soul. 
Thus, the soul originates in God's breath, has its beginning in 
thi s creative act. 1 However, the creation of the soul is not 
the srune as the birth of souls, as will become clear in the doc-
trine of traducianism, the hereditary transmission of the soul. 
Tertullian asserts against Plato, however, that the s oul has 
both a birth and creation. 2 This makes the soul a created and 
not innate being (facta non innata substantia). 3 Tertullian also 
repeats his criticism of Hermogenes, who draws t h e soul out from 
God's spirit (~iritus dei) rather than from God's breath (flatu ~ 
dei).4 He quotes Scripture against Her.mogenes as follows: 
Thus saith the Lord ••• he that giveth breath unto 
the people upon ••. ~he earth and spirit unto them 
that walk therein./ · 
My Spirit went forth from me, and I made the breath 
of e·ach. And the breath of my Spirit became the 
soul.b 
Tertullian r efers to Adam again, in whom the spirit of God was 
added during prophecy, 7 for it was not part of his soul natur-
1. This definition occurs in De Anima, III, iv, IV, i, I, i, 
XI, ii, XIX, ii, XXV, ix, XXII, i. See Adv. Mar ., II, ix 
and Adv. Merm. and De Censu Animae also. Cf. Irenaeus, Adv. 
Haer., V, xii, 2 and Waszink , TDA, 194, 197· 
2. De Anima, IV, i. Cf. Plato's Phaedrus, 245. 
3. See Waszink, TDA, 121. 
L~ . De Anima , XI , i i . 
5. Tertullian quotes Isaiah XLII, v in De Anima, XI, iii. 
6. He also quotes Isaiah LVIII, xvi here, but his reading differ? 
by a wide margin from modern versions. See Holmes, WT, II,4Jl 
7. Here Tertullian follows Paul's statements in Ephesians V, 
xxxi-xxxii. 
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ally . 1 Man is thus a dichotomy of bod~ and soul.2 
As mentioned earlier, this distinction of breath and spirit 
was n1ade to interpret Scripture more accurately, and refute the 
taining a close original relationsh i p as the true Christian view 
Waszink regards it, however, as primarily based on an analogy 
betwe en the breath and s oul in man and the breath and spirit in 
God.J 
The re lationsh i p between man's respirat ion and his soul, 
and God's breath and spirit seems to be a strange analogy, for 
is God's spirit analogous to man 's soul? and is creation by 
breath analogous to breath as a natural function of a substance? 
Tertullian is in great difficulty he re, v1hich he does not real-
ize. Even the dixtinction betwe en breath and spirit in God is 
of doubtful importance, and has been criticized in Chapter II. 
Esser get s at the nub of the matter when he says that in Tertul-
lian t he soul c annot be part of God, yet it must be related in-
separably to him,4 as in the Genesis account quoted above.5 
Tertullian's Christ ian interpretation of genetic p sycr1ology 
be gins with this statement. 
Can any reasons be~iven for relating the human soul, which 
1. See De Anima, V. 
2. Some sch olars h ave thought t hat Tertullian was a trichotomist 
in viewing the nature of man as composed of body, soul and 
spirit. This view is without support in De Anima. For a full 
I ' discussion see Tixeront, HD, I, 314 , Roberts, TT, 149-150 and Robinson , Art. ( 192..1), 735 and bibliograph"Jr in Waszink, TDA,20C 
;3 •• Waszin.."k: , TDA, 19£ , 196. 4 Esser, ST, 49 , 55. 
5. Of. Esser, ST, 54 and Waszink,: TDA, 122 on natam et factrun 
in De Anima, IV as equivalent to 11 creation." 
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has the breath of God as its source, to th~uman soul vvhich has 
as its essential function respiration? Beyond those suggested 
above, it seems doubtful. In the last chapter, it was pointed 
~. out that Tertullian has in no way shown that re~piration is es-
sential to the soul apart from the body. His view that .God's 
breath causes the soul seems hardly sufficient to establish 
breath as a function of the soul thus caused, and once again 
Tertullian is not aware of this. Further difficulties vld.th this 
origin of the soul can be seen both by reference to the theory 
of the soul as corporeal and in the following pages as Tertul-
lian1s doctrine of the origin and transmission of the soul is 
unfolded. Before this, however, it may be worthwhile to follow 
the course of the creation of the soul in Adam. 
Tertullian points out that when God breathed into Adam, 
the soul passed into the inner structure of the body, filled all 
its interstices, and took on the shape of the human form, even 
to the extent of having eyes and ears con~esponding to the 
fleshly body (l). 1 During t h is process, the soul apparently be-
2 
came corporeal. This reasoning accomplished his aim of refu-
ting heretical metempsychosis in a new way. Since the soul as 
corporeal fills only its body, the rigidity which it assumes 
" 3 
makes it impossible to fit any body other than it s own. 
However, this assertion that the soul congeals in the struo 
ture of the body tends to make breath as the basic function of 
1. De Anima, IX, viii and Tertullian 1s interpretation of II Cor. 
X~ I, ii-iv, which he thiru{s requires his position here. 
2·. De Anima; IX, viii. 
J. De Anima, Y~~II, vi. 
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! 
e 
tu,.a- ;:;"@ the soul incomprehensible. And what happened to the 
soul as corporeal and not material? 
1 
ii. Traducianism, the mechanics of heredity.--According to 
\i'lilliams, traducianism is a 11 ••. materialistic doctrine of the 
transmission of the soul by the OI'ganic process of generation, 112 
and was found before Tertullian in certain Greek and even Chris-
tian literature. 3 Tertullian begins his theoi'Y with these 
phrases: 
A primordio enim in Adam concreta et configurata 
corpori anima, ut totius substantiae, ita et con-
dicionis istius semen effecit. 
Consitltueramus animam in ipso et ex ipso seri 
homine et unum esse a pri5ordio semen, sciut et 
carnis, in totum generis • 
••• anima, aua flatus et spiritus tradux.6 
These passages mean t h at the soul, originally the breath of 
God in Adam, was transmitted by insemination through the female 
by the male7 as a corporeal body after it congealed in Adam's 
body originally. The soul thus is created, has one source, is 
of one substance, and is born for each human being. 
1. 
2. 
3-
L~. 
15. 
6. 
On traducianism, see in general Esser, ST, 219-227, Roberts, 
TT, 240-250, Te11..nant, OPS, 71-38 and Williarns, IFO, 235-245. 
Dubray, Art. ( I 9 I 2. ) , 14. 
Williams, IF'O, 235 cites Aeschylus and Aristotle's De Genera-
tione Animalia 729 a 21; Waszink , TDA, 342 gives 737 a 27 ff. 
De Anima, IX, viii: ''The soul from the beginning associat~d 
wi t h Adam's body was both moulded after h is shape and pro-
duced in this single created being." 
De Anima, Xt"'CXVI, i: ~'We have established the soul as sown in 
man by man and to be one seed from t h e first soul, and uni-
form in t h e vi/hole human race. rr 
De Anima, IX, vi: u ••• t h e soul, an hereditary wind or breath.' 
Waszink, TDA, 175 translates trad'llX (a vine tendril) as 11he- -
redity in general.n For other uses of t h is phl!lase and varia-
ants in Tertullian, see De Anima, XIX, vi, XX, vi, JG."VI, viii 
ix; and Waszink , TDA, 175. 
7. De Anima, XXVII, v. See Waszink , TDA, 342. 
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From the original creation and transmission of the soul, 
Tertullian turns to establishing the precise relation of body 
and soul throughout this process. He finds that t h e substance 
of the body and soul come into existence in utero a t the same 
1 
time through t he act of procreation, and life for the new soul 
') 
exists from the moment of conception, (_ for life, soul and breath 
in De Anima have an organic unity as well as a verbal affinity . 
At this point he attacks t he Stoic view, shared by certain 
physicians, that the s oul enters the body with the first breath. 
The soul enters the body in the moment of insemination. He also 
denies that the embryo and fetus are without a snul on the basis 
both of facts of pregnancy and Holy Scripture, although his ar-
guments stretch the facts and Scripture beyond reason. He also 
denies the other extreme, that the soul precedes or succeeds 
the body in time.4 
The actual composition of the emb ryo, of flesh and soul,5 
is described by Waszink , paraphrasing De Anima, as : 
The spe rm of the male consi s ts of a 'corporeal' 
and a ' p sychic r element: the coPporeal ingpediemt 
has nroceeded from the whole body and is moist, 
the p sychic one comes ex animae distillatione 
and is a got, aerial essence, · just like the soul 
it self ••• 
This male sperm "solidifies" with the female KIXTO(tAvfvLOC. 7 , thl€ 
1. De Anima, XXVII~ i. 
2. De Anima, XXVII, ii. 
~: De Anima, X'AV . De Anima, XXVII, iii. s. De Anima, XXVII, Vlll. 
6. Wa-szink, TDA, 344 on De Anima, x.xvii, v, vii. See also Was-
zin...1t , TDA, 335. 
7- Waszinl{, TDA, 342. See also De Car. Ch r._, XIX. 
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"matter, 11 which together produce the embryo. 
In the embryo, the soul and body are mixed (miscix), 1 or 
2 perhaps t h e former is diffused through the latter. Again, Ter-
tullian argues t hat this view of the reJa tion between the body 
and soul pre~des any possibility of metempsychosis or meten-
somatosis,3 for the soul does not enter a body from the outside 
and. is in no way an additi on to it. Although distinct through-
out life, the two are together simultaneously and initially in-
separable, thereby defending t h e Christian conception of resur-
rection of body and soul rather than the transmigration of the · 
soul alone. 4 
From the unity of the soul and body in insemination, Ter-
tullian passes to examining the distinctions of sex. He finds 
that along with the simultaneous existence of body and soul is 
t he determination of sex, which occurs vJ'i th the fertilization 
of the ovum by the sperm. 
Anima in utero seminata pariter cum carne uarl~er 
cum 1ps_?. sortitur et sexUm., ita pariter ut in 
causa sexus neutra substantia teneatur.~ · 
He argues that although Adam, a male, was formed first, 
1. Waszink , TDA, 176 com..menting on De Anima, IX, vii, says: 
"Tertullian ••• follows the example of the Stoics and assu.mes a 
complete tiL ~LS of body and soul. 11 
2. De Anima, XV, v, XIV, iii-v. See also William~, IFO, 235. 
3. Waszink , TDA, 382 points out that this is one of the first 
usages of mete·nsomatosis from the Greek, • 4. De Anima, XXIII, v-vi, XXVIII-XXXV. See Waszink, TDA,318,176 
5. De Anima, XXXVI, ii: 11The soul, being sown in the womb at the 
same t ime as the b ody , receives likewise along with it its 
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sex; and this indeed· so simultaneously, that neither of the 
two substances can be (alone) held as the cause of sex, 11 trans. 
Holmes, WT, II, 497· 
I this theory need not be altered, for " ••• Eve lay for some time 
as 'formless flesh', 111 and already possessed a soul; at that 
time ·she was " ••• in soul as even a portion of AdB.J.ll. 11 2 
Traducianism can be criticized basically on two counts: 
biologically, it is not supported because the existence of a 
soul or body 11 substancerr (gene?) has not been accessible to ex-
perimental verification nor is any part of the implied physical 
process open to even inferential verification;3 more important, 
soul theory. It is curious that Tertullian did not claim, as 
he must, tha t the semen contains the 11 essence 11 or vital particle 
of the sou l substance, making its transmission possible. But 
his ~xplanations-' . of · the :-..; physiological process are, as might be 
expected, quite inadequate even though based on the best infor-
mation of his time, 7 and ingeniously expounded. 
1. De Anima, XJLXVI , iv, trans. Waszink, TDA, 419. 
2. Holmes, \VT, II, )+99 , trans. same passage. 
;3 •• See Tennant:1t OPS, 35-36. 4 Tennant, OPS, 31-38 gives a good criticism of the theory at 
'I this level. 5. Waszink , TDA, 342-3~_8 does not draw t his necessary conclusion 
but Roberts, TT, 250 and Tennant, OPS, 31 do. 
6. Tennant, OPS, 32. _ 
7. See Waszink , TDA, 342-348 for an excellent reconstruction of 
the details of Tertullian's views. 
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However, two derivitive conclu sions from the doctrine of 
traducianism as Tertullian presents it do seem to be supported . 
jby contemporary genetics. The assertion that the embryorns the 
1life-principle (soul, self?) from the moment of insemination, 1 
and that the embryo has its sex determined at this instant. 
Even today , the first point is open to dispute, pending defini-
tion of the life-principle, soul or self. The other view, that 
sex is determined at the moment of inseminatio~was highly uni 
2 
among Christians at this time, although it was not :invet1tea . by 
Tertullian--none of these views were--as the next Chapter will 
show. Both of these theories were useful in De Anima in t h e 
attack on transmigration; Waszi!l.J{ observes that "The principle 
motive f or the assertion that the embryo has a soul is once 
more to be found in the desire to defend t h e doctrine of the 
church,n3 namely, the resurrection of the body. 
The emphasis on the unity in utero of body and soul, as we 
as the emphasis on the inseparability and equal value of sense 
and intellect c omes out interestingly in the view that man is to 
be considered neither as corpus nor anima, but as homo, a 
"human b e ing." Man becomes substantially a human from the com-
uletion of the fertilizing act, 4 in so fai' as ncomplete human'' 
means that the na turalia are established and only accidentia can 
follow. 
r:-3ee Esser, ST, 219 for details here. 
2. VJaszink, TDA, l-1-20. He adds U~20), however, 11 ••• 'l,he question 
of the origin of sex · was not · of paramount importance to Tert. 
3. De Waszirur:, TDA, 318, 324, 346. · 4. De Anima, XXXVII, ii. Of. De Anima, XLIV, i and see Waszink, 
TDA,44?. 
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While Tertullian does not stress the subject, his concept 
of man as homo, of the unity of soul and body, and its relation 
to a concept of personality may be briefly discussed. Unfor-
tunately, it is not p os sible to establish with much precision 
his concept of the status of ''man" as a being . This is because 
his use of the term, homo, cannot be invested with the emphasis 
1 
placed on it by St. Thomas, for instance. Wasziru{ claims that 
homo approaches corpus, but never appro aches anima, 2 illustra-
ting again Tertullian's anti-Platonism. 3 It does seem that Te r-
tullian is aiming at the view that the two substances of which 
man is comp0sed, taken set arately or togeth er, neither explain 
no r exhaust the intimate r elationsh i p wh ich transcends all 
analysis, the existential land experiental relation of the soul 
to the body; a more conte~porary thinker might say tln t the re-
lations existing among thj parts of an organism are not given by 
summation of the parts thimselves. 
One might ask also hrv this compares to a conc ept of per-
sonality . There\is no siml lari tv between Tertulli an 1 s homo and 
I ~ . -
Boethius's standard definition of person as naturalae rationalis 
I -
individua sutstantia.4 j owever, it is similar to his definitilln 
of the soul in De Anima, XXII, where he says Definimus animam •.• 
. . I . -.----s · . 
substantla slmplicem, ___ _9.~·- ·suo _§_§J2.i ~g_~~~n-' ••• ratJ .. onalem... It lS 
1. See St • Thomas, S=a C ologie a, I, Quest. 7 S, Art. 4. 
A 2. Waszink, TDA, 418, L~25 j ~-77· 
W 3. ;Haszink , TDA, 531, and [ cf. Pl a to 1 s definition of man in Al-
cibiades 130: "man is defined as a soul using a b ody ." 4. Brunner, RR, 364 refer 1 to Boethius, Contra Eutychem et 
Nestori~, III. 
interesting to note that Tertullian gives a much better defini-
tion and account of persolality in De Anima in terms of anima 
than he does in his other writings when actually dealing with 
pers~. There, his discmssion of personality is l~ss satisfac-
tory because it is based f n the legalist ic meaning of persona 
in relation to the Trinity and refers to various 11 officesn held 
I . ) / 
by the one substm ce; rat:llier than a derivative : of ov6L9<, here 
'.f / 
persona is from the Greek TO -rrpo6.W"TI OV , which has a totally 
"unsubstantial~-~ meaning. 1 
iii. Later life and 4eath.--Tertullian continues his gene-
tic psychology by develop ng the history of life from birth to 
puberty, concentrating on the topic of natural and unnatural 
drives in man. In the text, this discussion is terminated with 
the analysis of sleep and death ( cf. Reference Outline), which 
has already been discussed in a different context. From now on, 
. I 
Tertullian 1 s interest shi~ts from phys iology to making.his ac-
count of original· sin and natural depravity eventually under-
standible. 
He observes that pre~nancy usually lasts slightly over nine 
months, at which time the. l child is born. 
2 
Because the embryo is 
already a complete human tieing in naturalia, he opposes the prac 
tice of ab ortion at any tlme after conception. It would be tan-
1. On persona and -cc5 -rrpo~w1Tov and 11personali ty," see Hatch, · 
IGI, 269-278, MacKinnOJ:jl , CC,, 4-3)+-437 and Edwards, CP, 341-342 
Liddell · and Scott defiljle -co 1Tpoo-wn ov as ( 1) 11 face, 11 ( 2) 11 co'Lm-
tenance," (3) "mask, 11 and (w_) "person. u See also Bethune-Baker 
EHC, 233, 138. 
2. De Anima, XXXVI I, iii. 
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trunount to murder, he feels.~ He tries to support his conten-
. I 
tion by referring to the ~T, probably Exodus XXI, xxii. However 
Waszink points out that i f the LXX version, this passage "··· 
does not take into accounj the life of the unborn child, 112 which 
is what Tertullian is claiming here. Still, his position is 
commendable, supported by Scripture or not. 
At the moment of parturition or slightly thereafter, the 
child emits a cry, the 11 e l rliestvoice of infancq, 113 which has 
been interpreted as " •.• a f augury of .Cfliction in the prospect 
of our tearful life,u4 and probably rightly so, thinks Tertul-
lian. Although the birth cry had been variously interpreted by 
Tertullian in De Anima. 5 the ancients, none conceif ed it as did 
It may be observed that tfue cry of the new born child, the 
initial respiratory refleJj' regarded as a forecast of the un-
happy life ahead, p erhaps even an Urangst, has a place in con-
temporary psychoanalytic j heory in the thought of Otto Rank. 
The passage of centuries does not s eem to have curbed the play 
of fancy. 
Tertullian 1 s analysi ~ moves on to his arguments against 
Valentinian psychology . ~renaeus 1 s account of Valentinus had 
pointed out that the Valemtinians held to tbree kinds of souls 
with three distinct naturl s, only the h ighest of which was truly 
Christian. Tertullian, r lj asoning from his traducian principles, 
1·. De Anima, XXXVII, ii. 
2. Waszink, TDA, 426. 
J. Holmes, WT, II, 456 trans. of above passage. 
LL. De Anima, XIX, viii, ttans. Holmes, WT, II, 456. S. Waszink, TDA, 279· 
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' argues that only one soul lis created, transmitted and existent 
e 
' 
in man, 1 and man himself is all of one kind (unum species),2 
,whi ch Williams has called "the t h e ory of seminal identity. u3 
His argument begins import antly enough by asserting that all ob-
servable variations in maf are the re sult of exte rnal environ-
lmental and internal tempe ramental conditioning, and not to any 
I difference among soul substances. From birth onwards, the 
~~ growth of man is controllld by the changing environmental con-
ditions--physical, social j natural--and it is to these circ~rm­
stan~es t;,t the variatiof s among human being s must be attribu-
ted.~- Although the natur•e of the soul remains constant, the use 
which is made of it, the ~uidance which it receives from the 
parents , and the pos sible influence s of evil and good spirits 
\from time to time, will i~evitably have their effects a s acci-
dentia,5 but only as accidentia. 
This opposition to V, lentinian psychology is the context in 
De Anima in which the traducian theory is first enunciated (cf. 
Reference Outline), and tlus traducianism may be seen a s an in-
stance of the theory of tie primal unity of mankind. This th.eor 1 
was supported in both the Stoic and Epicurean philo sophies , but 
Tertullian was using it here as essentially a Christian theory , 
viz., t h e equality of all men before God, and not a philosophic 
r1. De Anima, JG"'\I • i 
12 . De .Anima , XLI, . . llo 
3. ·- -·· Williams, IFO, . 237 . 
LL . De Anima, xx; iv-v, XXI¥ , iv, XXXVIII , i. 5. De . Anima, XX , iv .• 
-
' 
theory, for- "•• .the universalism of Jesus rests upon quite a 
different basis than that of Hellenistic philosophy. 111 Esser 
j.nsists that it was just this moral univers2_lism tm t Tertullian 
was trying to rescue· fromj the Gnostics and their• divisions of 
mankind into metaphysical ·y distinct groups. Thus, traducianism 
can be seen not just as a consequence of the corporeal soul 
theory, but as a consequelce of the unity of mankind before God. 
This purpose in the Jheory is partly valid and partly in-
valid. It is invalid to ~he extent t~ it overlooks the great 
differences among men which do not seem reducible to extrinsic 
and environmental factors J But it legitimately denies that 
there is any possible basis for a real metaphysical distinction 
--
,. 
among men before they have lived. However, Tertullian's reason-
ing is erroneous on both scores, for he assumes tm t 11 ••• the 
unity of man that faith affirms is geneologic ••• and not spiri-
tual.") He has confused moral equ9-lity with genetic unity. 
Christian doctriDe since Tertullian has asserted that this equa~ 
i ty n ••• is founded, not upon the original unity of mankind ••• but 
upon the principle that all men are alike capable through grace 
of standing in a relation of sonship to God,n4 and this equality 
is no longer dependent on the generation of the species from one 
pair of primordial parents. 
While he admits that the soul and body are transmitted in 
un~, Tertullian distinguishes between growth for the soul and 
1. 
2. 
~ ~- : 
Fsi rweather, JG, 355-356. 
Esser, ST, 221, 225 and Roberts, 
Knudson, DOR, 115. · 
Fairweat~r, JG, 355-356. 
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!for the body . They are not identical processes, for the body 
Jgrows in magnitude, whereas the soul's substance does not in-
crease but rather " ••• all its natural faculties develop gradual-
ly together with the flesh; 111 that is, growth for the soul does 
not mean augmentation to substance but unfolding of inherent 
nature in t he passage of time. Tertullian 1 s motive here is 
revealed as he says if it were possible for t he soul to increase 
l in substance, it could presumably decrease in substance, too, 
2 
and extinction might then reasonably follow. Therefore, the 
I 
IJ 
I 
correct concl usion: 
••• the growth and development of the soul are 
to be estimated, not as enlarging its substance, 
but as calling forth its powers.J 
The principle of accidents in relation to substance is most 
important in Tertullian's treatment of irr ationality, as the 
last chapter suggested. It is also caught up with his theory of 
enviro~mental conditioning , outlined previously, for he observes 
that just as actual irrationality is added from the 11 outside," 
so the improvement in rationality is made by "outside" influen-
ces such as geographic locality where one lives, the health of 
-
the body, one's occupations, habits, desires and the like.~-
However, Tertullian, again following Scripture closely, 
finds that rational desire and anger also exist. Contrary to 
lthe ur~atural irrationality of the soul, there is a natural 
I 
1. De Anima, XXVIII, v, trans. Waszink, TDA, 
Wa szink, . TDA, 423-L~24. I 2. 
1
3. 
4-
De Anima, XXVIII, vii, trans. Holmes, WT, 
De Anima , XX, iv. 
~23. 
II, 500. 
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source of desire and anger (ind~gnativunl et concupiscentivum)l 
which forrn a "trinityn--rationality, desire, anger--that does 
not proceed from the devil, since Christ himself e y..hibited them. i1 
Nhile there is no doubt that desire and anger can be irrational, 'I 
thi s. trinity can be 11 ••• operated in . entire accordance with 
1.L 
reason. 11 • Tertullian' s theory of rational emotions is probably 
due in part to his attempt to maintain the unity of the soul and 
its activities,S to account for some of Christ's actions as they 
are reported in the }~, 6 and po s sibly to rationalize his ovrn 
emperament and emotional constitution and Montanistic conm1it-
The irrational desires particularly occur at puberty. 
Puberty commences more or less simultaneously .for both body and 
s oul at the age of fourt een. The soul achieves it by experience 
(suggestu sensutun) ~nd the body by the developne:nt of its limbs 
7 (processu membrorum exsurgere). He finds this is supported not 
just by the fact that adulthood is legal at this age in Rome, 
ut because the feeling s of shame which derive from the know-
ledge of good and evil discovered by our primordial parents ac-
. 8 
crue to us at thJ.s age. 
The sense of shame is peculiarly concomitant wi th the con-
1. De Anima, XVI, iii. 
2. Tertullian found rational concuuiscentivrun i n L\1~e XXII, xv 
and rati onal indignativum in Matt. XXI, xii. 
3. De Anima, XX, iv-vi, XIV, v11. 
• De .Anima, XVI, v, trans. Holmes~· WT, II, 4!-~3. 
S. Waszink, TDA, 230: 11 • .•• The ch ief advantage of this theory is 
that it preserves the unity of the so_uJ. 11 
6. 1:Vaszin..1{ , TDA, 231 adds: 11 •• .[It] is dominated by the reality 
of the affections of God and Christ. 11 See Es ser, ST, 109. 
7. De Anima, XXXVII I , i. 
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sciousness of sex. Tertullian finds that this easily leads to 
. 1 
unnatural deslres, a delinquent concupiscence, which far over-
step s the simple ne eds of the body, 2 which include only food and 
sleep. It is important to note that the soul itself has no 
physical needs, except . in so far as it desires that which will 
3 facilit ate the he alth of the body. 
the soul for food to feed the body 
For instance, the desire of 
is ordained by God,4 but de-
sires such as lust after .the flesh as found in the experiences 
accompanying consciousness of sex are not really 11natural.u 
Hunger may be regarded as a natural instinct (scientia natural-
5 ium), but not the other conscupiscentia. By argumentum ex 
scri·ptura sacra, Tertullian points to the fact that these latter 
unnatural desires, were exhibited by Adam and Eve only after 
6 their sin, hence they must. be regarded as improper for Chris-
·tians. By itself,the soul's nature and therefore its needs in-
elude only immortalitatem rationalitem sensualitatem intellec-
tualitatem arbitrii libertatem.7 
The accuracy of Tertullian 1 s views concerning the con-
sciousness of sex at puberty have been widely revised in recent 
"JB ars, for consciousness of sex in his sense does not wait until 
puberty;!or, rather, puberty does not wait until fourteen years 
8 
of age. This is important to notice, not only because Tertul-
1. De Anima, x:txVIII, ii, LII, ii. 
2. De Anima, XXXVIII, iii. 
3. De .Anima, XXXVIII, v. See also Vvaszini:, TDA, 439· 
4. De Anlffia; XXXVIII, iii. He refers to Gen. XI, xvi. 
5. De Anima, XXIV, v-vii. ----
6. De Anima, XXXVIII, ii, LII, ii. See Waszink, TDA, 535. 
7. De Anima, XXXVIII, vi. According to .Waszink, TDA, 440, both 
r-at~alitatem and intellectualitatem are neologisms. 
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lian is wrong here (he is often wrong in both fact and theory), 
but because it misses the problem of Tertullian's view of sex. 
Tertullian seems to be moving toward asceticism here, but as 
Lovejoy has observed, his interest in natural processes, one of 
which is sexual desire and satisfaction, keep s him from advo-
eating chastity all the time in his writings. I n one pa ssage, 
he even approve s sexual intercourse if motivated only by "normal 
n'eeds 11 and not lust or 11 exce ss 11 ( exce ssus non status), 1 since it 
is approved by God hims elf (in Genesis I, xxiii). 2 However, 
Lovejoy over looks the fact that the context for this adulation 
of sexuality is one in which Tertullian approves of arguments 
which investigate sexual union in order to prove that the soul 
and body are inseminated as he thirucs in h is traducian theory; 
s exuality is merely an interlude in the traducian argument, and 
without a doubt in De Anima, the excessive state worries Tertul-
lian mor e than the legitimate desires of the flesh. 
Thus, it would s eem that Te r tullian's philosophical anthro-
pology and genetic psychology rest on the following fundamental 
theses: (1) the argument of t h e soul as the breath of God, ( 2 ) 
t h e theory of corporeal traducianism, (3) the primordial unity 
of mrurucind, (4) environmental or accidental conditioning, and 
(5) t he intimate r elationship of soul and b ody . These doctrines 
coupled with t hose of the last chapter, viz., the corporeal soul 
4lt the unity of the soul, sensationalism and t he equality of sense 
1. De Anima, XXVII, iv. 
2. See Lovejoy, EHI, 331-333 for his interpraation of this pas-
sage from De Anima , XXVII. 
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and intellect, seem to suggest that in De Anima there is an elu-
sive harn1ony of the basic doctrines with one another which be-
lies the real inadequacy of the theories one and all. 
2. Ethics. 
The theory of natural and unnatur al desires, corporeal 
transmission of the soul, etc., leads directly to a considera-
tion of the basic ethical principles upon which De Anima is 
built. U~~ ortunately , Tertullian presents no clear-cut ethics 
as he does a rational psychology and genetic p sychology ; his 
ethics, like his arguments for imr~ortality, must be inferred. 
Despite its unexpected character in ethics, De Anima is 
important because it p resents one of the first t he ories of free 
will , original and committed sin, and suggests views toward a 
theory of natural depravity. It also discusses, as the last 
I s ection indicated, early Christian views of why abortion ought 
to be pDohibited and an interesting theory of natural and unna-
tural dri ves. All the se, with the exception of his hints con-
cerning the divine-human relationship, are bound up with the 
! theory of traducianism and in the attempt to elucidate this 
the ory, they ha ve their reason for inclusion in this treatise. 
i. Original sin and natural depravity.--The general ethical 
significance of the natural and unnatural desire s traced in the 
last section can be recast here in a new light. It will be re-
called that for Tertullian, what usually goes under the descrip-
t i on of llirrational desires" cannot be immoral in themselves, 
since they are natural to the body. Thi s use of concupiscentia 
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recalls the OT ye§er ) / and the Pauline ElT l @"V t--l LQC. , as an 11 ••• ap-
petite whi ch in itself is ethically neutral. 111 These natural 
bodily appetites include primarily hunger, thirst and sleep. 
The sexual libido tends toward the 11unnatural 11 because it is 
found in Adam and Eve only after their sin, and activated fur-
t h er by the devil at puberty. It must be said that in this pos-
sibly Montanistic view, sexual relation s are not merely inade-
quate expressions of man' s potential or highest capabilities, 
but are almost sinful in themselves. 
In the same context, he rescue·s the soul from having any-
thing but rationality naturally predicated of it. This is an 
important part of one of his major positions in De Anima, i.e., 
that the flesh does not deserve the criticisms of the GnosticsJ 
further carried out in De Car. Chr. and De Res. Car. He does 
this by showing that evil or irrationality is use cond 11 nature to 
the .soul because, while it always accompanies the soul, it is 
not part of its primal nature. 
This appeal to the natural and t he unnatural, to the ethi-
cally neutral, is probably a further rami fication of his theory 
of nature as norm for truth, in this present case , for good as 
well. It will be remembered that in his argument against the 
Valentinians and elsewhere, e. g ., on desires, irrationality, he 
does not distinguish am:ong ''evil, 11 11 irrationali ty," and 11un-l . 
natural," and their opposites, "good," "rationality, 11 and 11na-
ture." This fact seems in fullest accord with the analysis of 
1. Wi lliams, IFO, 24-4 for further details. 
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nature given in the last chapter. Indeed, Professor Lovejoy 
observes that " ••• whatever is 'natural' is good [and] indulgence 
1 
in what is not 'natural 1 is evil." Thfus became .~ apparent also 
4lt !when Tertullian denied as unnatural and therefrnre evil (or evil 
l and therefore unnatural?) exces s ive s exual indulgence, etc., in 
the previous section. The task is to determine the natur e of 
e 
the 11 second n nature, which has the status of evil and irratio-
nality with respect to the soul. First, however, his view of 
the location of evil in the soul must be examined. ·· 
Tertullian argues that because the soul is transmitted from 
Adam and has Adam's evil as its second nature, the soul is in a 
sense evil, and this evil is comraunicated to the flesh because 
of their intimate conjunction. 2 Tertullian rejects the more ob-
vious notion that the flesh is intrinsically evil; 3 good or evil 
do not accrue to the flesh ~~but per accidens. Good and 
evil are only predicable of the soul. This is his position be-
cause he regards the body as a nministering thing, 11 <[res] mini-
sterimn),4 which functions afteF the fashion of a 11 ve sseln.5 or 
11 chalice 11 (calix)6 to its contents (the soul), not as an inde-
pendent agent. In many ways, t his seems surprisingly close to 
the Platonism which Tertullian repudiates elsewhere. 
1. 
2. 
~: 
5. 
~ 
Therefore, the differentia or distinguishing 
property of manl):fno means lies in his earthly 
Lovejoy, EHI, 329 . 
De Anima, XL, i. 
De An~V).a, XL, ii. 
lJe AnJ.ma, XL, ii, in Waszink, TDA, 56 , line 23' trans. 
V'JT, II, 504. 
De Anima, XL, .. in Waszink, TDA, 56, line 24., trans. J.l, 
WT, II, 504. 
iV-a- s-~~~ ~s~t=-i-~ f t-h - S:$1~ ~ 
Holmes 
Ho:lmes 
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I 
e 
element; nor is the flesh the human person, as be-
ing some faculty of his soul, and a personal ,quality; 
but it is a thing of quite a different substance 
and di f f erent condition, although annexed to the 
s oul as a chattel or as an instrmnent for t he of-
fices of life.l 
The Scriptural passages which speak about the sinfulness of the 
flesh in itself2 Tertullian interpr ets to mean that the soul 
Yle'tlc.e 
uses the flesh as its instrument in sinning, ~ the sin ac-
crues to the soul and the flesh remains only a partner to the 
crime (crimina adpingas). 3 Of course, t he body is not im1ocent 
of sin, but this guilt does not make it sinful in itself.4 
Although evil is "second nature 11 to the soul, its natural 
good is not destroyed by either transmitted or committed evil; 
but t he natural good certainly can be obscured.5 The evil about 
which Tertullian speaks pal~ticularly is t h at malum ex originis 
vitio, which , thoue;h similar 
ginali, is not identic a~ith 
to the later malum ex peccato ori-
6 
it. This evil can be removed , and 
it is the function of Christian baptism to do this, as " ••• it 
[sin] is tak en up by the Holy Spirit. 117 But even baptism is not 
sufficient to insure continual moral behavior . 
In the c ourse of life, it is quite likely that the s oul wil, 
fall away from its new holines s and resume its delinquent be-
l. 
2. 
J . 
4· 5. 
6. 
7· 
De Anima , LX, ii, trans. Holmes, WT , II, 504. 
Tertullian\refers to Rom. VI, iv, VII, v; Gal. V, xvi; Mat t. 
V, xxviii. 
De Anima, XL, iv. Waszink, TDA, 452-L~53 sugge sts t h at this 
is a very uni que idio~. 
De Anima , XL,iv. 
De Anima , XLI, ii. 
See Waszink, TDA, ~-5~-· 
De Anima, XLI, iv, tran s. Holmes, WT, II, 506. 
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havior , sinc e .the devil constantly struggl e s for i t to this end .l 
It is important to note that Tertullian d oe s not regard the c on-
tinual fal ling away as due to the innate or inexpung ible evil 
nature of man o r the flesh , but to the powei' of the devil . 
'I'hi s point ought t o be k e p t in mi nd when it is suggested tha.t 
Tertullian ho l ds t o a cons istent t h e ory of natlJ_ral depravity . 2 
Thus, by mak ing t h e flesh ancillary to the s oul in co~ru'Tiitt iP_g 
sin and not evil in itself, but , bec ause of it s int i mate rela-
tion vvith the soul , contractin g its evil, Tertullian makes it 
subservient to the soul in act s b ot h g ood and bad , but also 
elevates the b od;,r be c ause he der:lies t h at there is any 11physical 
evi1 11 J in its makeup . Noth ing moral can be p redicated of the 
flesh pe_!'~_ : the body is only an instr-DJnent whi ch acquires its 
mor al valence from the soul . 
This returns the discussion to the central problem of 
Tertullian 1 s ethic al theory, the Christian do c trine of orig inal 
s i n and the fall and depravity of man . The first effe c t of 
orig inal s i n is irrationality ; 11 ••• all that is contradict ory to 
reason in man , all irrational passions and desires • • • [ are ] the 
LL 
effects of the orig inal corruption. 11 ' However , this orig i nal 
corru:t; t i cn i s neve:c: snfficient to conquer the natural g oodne s s 
(natural rationality) of the soul.5 'l'his ir·rationality is only 
1. De Anima, XLI, iv . The devil is s Diritus iTn.nlundus a s opposed 
to the Sl:Jiritus sanctus . See Wasz..-l1'lk-;TDA~-1j~58 . --
2 . 1Hillia.ms-~ j_FO , 2L:_J. al s o· recognize s this imp ort ant point. 
3 . Tennant, OPS, 38 suggests t h at traducianislll makes sin into 
11:9hysical evil; 11 in part thi s j_s true , but it is dj_ffi c ult to 
square vvi th Tertullian 1 s viev1s as smmnarized above . 
)_1_ . F~andeP, AST , Ll-6 5 . See also \i'lasziru~, TDA , 292 . 5. E sser, ST , 107, 230 claims this becau se 11 evil b.as no substanc !1 
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one wa-y of looking at the conse quences of sin, however , 'The 
orig inal sin contains a near-catastrophic effect whi ch is re -
moved from man only by the rite of Christian baptism, which con-
sequentl:' p lay s an imp ortant part in Tertullian' s ethi c al theo-
1 
ries as outlined in h is De Baut ismo. Original sj_n also seems 
to malw m.an s us ceptible t o demons and tb.o~_ P :i_nfluenc e s duri ng 
the 2 growth fr om childho od to ~1ub er•ty . 
Tertullian t s con cep t of evil as 11 s e cond natv_re 11 to the soul 
lies in the direction of the later theory of vi~ium _?.ri !};inis, 
orig i nal coz•ruption . 3 But as to the exact nature of the theory 
vrhich Tertullian advocates in De ~=2::-im.a , scholars differ. Hil -
l . 
_lams interprets Tertullian as 11 • • • teac:Ling no exp licit d octrine 
of 1 OriEsinal Si n , 111 althou gh still deriving strong conse quenc es 
from Adam 's fall. L!- He terrns Tertullian t s concept here as nthe 
h ereditary moral handicap , 11 the o~"i ginis vithun, from which the 
later Augustinian v i evJ of pe cc atmn ___ ?2:-:i g ina~~ v.ras developed . 5 
Long a g o, Heander observed, and this p resent investigation sup-
p orts him, that just as much as the vit~l-li?- orig i nis, 'I'ertullian 
empl:~asi zed 11 ••• the [ orig inal J ... a n d i nal i enable relation of the 
soul of man to God, 11 6 for t he soul i s alv1ays flatus dei. 
l . See VifaszirJs: , TDA , L!-55 , L!-57. 
2. Tertullian 1 s demonology warrants no special attention in thi s 
the sis, and it has been neglected a s a result . It wa s a 
cormnon heritage to Christian th:tnkers of his time , an.d its 
actual influence on his philos ophical, psycholog ical and 
theolog ical theorie s is difficult t o gau g e; it is . probably 
neglig ible . 
3. Tertullian f irst mentions the concept in De Anim~, XLI, i. 
For a geneJ.-.al tre at ment of the p roblem , see Tennant, CS, 
Ch a pter II and Williams, IFO, 95 -112. · 
Li-· ~·lilliams , nro , 2L,_l . 6. l'!eall.der , AST, l_;_6L;_. 
5 . Williams , IFO, 2li.5 refers t o De Anima, XLI , i, and cf. the 
auote from Waszil~r. , ~:DA, L!.5l.1• citecf"a.bove (p ag e 136) . 
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Roberts insists that Tertullian did not emphasi ze t he theory of 
viti mn orif) inis a t all in the malliJ.e r i n 1.r.rhi ch lator writers did . 
. On the othe i' han d , Hagenbuch (and i;VilliBiilS ) i nsisted that 
Tertulli an cont ributed the t heoi'Y of vi tilJl11 orig i n i s , ev en while 
he made the distinc tion of man 1 s true nature from his a c qui red 
nature , a distinc tion between the tr ••• natu:L"ale auod arnmodo and 
;::> 
pl~oprie natv.rale . " ~ However, this distinct ion and its ame liora-
tive implications are not str e ssed in t he latex' theory as they 
are in De Ani1;1a . 
. 
E:.1"1Uds on cont inues t hi s theme a n d claims t h at Tertull i an 
was one of the early Christians vrho 11 ••• emphasized the orig inal 
sinfulness of man and the i:rm:)Qte n c e of the h u:rnan will . 11 3 :!:Tmv, 
in De __ .{mima, Tertulli an does precisely the op p osite , as it b.as 
in p art been seen . Waszink surm,,arizes more a ccurately wh en h e 
sa·ys tbat Tertulli an taue;ht 
••• the corrup t ion of the soul by s in •.• vv-hi c h c or-
runt i on has pl"o c eeded from t he s in of Adam, a.11.d has 
been transmit ted by the vitimn origi nis ; it has 
be come s e cond nature to u s , ·though i t fs not as 
p mverful a s [the orig i nal , l~at ional, and g o.od nature 
of the soul. !-
The re lation between traduc ianism and orig i nal s in, as 
p r e v i ous s e ct ions of this chalJter have ind icated , i s a c l ose one 
sin c e some v ehicle of transmission f ox' the OI'iginal co rruption 
i s needed . S But as an account of t he t heory of o~eiginaJ_ and 
1. R~be;ts , TT, 165. 
2 . Ha genbuch, TI-ID, I , 168 and \tV:l lliams , IFO, 21.~5 . 
3. Knud s on, DOR , 137 . 
l.L. Waszin."k , TDA , 23 0 . Se e also E sser , ST , 108 . 
~ . Both Cople st on , EP , II , -2L!- and Tennant, OPS , 31 ma ke int eres -
ting ob serve:c ions here. Both observe Tertullian' s implicit 
reje cti on of corp orealism in favor of materialism. 
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j nereditary sin, Tennant objects that it is grossly inadequate : 1 
JHe is correct, and this thesis observed the same criticism in 
an earlier section of this chapter. However, the real effective 
ness of this criticism is not against the traducian doctrine, 
but against the doctrine of original sin :ii:Belf from which tradu-
cianism stems. Thus, original sin and the various theories of 
its he r editary transmission hold primarily historical interest 
today, and the really vital criticisms of traducianism are also 
criticisms of original sin, as in the present case. But the 
I 
/important fact here is that for Tertullian, given the Christian 
!doctrine of the Fall of man and a vague notion of the hereditar~ 
effect of this occurence, some sort of transmission of evil as I 
second nature was implied; more particularly, his theory of the 
corporeal soul and traduc.ianism were i mplied, since only they 
could handle both the generation of the species and the trans-
mission of the moral handicap. 
ii. Free will.--Tertullian's doctrine -of free will re-
ceives only insignificant attention in De Anima; it is discussed 
i n t h e latter part of the chapter against the Valentinian psy~ 
ch ology and on t h e topic of death (cf. Reference Outline), both 
of which h ave been dealt with before. However, the concept is 
important to Tertullian and deserves attention here, since a 
good deal of the foreg~g discussion is . invalidated without it. 
It is clear that the soul in proc e ss of growth may take 
I 1. Tennant, OPS, 31. 
many fo~ns although it has only one source. 1 Accidental irra-
tionality and natural rationality are part of the basis for this 
2 fact; also, environmental conditioning helps explain it. But 
e the i mplication of these facts is that accidental attributes of 
the s oul can be changed.3 
Tertullian finds that this power of self-change is suppor-
. L~ 
ted by Scripture, and the heretics who claim that man is deter-
mined in all his actions are refuted.5 Vfuereas changes can be 
made through the supervenient grace of God, other changes are 
. 6 
made possible by the natural free will (arbitrii libertas) of 
the soul. This is a power of independent authority natural to 
' ' ~ / 7 the soul, -ro IX.if"CE::SWO""Lo0, as Tertullian observes in De Anima, 
XXII, ii, Definimus animam ••• liberam arbitrii. Unfortunately, 
his logical argument t hat whatsoever has been born or created, 
in this case the soul, can also be changed, since only the un-
. 8 born is immutable (God), is not altogether sat1sfactory. 
The data from death also supply testimony to the free will 
of man, for Tertullian, it will be recalled, insisted that man 
was riot appointed to die by nature, but by free will chose to 
sin, the consequences of which were known to him and which he 
also knew would follow necessarily from his free act.9 Thus, 
1. De Anima, XX , ii. 
2. De Anima, JG'CI, iii. 
J ·. De Anima, XXI, iv. 
Li- • De Anima, XXI, v. Tertullian refers to Matt. III, vii-ix, 
Eph. V, viii, II, iii, I Cor. VI, xi. 
5. See Adv. Val., XXIX, where this is more fully discussed. 
6. De Anima, XX, v, XXI, vi, XXIV, iv. 
7. De Anima; XXI, vi, in Waszink, TDA, 30, line 25. 
8. De Anima, XXI, vii. Waszink makes no comments on Tertullian' 
argument here. 
a RAA De Anim~ T IL.t:d,i_a_l'ld Jlvasz1 nk TDA _S'_16 _ __f_o_r_ co1mneJ:')~,...,r 
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while 11 the idea of original sin11 may be 11 the root-idea of his 
theology: the actual term is, indeed, his creation," Rashdall is 
quite correct in adding that " ••• it is not pushed to the length 
·e of denying free-will in man after the fall. 111 
Far from being volitionally impotent, Tertullian claims 
that man by his very nature as a created finite being has a will 
free from internal necessity or external compulsion. 2 More than 
a mere 11 ••• unmotivated free will, n3 as Roberts suggests, t h e 
h 
vJill if it inclines at all, inclines toward the good,· since it 
is naturally good (rat i onal). This inclination and freedom is 
quite di stinct from the Augustinian post-Pelagian view of the 
impotent will, as the :last chapter will indicate. Dean Knudson 
claims that no pre-Augustinian thinker held to real 11metaphysi-
cal freedom ••• the freedom of contrary choice. 11 Yet it seems to 
do an in justice to Tertullian to allow him only the concept of 
mere 11p sychological freedom ••• the freedom of action," or mere 
"moral freedom ••• the freedom of reason."5 Admittedly, Knudson 
makes import ant distinctions in what is meant by the 11freedom 11 
of the will , but Tertullian 1 s concept in De Anima (and also Adv. 
Mar. ) does not neatly p i geon-hole into any of them. 
It might be suggested that Tertullian in De Anima has a co~ 
cept of freedom whi ch approaches self-determination or real 
metaphysical freedom in Iu1udson 1 s sense, even though he does not 
discourse on it at great length. Both Hagenbuch and Tixeront 
1. Rashdall, IA, 249· 
2. Esser, ST, 189 stresses this. 
J. rtoberts , TT, 163. 
&_. Esser, ST, 190. 
5. Knudson, DOR, 130. 
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have observed this. This thesis agrees with them that 11Tertul-
lian affirmed human freedom and saw in the exercise of that 
1 
liberty the explanation of moral evil and of sin. u Esser ar-
gues that elsewhere, the free will is recognized by Te r tullian 
as the volitional faculty of the soul and closely related to 
the rational p owers, just as in God truth is related to good-
2 
nes s . All the consequences of man's behavior on this earth 
·which are . against nature (reason) accrue to him as a consequence 
of the misuse of freedom. 
':Vertullian also holds that in a certain sense, which he 
does not elaborate, men are influenced toward evil by the power 
of demons and the devil--the general deleterious effects of the 
11 second nature. n3 Wnat happens to real moral responsibility 
in this case, when the will is no longer autonomous, is open to 
spe cula tion; Tertullian does not seem aware of what he has done 
to ethics. 
The related problem for later med:le:oal thinkers of free will 
and divine fore-knowledge, of volitional freedom and cosmic de-
te r minism, was not investigated by Tertullian in any of his wri-
tings. uof predestination ••• we find no trace in any of the ·wri-
tings of Tertullian. 114 And it also may be said t hat the more 
significant philosophical problems concerned with the theory of 
free will did not occur to him, either. Besides the illustra-
I ~~ion in the previous paragraph, De Anima offers no analysis of 
1. Tixeront, HD, I, 315. See also Hagenbuch, THD, I, 155, 
Tennant, OPS, 167, Waszink , TDA, 295. Cf. Adv. Mar., II, v-b 
2. Esser, ST, 187~188. 
3· See De Anima, XL-XLI and Esser, ST, 107. =====li=Jr~,;;:-=· =;-"~r, a ..; - - C!e,e_ad:,~-- -i aan4EHk ~~J±"l=!,.£g_,_\::Z.:f=-~.L~bf'-d,~S~_,1i8-. =-=======~F=====~ 
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why men do choose t he evil ~ they can choose the good as 
well; the supposed influence of demons and the hereditary pre-
disposition can be countered logically with the natural good of 
the soul, all of which seem out of harmony together and collec-
1 
tively fail to explain man's behavior. Further, the consequen-
ces of t h e fall and the natural free will of man in man's presen ' 
state are not drawn in any detail in De Anima. 2 
iii. The divine-human relationship .--Three observations can 
be made in this subject to conclude the exposition of De Anima. 
The basic position of the rebtion of God to man is found in the 
the ory of the soul as flatus dei and all the ancillary argumen-
tation in which Tertullian engaged in Adv. Herm., De Censu Ani-
~  and De Anima in order to refute varying heretical positions 
which either make the soul pl"actically divine or very distant 
from God. Unfortunately, Tertullian draws no ethical consequen~ 
ces from this fact in De Anima, although some certainly might 
have been drawn. 
On the problem of forgiveness of s ins and expiation of 
guilt, Tertullian generally holds to the view that God demands 
satisfaction (satisfactio) for all sins. By sinning, man cre-
ates an obligat i on to God for which penance is prescr:lbed and 
punishment exacted. Therefore, i t is man 's task to work out his 
obligation b y various methodsAnone of which, however, is ever 
11 
••• an equivalent or payment for the sin,"3 anticipating the 
1. Roberts, TT, 163 has noticed this, too. 
2 . Will iams, IFO, 2Ll-3· 
3. Gwatkin, ECH, 8~-· 
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view of St. Anselm in Cur Deus Homo. In this ethical relation-
ship of man to God, Tertullian 1 s legali sm is :unmistakably found, 
for 11 ••• satisfactio is a form of solutio--the destruction of an 
obligation, 111 and it is in this sense that Tertullian uses it. 
Unfortunately, nothing is said about this doctrine in De Anima. 
Third, Tertullian's oppo sition t o metempsychosis is groun-
ded ethically in his antipathy to its claim of justic.e which 
disputes the claim to justice in the Christian eschatology. 
Metemp sychosis, prop osed as a 11 ••• nece ssai•y ••• retribution ••• for 
2 
one's earthly l ife,tt must be repudiated by Christians as a de-
structive concept to the dogma of the Last Judgment. 3 11 ••• If 
the judgment after death re quires the transmigration of souls 
for carrying out its verdicts, this judgment is as unworthy as 
it is inept. 114 Thus does Tertullian conclude his final argument 
against · all transmigrations, be they Orphic, Pythagorean, Empedo 
clean, Platonic or heretical. Once again, Tertullian appeals to 
the unreasonableness of his opponent's theories when compared 
to the Christian theories he is defending, a fitting point on 
which to end this examination. 
3. Summary: The Systematic Philosophy in De Anima. 
The examination in these last two chapters has tried to 
bring into relief five areas of problems in De Anima , viz., its 
1. Gwatkin, ECH , 84. See De Anima, XX.X:V , i on Matt. V, xxvi here 
and also Waszinl<:: , TDA, 1+12 and Esser, ST, 2~ 
2 . Waszink, TDA, 393· 
3 . De Anima, XXXIII. 4. The se words are Waszink 's actually, but they present even bet 
ter than Tertullian 1 s t h e gist of his argument in De Anima , 
XXX TI T . SAA WR.az..ink •. _TJ2_4., . _'3.Sl1. 
basic terminology, rational psychology, epistemology, genetic 
psychology, and ethics. The conclus ions in these areas of anal~ 
ysis can be briefly su~arized here in order to draw them togetb 
er before passing on to the relation of De Anima to Hellenistic 
philosophical thot~ht. 
Tertullian's basic terminology was outlined in three words, 
. c/ \ 
substantia, corpus, and natura. Substanba is from the Greek 1JAV' 
t / ') / ( / 
and Vl\0"-E:Lp.E:vo~ but moreflosely allied · to ovo-<.Q~; and -vnoo .. ·c O<.CflS. 
In De Anima, it is used primarily with l"'ef'erence to the soul, 
and may be translated as 11 a real concrete thing," while also 
referring to the primordial stuff from vnLich all real being is 
made. Corpus is close to substantia, but seems to lie somewhere 
between it and materia. Tertullian never says precisely where, 
and it is doubtful if he ever worked it out. Natura has two 
basic senses, and the met~hysical meaning of the term is the 
total naturalia of each substantia, as opposed to the accidentia 
It is thus close but not identical wi t h substantia. 
Tertullian's rational psychology begins with his doctrine 
of the corporeal soul, for which he provides four logical argu-
ments as well as some ex s.crintura sacra and an important vision 
But they all run afoul of the criticism tHat the soul is not ex-
perienced as corporeal. However, his aim was to protect such 
Christian doctrines as real immortality (possible only for a 
e .. substance' which tends to argue that corpus anima equal ~s .. ·sub-
stant~a anima), and resurrection of the body against heretical 
transmigration. 
The details of the rational p sychology in De Anima were ex-
p lored under the t h eme of arguments for immortality because it ·I 
is thi s object 'Nhich p robably motiva ted Tertullian' s discussions II 
His first argument is based on the unity of the soul with its 
faculties (or powers), making it an indivisible substmce, and 
therefore immortal. But he also claims that this substance is 
corp oreal, and it is dif ficult to see how a corporeal substance 
lean be indivisible. 
The second argument was based on the continual activity of 
the soul , implying that not even death would cancel its activit~ \ 
His data were Cir>awn mostly from sleep and dreams, but here he fail ! 
of truth in many places in De Anima. The relation of this cri-
terion with the earlier and more widely emphasized one of Chris-
tian authority ls obscure, but the latter apparently is a supple l 
ment of the fonner, both, however, being from t h e one source, 
However I God, and therefore not necessarily incompatible at all. 
I the term, "nature, " in its e p istemological sense , is also equi v-
jalent to "reason" and "common sense~' something with which the 
I 
I ] 
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mind is endowed by its creator. Regarding sensationalism, Ter-
tullian defends it against the here tics who ma lign the body and 
certain Christian exp eriences as hallucinations. However, his 
~ theory of error is not too accurate. In the knowledge p roces s , 
· he concentrates on one poiht in it, when sense and intellect are 
united, rath er than giving~ttention to their differences. This 
e p istemology is in part adumbrated b y his mention of visions at 
death and ecstasy. 
In his genetic psychology, Tertullian traces the soul from 
its creati on in Adam to death, ending ... De Anima just short of 
resurrection. The soul is defined genetically as flatus dei, 
based on Genesis II, ii, against Hennog enes's reading of s n iri- I 
tus dei. The soul then densifies and takes on a physical shape, 
apparently because for Tertullian this presented a further ob-
stacle to transmigrationism. This densify ing process, however, 
bridges his sy stem from flatus dei to corpus anima and relates 
his two basic p sychological concep ts of the soul. 
His major genetic discussion concentrates on traducianism, 
t h e doctrine of h ereditary transmission of the soul. This view 
was p robably proposed for many reasons, the most important of 
which is as an account of the doctrine of orig inal sin. Yet it 
is inade qu a te to account for s in, and genetics does not bear it 
out,either. His emphasis on the intrauterine coalescence of 
e soul and body and his views on t he differentiation of sex are 
interesting . They furthe r illuminatehis view of the ep istemolo-
g ical unity of sense and intellect, as well as arguing for 
bodily resurrection against transmig rationiam, and of course, 
are not incompatible with the theory of corpus anima. They lead 
to his doctrine of homo, which is analyzed but reveals little 
in the direction of t h e later persona, although his anima, 
Rapidly tracing the development of the child t hough puberty, 
jTertullian's doctrine of environmental conditi oning , based on 
the dist inction of substance and accidents, mentioned i n many 
contexts, receives hi's full attention as he shows how irration-
ality and unnatural drives emerge. He also distinguishes betwee 
what is natural for the soul and for the soul together with the 
body. He is seen to be moving in the direction of asceticism, 
but his doctrine of nature saves him in De Anima. His rejection 
~~ of Valentinian p sychology is important because it shows another 
traducian i nfluence j_n the concept of the primal unity of man-
kind. However, Tertullian has c onfused the St oic concept with 
the Christian, and affirmed a common genetic origin rather than 
the equal moral status of man befor e God. 
In his eth ics, ·the genetic p sych ology :Ls seen as background 
for his t heory of original sin, and his theory of substance and 
~~ accidents and of natu re, is seen to be the means whereby he 
!hereditary sin as "second nature" to the intrinsic (substantial) 
I 
good of the s oul. It is also iillJlortant to remember his equ~tio I 
of "good,." "natural, 11 and "rational, 11 and their opposites, 11 evil"' 
11unnatural,n and 11 irr ational, 11 an important principle of expla-
nation or a basic conf using indiscrimination, depending on how 
lone look s at it. Sin is transmitted, of course, b y t he means 
provided i n t h e traducian t heory. Te r tullian does not hold to 
natural de pravity nor to complete corruption of the flesh by 
unnatural desires; the flesh is only ancillary to the soul, to 
e which the rea l sin adheres. His t heory of free will is the 
meru1s v-rhereby moral evil is explained, for man ht s t he poweB to 
choose as well as change his accidentia. As one of its attri-
butes, the soul has f ree will, without a doubt. r he divine-
human relationship i s establish ed in the definition of the soul 
a s flatus del, although Tertullian draws no ethical conclusions 
from it. His general theory is the legalistic one .of satis-
factio to God for all sins c ommitted, but this is not found in 
De Anima. His most important r efutation, h~¥ever, of metempsy-
ch osis is based on t he fact that it asserts an unworthy judg-
ment on the soul when compared with t hat p roposed in Christian-
ity . 
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Clil-\.PTER V 
DE ANI MA AND HELLB;NISTIC PHILOSOPHY 
Tertullian 1 s awareness of non-Christian philosophy is seen 
in the fact that De Anima reads like a partial lexicon of phil-
osophical thought from the ancient writers after Thales to the 
He llenistic thiru~ers who were early contemporaries of Tertullian 
h imself. 1 Tertullian 1 s supposed antipathy to philosophy and to 
ancient philosophers is not a sufficient explanation to account 
for every case of his interest in a philosophica l opinion. If 
this is not the case, one might reasonably ask just how much any 
of these philosophers did influence the doctrines in De Anima 
and v1hy Tertullian devoted so much attention to them, claiming 
as he did t hat he was a non-speculative Christian? 
Tertullian wrote De Anima wit h no little awareness of non-
Christian writers who had dealt with problems similar to his. 
As this chapter will show, he often depended on the work and in-
vestigations of certain predecessors for specific theories. 
Even many of the arguments outlined in the last two chapters 
were not really his, t hat is, they were not original with him. 
In ans·wer to the second part of the above question, the next 
chapter will indicate that the Christian traditi on did not pro-
vide sufficient answers to all the questions vn~ich it r a ised, 
thus ma.1dng Te r tullian' s recourse to other sources of inform.a-
tion absolutely necessary. 
1. F or a complete list of philosophers mentioned in De Anima, 
see Waszink, TDA, 623-626. 
I 
But the primary answer to t h is p roblem will be seen in the 
1
surprising ·fact that De Anima is pat te rned chapter by chapter 
~fter a Hellenistic psychological treatise written by a physiciru 
~ho was influenced from a variety of sources, reflecting the 
press-currents of philosophy during this period. 
Vfhereas the subject of the following chapter is still in 
!need of the attention of interested scholars, the subject of thi~ 
lphapter has been explored by many, notably Karpp, Diels, and 
most recently Waszink. Only the outline of their conclusions as 
summarized by Wasziru{ can be attempted here. 
1. Preface: Tertullian and Classical Greek Philosophy. 
Originally, it had been platmed to include a whole chapter 
~reating Tertullian's remarks on ancient philosophy, viz., phi-
~osophy from Thales to Aristotle, as an illustration of t h e way 
Ln which he used alien philosophical theories and arguments. 
r owever, this has been abandoned for two reasons: it is a detail· 
r d examination which takes too much space for the insignificant 
positive results reached, for no new insights into clas sical 
philosophy are found; and it does not advance the understanding 
of De Anima to any great extent. Consequently, only a summary 
pf this material will be presented here as an introduction to 
~he more pressing matters of the present chapter. 
There is no doubt that Greek philosophy had some influence 
on the psychology and philosophy in De Anima. This is not al-
tered by the fact that Tertullian was not interested in ancient 
philos ophy for its own sake, did not examine it systematically, 
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~nd seldom found in it more than corroberative documentation for 
r is ideas. His treatment of its import ant figures, e. g .,- Plato 
r nd Ari stotle, was inconsistent to a high degree. 1 The sruae may 
pe said for his view of their philosophies, for while he opp osed 
Platonic transmi grationism, he approved the Platonic simple sub-
2 ~tantiality of the soul; while he accepted a revised version of 
~ristotelian faculty psychology, he rejected the closely reason-
~d arglfffients of Aristotle in . principle. 3 This inconsistency is 
f- ypical of Tertullian's views of the ancients in De Anima. 
His knowledge of this philosophy, with the exception of 
· ~ ome Platonic dialogues--particularly the Phaedo~-, was second-
p.and and based on the writing s of the doxographers, the recorder~ 
pf ancient opinions. As a result, it is quite difficult to de-
~ermine with precision whether the err ors in Tertullian's view 
pf ancient philosophy are due to his own lack of care and in-
~ erest in reporting correctly these views, or whether it is due 
lvo the faulty sources on which he drew f or his information. 
i~his latter is definitely the case in many instances; e. g ., his 
view of Heraclitus's t h eory of the soul, Parmenides's theory of 
~leep , Zeno's divisions of the soul, Anaximenies's t heory of 
~oul-substance, Democritus's theory of immortality and Anaxa-
~oras's theory of soul and mind.5 
p_. Cf. De Anima, XXI, vi and XLVI, ix on Plato and Socrates, 
and V, i on Aristotle. See also V!aszink, TDA, 117. 
~ . Cf. De Anima, X, i and I for Tertullian's inconsistency rere. 
~ · Cf. De Anima, VI, vii and XII on Aristotle's minutiloguo. 
~. See Wasziru{, TDA, 36°, 40°-41°, ~4°, 368-370 for details. 5. See :ne Anima, XJI, ii-iii on Anaxagoras; De Aninm~ IX, vii,XJ 
on Iieraclit us; De Anima, IX, vii on Anaximenes; De Anima, 
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XLIII, ii on Parmenides; XV, iii on Zeno; XIV, ii on Democrit).ls. 
t I 
I 
In De Anima, Tertullian functions primarily as a critic of 
!Platonism in his view of ancient philo s ophy. His criticism takes 
ltwo forms. The first is his sustained attack on the ability of 
1~ocrates and Plato to discourse intelli@bly on the soul, an ar-
gumentum ad hominem, which is only occasionally above the level 
. 1 Jof caustic cav1l. The second is his controversy with Platonic 
!Philosophy itself on a number of important pod:nts, e.g., the 
!theory of transmi gration and remini s cence, the incorpore a lity 
of the soul, the division of the soul into parts, and the rela-
ltion of sens e and int el l ect. T~e former leads him into argmnen-
~rum ad homine~ a gainst all the philosophers who influenced or 
rNere in.fluenced b y Plato, e. 9 ., Empedocles, Pythagoras, Aris- . 
totle. The latter leads him to a refutation of all philosophies ! 
a s sociated with Platnoism, e.g., Orphi c and Pythagorean trans-
1migrationism and Valentinian psychology. It is this problem of 
transmi gration which receives more attention in De Anima than 
any other single topic (cf. Reference Outline), and in it Ter-
tullian presents a fairly adequate and orig inal refutation of 
it, as Chapter I suggested. He was interested in it, of course, 
because of its possible adverse effect on Christian doctrine. 
Waszink has gone so far as to say that from Tertullian's open-
'ing words in De Anima, it is evident that 11 ••• t he entire contra-
versy with pagan philosophy is primarily subservient to the pur-
pose of attacking the foundations of heresies. 112 Thus, asTer-
This is initiated as early as De Anima, I. 
Waszink, 'fDA, 7°. 
I 
I 
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itullian attacks ancient philosophy or, as is also often the case 
agrees w·i th ancient' philosophy, it is important to discover in 
each case how the ancients agree or disagree with Tertullian's 
view of Christian doctrine. 
The philosophers mentioned most frequently by Tertullian 
in this period of Greek philosophy are Democritus (~_), Hera-
,clitus (7), Empedocles (13 +), Aristotle (12+), Pythagoras (7 +) 
and Plato (37 +). 1 With the exception of Empedocles, Pythagoras 
and Plato, Tertullian was not really interested in these thin-
kers. Yet they find prominence i~~i~ because they vv-ere 
-+ov-
objectsof interest ;a his sources. 
It is also worth noting that many controversial interpre-
tations in ancient philosophical doctrines were touched on in 
1'\ 
De Anima. rrhese include the theory of VOVS in Anaxagoras, the 
,.. ) \(' - / I 
relation of vov5 , EV"T:f::.Af:.""f..€::L~ and '\f"VXV) in Aristotle ,
1
and the 
twofold or threefold theory of the soul in Plato. Tertullian's 
discussion of t hem sheds no clarifying light, however, for he 
contributed nothing in his analysis not copied from his sources. 
It is very doubtful whether any ancient Greek philosophical 1 
idea had a direct influence on the philosophy of De Anima. 
Tertullian was wary of everything advocated by the ancients be-
cause he found them I'easoning outside, or, more accurately, be-
fore the Christian tradi tion. Of course, there are many agree-
ments between Tertullian and the ancients, e.g., Plato's theory 
J 
of the immortal soul, Aristotle's theory of the powers of the 
1. Some of the 11 + 11 references are to ttpythagoreanism" and uPla-
tonism, 11 rather than to 11 Pythagoras:t or 11 Plato; 11 some are -l:o 
=====#==ffi;r~e= ~I:l~e-:f;e.,ne-F~~f'c..,...<=>Yice ;,..., !:> char~-(' 
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soul. Bu t these are most certainly not direct influences, with 
the p ossible exception of Plato's views on immortality. The 
only certain direct influences on h is t h ought were legalism, 
alre ady explored, t h e Christian tradition, to be further outl~ 
in t he next chapter, and Stoic, Epicurean and Sceptic and Eclec-
tic philosophy which supplied the great majority of the actual 
arguments for the philosophical positions adopted in De Anima. 
It is these l at te r inf l uences which are most important here. 
Also, it is t h e rather extensive agreement by Tertullian with 
v i ews of the pre-Socratics which t hey never helf but which were 
widely attPibuted to them t hat further indicates the influence 
of these Helleni stic and doxographical writers on De Anima. 1 
2. De Anima , the Stoics and Epicureans. 
It is a fairly wide:spread preslunption that iJfe Anima, as 
elsewhere in his writings, Tertullian i s to be regarded as in 
most particulars a l at e Stoic philosopher and as a min imlun, a 
2 Christian gPeatly influenced by t he Stoic philosophy. Zeller 
f re quently refers to Tertullian in his discussion of Stoic phi-
losophy.3 A careful study of De Anima does reveal t hat many 
St oic concepts are used and t hat Tertullian constantly refers to 
1. For a general int roduction to thi s topic and a summary of the 
contributions of others, see Wasziruc, TDA, 21°-47°. 
2. See Harnaclc , HOD, II, 255, Farrar, LF 1 232, Ueberweg- Baum-gartfner, GGP, II, 85, _!i.oberts, TT, 6b ff., Mo_;'gan , IT, ~l ff. 
Williams, IFO, 233 and l\:nudson, DOR, 97 . In tne same veln, 
but less forcefully advocated, see Bonwe tsch, Art.(l907), 549, 
Gieseler, TCH, I, 230, Robins on, Art.(l9?..1 ), 735, Tenn.~, . 
OPS, 31 and Lebreton and Zeliler, HPC, II, 834. 
3. See, for instance, footnotes in Zeller, SES, 148 , 159, 211, 
213-215, 218. 
important Stoics such as Zeno, 1 Cleanthes, 2 and Chrysippus.3 
The locus classicus is De Anima, XX; : i, where Tertullian s peaks 
of Seneca as saepe noster. Therefore, when Ueberweg-Geyer de-
scribes the philosophy of Tertul l ian's De Anima as a n ••• sen-
sualistische Erkenntnislehre und materialistische Psychologie,n 
and his 11 Weltansicht:.1.1 •. as " ••• ein krasser Realismus, ja Material-
1ismus,11 this can be explained in terms of h is basic St oicism.4 
It has been one of the major objects in Waszink's researche 
to show that this view shared by most historians has misleading 
tendencies as a principle of interpr etation. Briefly , it tends 
to overlook the fact that Tertullian's Stoicism is often the 
Stoicism of Seneca, Varro, Plinw, Suetonius, and Cicero.5 It is 
their i mpure and eclectic Stoicism which first calls the theory 
into question . Further, none of the writers from whom Tertul-
lian learned his Stoicism were themselves really Stoics, but 
these writ ers nevertheless profoundly influenced him. And 
finally , the character of St oicism i tself is open to certain 
variations as it moved from post-Aristotelian Greece to Hellen-
istic Rome. 
The important group here for De Anima is that composed by 
t h e writers in t he latest period. An obscure group for the 
average student of the history of philosophy, it includes such 
n1en as Soranus , Arius Didymus, Aenesidemus, Albinus and others, 
1. De Anima, I II, ii, V, iii, XIV, ii, XXXI,vi. 
2. De Anima, V, iv, XXV, ix. 
3 . De Anima, V, vi, VI, VKii, XIV, 11, XYJ.I , vi. 
4 · Ueberweg-Ge~er, GGP , I, 51. S. For instance, see Zeller, HE, 149-150 on Cicer o's Eclecticism 
- , 
_, 
who were i nfluenced by physicians, di a lecticians , and statesmen 
as well as the philosophical schools. In their writing s ,,which 
Tertullian use~ they may be said to represent the Eclecticism 
of the JBriod whi ch swept aside all vi tal distinctions between 
t he schools. 
The part pl ayed by Ep~cureanism , however, is largely but 
1
n ot completely subservient to Stoicism, s i nce many of the lesser 
Epicurean views Tertul li~ embraced were originally derived from 
Stoicism. Still, there are import ant points of divergence, such 
a s the theor i e s of sense perception and freedom of the will, 
which the Ep icureans and Tertullian championed,while the Stoics 
opposed them. Also, the r e are slightly fewer refere nces· to Epi-
cur us and Epicureanism in De Anima than to Stoicism. 
In order to clarify the relationship of Tertul l ian in De 
Anima to these philosophic viewpoints, some of t h e important 
teaching s of the Stoics (and Epicureans) may be discussed with 
reference to t he content of De k~ima a s indic ated in the l ast 
two chapters. Stoicism itself is usually studied in three 
phases, viz., early, middle, and l ate , which relate to the foun-
.._ 
ding of Stoicism in Greece, its transmission to Rome, and its 
decline. In this present disc11ssion, early and mi ddle Stoa will 
in general be emphasized at the expense of later Stoicmsm be-
cause the lat t er is hardly dist inguishable from the Eclectic 
~ movement. 
i~ Metaphysics and the soul.--The most import ant metaphysi-
cal para-llel between Tertullian in De Anima and Stoicism (and in 
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lpart Epicureanism) is the llmateriality of all things, 11 1 which in 
'De Anima becomes, perhaps because of the opposition to Hermo-
genes, t h e 11 corporeality of all things. n 'l'ertulllan' s basic 
assertion, then, that the soul is a corporeal body is seen to be 
closely related to a p rimary Stoic c oncept found perhaps as 
. 2 3 
1
early as Zeno, · and certainly found in Chrysippus and Cleanthes ~  
C~E._:(lUS est. 5 lAs Seneca later observed, for Stoicism, quod facit 
'Just as Tertullian never 
!mains central th~oughout 
tain differences between 
parts with this doctrine, it also re-
all three periods of Stoicism. 6 Cer-
Tertullian's concept of corporeality 
and the Stoic concept of materiality could be found. But the 
basic similarity of both teachings and CJ.'ertullian Is open asser-
ltion that hi s view is a Christ ian defense of the Stoic view7 in-
dic ates their comrnon ground. Both seem to mean that the soul is 
composed of an indefinable, attenuated material substance.8 This 
concept may derive from pre-Socratic philosophic views, perhaps 
jHeraclitus (although Zeller denies this),9 perhap s explaining in 
I part Tertullian Is interest in Heraclitus. 10 But ·whereas the 
1. Zeller, SES, lg5-l35, 194 , 439· However, Democritean Epi-
cureanism and 11eraclitean Stoicism differ as to their basic 
concent of materialism. 
2. 
I
I G-: 
5. 
16. 
17. 
8 . 
Esser~, ST, 72. · 
Zeller, SES, 125, fn. 3. 
Zeller, HE, 220. 
Quffi~d in Giesler, TCH, I, 230. See also Zeller, SES, 136, 
210, 253. 
Zeller, HE, 159. 
De Anima , XII-XIV. 
Knudson, DOR, 97 never seems to arrive at a clear definition 
of matter as he says Tertullian is 11 a most positive and out-
spoken materialist. 11 ~l Harnack, HOD, II, 255 and Anony-
mous, Art.(l863), 173 defend Tertullian here. 
See De Anima, V, ii and Waszink , TDA, 174. 
Zeller, SES, 133-13tl., 393 · 
i 
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l concept of matter was fairly e:;rJlaustively examined by the early 
III indicated that Tertullian discussed only 1 Stiliics, Chapter 
the aspects of corporem:ity which interested him. Topics here 
of such importance to the Stoics as the Aristotelian categories,
1 
lon which they depended and reinterpreted, simply are not fdLnd 
I 
in De Anima. 2 
The intimate relation between God and nature, expanded into 
!pantheism by the Stoics, is also important to Tertullian. The 
relationship of nature, God and reason in De Anima has its basic 
parallel again in Stoicism, 3 except for the major difference 
that for Tertullian, nature as the essence or sum total of all 
creation, is rational always because it is God 1 s creation, not 
exactly a typically Greek mode of thought.4 Also, the Stoic 
\/ / 
concept of i nnnanent or seminal reason, Aoyo·s O"'tttf~Ol "t'l K.OS, finds 
no place as such in De Anima. Perhaps because of his Christia, 
views, t his and other Stoic cosmological concepts, e.g., the conrr 
flagration of the world and eternal recurrence, held no interest ll 
for him.5 
The Stoic-De Anima parallel in the concept of nature is 
carried over into another basic topic, the relation of the soul 
to God. God, as a real existent, is a body forboth Tertullian 
6 
and Stoicism. However, for Stoicism, the soul was part of God 
(pantheism), a 11fragment 11 or 11 ••• part of the divine breath im-
1. Zeller, SES, 126-131. 
2. Zeller, SES, 109-110, 99-100. 
3. See Zeller, SES, 125, Morgan, IT, 11, 13, Roberts, TT, 75, 
221, and Glover, TAS, xv. 
Zeller, SES, 82, 156, 213 and Esser, ST, 24. 
See Zeller~ SES, 166-167 on these· 
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mersed in the humBn body. 111 While this relation of the soul to 
God's breath resembles aDnost verbatim Tertullian's interpreta-
tion of Gen. II, vii, it must be agreed with Esser that Tertul-
lian completely re j ected the Stoics's consci ous pantheism, 2 
although one must also admit t h a t the r e is ''einer Gedanken-Anal-
ogie "3 here between the t wo. 
Further, the view of the s oul a s a body in both the Stoics 
and in Tertullian prohibited neither from also holding that it 
was bre ath. Roberts suggests that Tertullian' s statement of the 
soul as flatus dei is " ••• easily r ecognized as a Christianized 
statement of the Stoic ide a . n4 The cosmic principles of be at> or 
\ / ./ fire, which is closely related to the AO"fOS o-n~ppo<-cL t=:.os in Stoi-
cism,5 becomes thefiatus of the Christian God in De Anima, and 
in b oth cases, the essentially ne ar-divine nature and source of 
the soul is preserved. 
Th e characteristic emphasis on t h e unity of the soul in De 
Anima was also an important doctrine of the Stoics; they upheld 
t h e unity of t he soul 11 ••• vd th greater rigol~ than either Pl ato 
or Aristotle, 116 and Tertullian's position f ollows their lead 
be re. 7 
VJhile Chapter III quoted and agreed with Esser that Tertul-
lian doe s not offer a connected argument in De Pnima explicitly 
1. Knudson, DOR, 95 and Zeller, SES , 351. 
2. Es ser, ST~ 45-48, 85 , 161, 218 . 
J. Esser, ST, 47· 
4-· Roberts, TT, 69. 
5 . Zelle I'~ SES, 14J+, 153-154,210-211. 
6 . Zeller, SES, 215. 
7. Es ser, ST, 216 and Viaszink, TDA, 201. 
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!for immortality, 1 it was also observed there that he was intense 
I 
ly interested in protecting this doctrine, and as a consequence 
opposed not on_ly Platonic transmigration, but also the predomi-
1 nate Stoic view of a mer•ely 11 ••• limited continuance of existence 
2 
after death, 11 and the complete denial of immortality in Epi-
jcureanism. Instead, he appealed to a Platonic interpretation of l 
'his own concept of soul-substance as the basis for his rational 
proofs for i!innortality. 
Whereas the Stoics generally held to the rigorous determin-
ism of the will, 3 with occasional gestures in the direction of 
I -
"psychological freedom,"4 Tertullian more nearly followed the 
.:: 
Epicur eans at this point...... However, Christians such as Tertul-
lian were more interested in the ethical implic ati ons of :_·reedom 
of the will than were the Greel-cs, who s eemed more interested in 
6 
its metaphysical implic ations. 
Basic metaphysical problems which interested the e arly 
Stoics, viz., natural evil, natural science, causality, time, 
space, were of no interest to Tertullian. Again, Tertullian 
shared with the later Stoics a disinclination toward abstract 
ii. Anthropo1ogy.--For Tertullian and the Stoics, the body 
and soul exist together in a state of 11mutual intermingling, 11 
For the Stoics, this is merely one instance of their 
1. Esser, ST, 84. 
2. 
3. 
4-· 5. 
======#b: 
Zeller, HE, 223. 
Zeller; SES, 217. 
Zeller, SES; 179-180. 
Zeller; SES, 446·. However, 
Zeller, SES; ?-36•.)/· Ze~la~ ..SES.. .J 1 ~o -1Ln1 
Knudson, DOR, 130 disagrees he're •· 
-
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!b a sic world hypothes j_s of ~miversal int e r mingling , 111 and al-
l 
t b.oug h De An:tma does not reflect t his "root metaphor, 11 t here is 
:mp r ea s pm to doubt that Tertullian' s concept vias found in this 
Stoic view. For both, the d i ffusion o:L the soul throughout the 
body is related to the idea of f'·l\. ~ LS. Inte g ral with t he blood, 
the SOlll mixes in all parts of the body by this means . 2 Another 
idea shared by De Anima with t he Stoics and Epicureans l'elates 
l'c / 
to To 1"\YE:pc:N I.KO~ 11 ••• der Zentra lpunkt a lle r psychischen Funk-
tionen, ..• das Zentralorg an '[ der] •.• h ochsten Reg ion der Seele. rr 3 
rrel"tullian a gain was following the Stoics a nd Epi curea~s, under 
t h e iP..fluence of the physicians , and located t h is dire cting 
})rinciple of t he soul in the heart. 
Bv.t of all the physiolog ical t heol'"' i e s shared by rl1ertullian 
in De Anima , t he Stoic s and Epicureans, the most i mportant is 
their co~1Jlj10n v'18.vv of the t ransmission of the soul by insemination 
]I 
or traducianism. '-;- The rudiments of tJJe tro..ducian t h eory date 
r:; 
back t o both Zeno and Cleanthes.- In St oici sm thi s the c ry is 
\ / I 
related t o the 1\0"(0S cnT-E-ff-!IJI..\L~ since it becomes a physical 
i r;1manenc e of the cosmic life princip le, 6 whereas as Chapter IV 
shm;!ed, traducianism is best i n te rpreted in r e rtulli a n as the 
physiolog ica l exp lanation for he r editary or oritr, ina l sin. But 
credit must be g iven to Stoicism i n beque athing the physiolog i l 
7 
detai ls of the traducian t heory to Christianity via De ·An:."Lma . 
1 . Zelle~-SES , 10) , 136- 137, 196 . 
2 . Zeller , SES , 211-212 and Waszink , TDA , 227 . 
3 . Esser, ST , 114-117, Ze ller-, SES, 213 , lJ,S5 and Wasz i nk , TDA, 221. 
\-· Zeller , SES , 212 , LJ_)LJ. and Waszinl;;: , rrDA, 3LJ1~- 3l!_8 . 
) . Esser, ST, 72, 218 and Ze ller, SES , 211-212. 
6. See Zeller, SES , 172 . 
::u·et sch .AHt. 1 _Q_ s.nd Tennant, OPS , Jl . 
Tertulli an 1 s view·s on dreams, sleep , cmd death were pro -
foundly inf.luenced by the general Stoic a nd in some case s Ep:t -
curean t each ing s . Sl eep as a na:buPal suspension of t h e a ct:tv:t-
ties of the body a n d deat h as nour deb t to nat u re '1 both come di -
r e ctly out of Stoic wr itings . 1 iiVhile dre ar:1s and t h e pro ~-:>hetic 
a rt were upheld by the Stoics, and early St oicism even argued 
2 
that d ivinat ion wa s qui t e natur~l, later Stoicism, e. g ., Cicero, 
s u ggested that dreams vvere the g i ft of God , which view 'J:ler•tullic· 
3 de v elops . Thus, t he relations ·be t ween sleep and dreams, as 
well as the conce l-:rt of ecstasy , which '.L'ertul lian defends i n De 
)_1_ 
Anima , are not wholly unknovm in Stoicism. ' 
iii. EpistemolQ&• --vVi th the exception of h is dependence on 
Scriptural l"e v e l a t:Lon and au thor ity, 'l'ertulli a n I s epistemology 
is vvox•ked out on the basis of St oic:i.srn and Epi cur e anism, using 
the f o n ner 1 s concept of sensu s COlTIEilmis and t he le.tte r 1 s 
r.:' 
..., t . 1 • :J or sens a lOna_lsm. It i s t he top ic of sensationalism wh ich 
, · d .1..1 e D b .~.. , r e n earll' PI"' _C! 1··ol· c .-·L!=:l".-,1 and. ·l·b.e I-Telle""l. s1·l· c or:1 g es ul. g aJ. e t.. . ~ e _ - uv - v _ • .u v 
Eclecticism, for acc ording t o Zeller , it wa s the inab ilit ~r of J lJ .Ll<l-
Ep icl.n,eans to develop an adequate criterion of truth on t b.e basis 
of t h eir sens a t ionalism which led to Sc euticism in t he i r f ollow-
ei'S and the eve ntualdi sillusiomn.ent with a l l ~ol:dl os ophic rig or 
in its fina l t -., 1 ' . . 6 s a g e a s ~c e c~lclsm . It ·will be remembered t hat 
Tertulli an , too, d i d not hav e a clear epistemology which cou l d 
1. Vvas zinl( , TDA , L1.61, ~~ 19. 
2 . 3 sser, ST , 1L1.1 and ,ZelJB r, SES , 37 0- 375 . 
3 . S aszink , TDA , 503-505 . 
L. Zeller , SES , 377. 
_5 . Ze ller , SJ:S , 77, 1~26 and Vvaszlnlc , TDA , 237-238, 2L1.3, 24-7 · 
6 . Ze lJ.er, SES , 4.26 , Li.29 , l!-32 , 1:.57 - 11-59 . 
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include both divine revelation and sensationalism, even though 
he did not fall under the influence of scepticism at this point. 
Eclecticism was also led into Tertullian's thought by the 
jstoic epistemological principle )/ 1 Of XWUN- t\IVOLOCL. , conscienta 
. 2 . 
connnunls, or E_ens~onnnunls. As Chapter III suggested, Ter-
tullian coupled this idea with the general rational ity of nature 
and often appeals to the self-evidence of truths supposedly de-
rived from conrrnon sense, rather than to their conformi ty vvi th 
!reason or logic. Tertullian, as other Christians, felt that 
common sense was also a legitimate source for knowledge about 
3 God. It has been suggested t h at the ultimate justification for 
the basic Stoic idea of, metaphysical materialism is found in 
4 t he misapplication of t h e concept of common sense, resulting in 
a naive reali stic materialism. Tertullian 1 s epistemology and 
metaphysics could also be interp reted in this way. 
The Stoic idea of common sense may also be seen as the 
epistemological applicat i on of a fundamental anti-speculative 
tendency esnecially among later Stoics. For these philos ophers I , - -
the whole purpose of philosophy was to assist man in orienting 
hims elf to h is moral and social problems; 
Speculative knowledge is not ••• to the Stoics an 
end in i t self, but only a means ~or producing a 
right moral attitude; 5 ••• on no other hypothesis 
c an t h e internal structure and foungat ion of their 
system be satisfactorily explained. 
11. Esser, ST, 167 and cf. De Anima, II. 
2 . See Zeller, SES, 543, Glover, TAS, xv and Waszinl{, TDA, 1.~54. 
3. 1Naszink, TDA, 1 00 and Esser, ST, 170-172. 
h. Zeller, SES , 134-135. S. Zeller, SES, 381, 56. 
6. Zeller, SES, 57-58. 
Th is Stoic attitude could easily h a ve reinforced Tertullian's 
anti- s p ecula tive inte r e sts and also made ac ce p table the t hou ghts 
of thinkers less rigorous te 11911 : r t! than the early Stoics them-
selves. It ought to be rememb e red tha t the early Stoics did not 
s a crifice an intere st i n log ic simply because for them the moral 
life wa s more imp ortant t han the s p eculative lif e . 1 But the 
sacrifice of log ical rigor i n De Anima mirr ors the later Stoic 
tend ency to discard pure formal log ic as a necessary t ool in 
phil o soph y and appeal instead to the directly certain, the de-
ll 112 • live r ances of c o1mnon sense, whlch as in De Anima, is often 
an appeal to sophistry and quite "uncommon" sense. 
I-<' urther rela tion of Stoicism to De Anima is found in Ter-
tullian 1 s characteristic attitude toward the mind and body and 
their rela tion in knowing . According to Zeller, the Stoics 
felt tha t t h e diff erence b e tween sense a nd intellect 11 ••• is not 
an absolute difference in k ind, but a relative difference, a 
gradual shading off of one into the oth er. 113 r his relation of 
sens e and intellect is ·uaralleled in b oth Tertullian and the 
~ 4 
Stoics wi t h t h e assertion of the rationali t y of emotions. 
These j_deas, dominant in early Stoicism, 5 gave way to a differ-
ent view in later Stoicism, which d i sp arag ed sensationalism in 
e p istemology (evidenced b y the growth of Scep ticism) and the body 
in ethics (evidenced by their ascetic moral p ractices and the 
1. Zeller, SES, 65-66. 
2. Zeller, SES, 9 2 , HE, 19. 
3. Zeller, SES, 86. 
4- Zeller, SES, 291-292. 5. Zeller, SES, 83. 
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consequent assertion that d e sire and a n g er were irrational). 1 
Here Tertullian remained nearer the early Stoics and Epi cure ans . 
The pr-oblem uncovered in De Anima of whether Tertullian 
actually reg arded the objects of knowledge as in t h e mind when 
known, wa s also a problem for Stoicism after Chrysippus, for 
they held to a similar concep t and even proposed that the ob-
jects of thou e-)lt (ideas), if real (having referents), must be 
things, i .e., material bodies. 2 
Thus, there can be no doubt that in metaphysics, anthro-
p ology and e p istemology , Tertullian is gre a tly indebted to the 
basic Stoic theories for the philosophical arguments set fol"th 
in De Anima on these subjects. It is also apparent that Ter-
tullian's Stoicism is highly sele ctive, unsystematic, and de-
viates at important points in cosmology , log ic and ethics from 
the received doctrines. Morgan has suggested that " ••• his 
Stoicism ••• must be described as Christian Stoicism, 113 which is 
to say Tertullian's Christian interests dominated his selection 
of Stoic teaching s. Also, his knowledge of Stoic philosophy was 
derived from non-Stoi c ( and non-Ep icurean) sources, from think-
ers who c an be described only as adherents of the widespread 
Eclecticism of the a ge and whos e interp retation of Stoicism 
and even earlier Greek philosophies was ge nerally develope d to 
satisfy other than t h e needs of true historical reports. 
However remote from Stoicism mi ght be the interpretations 
1. Zeller, SES, 221, 223-224, BE, 70. 
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2. vVa szin-k, TDA, 138-139, 1L~2 and __ Zeller, SES, 78-79, 92 • 
3. Morgan, IT, 12. Cf. Fuller, A~t.(l887), 836 , Roberts, TT, 
========*===-~h- +-= n d ~tha~ ~t.~t.P.rnants j ~n~tbi~·=·-~~~ -n~t:~el~r~· ==================~F=======~ 
of it which Te rtullian had available, t he basic doctrines of 
De Anima refer back to that philosophy and no other. Stoicism 
is the one system of philosophy indisp ensable to an understanEI.- I 
ing of the theorie s of met a phys ics, psychology and anthropology 
in De Anima, since Christianity itself can h~rdly be described 
in this period as a system of philosophy. 
3. Eclecticism and the Direct Sources for De Anima. 
It has freque ntly b een suggested in thi s thesi s that most 
Y" 
if not all of Tertullian's inf omat ion about all ph ilosophy was 
"' 
' mediated to him by writers who may best be described as members 
of the Hellenistic Eclecticism (as opposed to t he Hellenic 
schools of the Academy or Stoa, for instance). Eclecticism it-
l 
self is difficult to characterize pos~tively,- but Tertullian's 
De Anima does reflect t h e cardinal method s of this movement in 
philosophy : careless logical analysis, amalgamation of differing 
philosophic doctrines into one artificial whole, lack of sci-
entific interest, anti-sp eculation, legalism, belief in some 
kind of sup ei•-log ical or revelatory truth, and h ypercriticism of 
2 
p revious philosophers, especial ly Pl a to. Eclecticism is found 
in De Anima not only in me4hod, but also in content, prima rily 
in the faulty interp ret ation of various philosophical doctrines 
held b y the ancients wh ich Tertullian takes over unwitt ingly 
1. Zeller, BE, ~- defines Eclecticism as ex tending from 1_50 B. C. 
to A. D. 1_50, and as briniTing together t he op inions of the 
previously distinct scbool.s, maJking itself a 11 one as well as 
th~other (Sowoh l-als-auch). 11 
2 . Se e the e xcellent discussion in Zeller, HE , 3-110, and es-
p ecially l~--20, 66, 70, 99. Compare this vvith the characteri-
zation of De Anima in t his thesls, Chapters I-IV. 
I 
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from his sources, e.g., attributing an acceptance of sensation-
alism to late Stoicism, divination in dreams to Aristotle, 
scepticism to Heraclitus. 1 
~nereas the previous part of t hi s chapter outlined the 
Stoic and Epicurean indebtednes s of De Anima, the reference to 
Sceptic influences may have seemed a bit strange. Was not the 
c ardina l doctr•ine of Scepticism aimed at the certainty with 
whi ch the Epicureans regarded sense perception, the very doctril1!3 
Te rtullian struggles so long to hold a g ainst all opposition? 
But the Sceptic influences in De Anima are of a different k ind. 
Although t here are s pecific references in De Anima to Sceptic 
philosophers, the Sceptic influence is primaT•ily via t h e more 
innnediate Eclectici:sm in that treatise. The reason for this is 
explained b y Zeller as follows: 
The eclecticism which since the beg inning of the 
first cehtury before Christ had repressed Scepti-
cism and united together the previously separate 
tendencies of thought, was2 .. merely the reverse side of Scepticism ·itself. 
The Sceptic influences on De Anima are thus seen to be implicit 
in the Eclectic influences. A brief examina tion of Tertullian 1 s 
direct sources, excluding Plato's Phaedo and Christian litera-
ture, puts these Eclectic influences in better relief. 
l. On Aristotle's theo ry of dr~s, see De Anima, XLVI, iii and 
the c ommentary b y Viaszin1c, TDA, 488 . On scept icism in Hera-
cl i tus, see De Anima, XI, vi, the c omrnentary by Waszinl-c, TDA, 
30°, and Fragment [~? in Freeman, .ASP, 27. On Pl ato's anti-
sensationalism see De Anima, XXIV and the commentary by VJas-
zink , TDA, JOlt-• 
2. Zeller, HE, 3. 
. l 
i. The Primary source: Soranus's lT~p~ lV11rns .--In the 
attempt to discover the source for Tertullian's copious refer-
ences in De An ima to non-Christian thought, scholars have com-
pared it to what is known of the works of Soranus of Ephesus, 
who is mentioned frequently throughout De Anima, and usually 
with deference and respect; Tertullian first describes him as 
n ••• the voluminous commentator on all opinions of the philoso-
1 
phel"s;' in De Anima, VI, vi. By collating the texts and refer-
ences, the conclusion has been reached that Tertullian not only 
depended on Soranus to a very great extent for information about 
other philosophers but alpo accepted his own views on a waalth 
of subjects related to the soul. 
It is important to notice how few theological writers on 
Tertullian recognize this indebtedness. 2 In doing so, they have 
unfortunately overlooked the primary argument against De Ani~ 
being basically a Stoic treatise and the primary a~gument 
a gainst it being exclusively a Christian polemic. 
Soranus of Ephesus was the founder in Rome of the Methodi-
cal school of physicians.3 He flourished about a century before 
Tertullian.~- The Methodical school was originally established 
i n Alexandria as a dissenting group from the Empirical school 
in the latter half of the first century before Christ.S The 
1. Other important references are in De Anima, VI, vii, VIII,iii l 
XIV, ii, XV, iii, Y~V, v and XLIV, ii. See also Waszink, 
TDA, 22°. 
2. Tixeront, HD, I, 3~- , Bardenhewer, PA~, 188 and Krttger, HEC 
are among those who do recognize Soranus 1 s influence on Ter-
tullian in De Anima. 
J. Kind, A~t.(l927), 1114. 
L!-• Patrick, GS, 2L1-S. 5. Patrick, GS, 209. 
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c ardinal theo:._~ i e s of this s c hool i n cluded such vie•us as 11 the 
l 
breath is t h e life :,Jrinci:ple , 11 - and all d ia&;no s is nmst be bas ed 
':) 
on data prov i ded by sense percept ion , ~ both of which a rc easily 
re c oe n i zed as p rincip l e s defended in De Ani ::na . PI'obably the 
Ll:ethodics a lso exhibited atavistic influenc ed fr om the earl i er 
alliance in Al e.:;candria betvieen t he Enpiric s a n d the Pyrrhoni st s 
J 
of the third c entu1"·y befor e Ch rist. I n t he year s antedating 
S o ranus a n d Tertull i an , t h e physic ians of both scho ols , despite 
nan y d i fferenc es , had be come intima·~ely related to the Sc e p tic-
h. ~yrr~: onic p h i l osophy . ' Soranus , a s founder of the 11 neo- Hetb od-
j_cs, 11 as the Roman f ;~ethodi cs were som.etirnes c a lled , brou.p;ht this 
n ore or l ess e c lect i c philos ophi c al and ~mdic al heri tag e t o h is 
o 'll1 v1ri ting s, a s vrel l as t he St oi c i nfluenced from t he Pnemnat ic 
1 l f.> b . . 1 . h 1 l d l ' ' ' . ~ 1 . s s c Do o 01 :0 _ysl cJ. ans w ll C 1.e a p erso_ a_ s:c-crac ·c :~. on ::,: or _l l m . ~ 
i1e vras a lso att r a cted b~r c ertain Sc e p tic d oc t rines vvb ich ming led 
free l y u ith h is ot h er interests . 6 
.tunong Soranus t s many worl:s , the one _nost p r obab l y used b y 
Tert ullian in De AJ?-i ma:. was n~p~ Vvx~s ~L~A~O<. &"', On the S oul 
I (in f our vo l Ulnes ).7 In this enc y clop edic Viorl-: , S o ranus had p re -
sente d t he h ist ory of medicine , mm1erous }hilolog ic a l p r obl ens, 
varj_ous vievr s of philo s o:nhers c onc erning t he sou l whi c h ll.e op -
op ose d , and advanc ed h is ovm psycb.o log ic a l the o r i es b a sed on t h e 
c u llin c s from hi s ~)hil o s ophica.l and medical p r ede c.essor s, and 
1 . Patri c k , GS , 2)_~6 . 
2 . Wa sz i n k , TDA , 23° . 
3. Patrick , GS , 203 - 211 . 
[:_ . Patri c l;: , GS , 2L:-5 a n d vVa s zink , TDA , 2L~ 0 , 30° . 5. '\·'!a szi:nJ·: , 'i'DA , 25° . 
6 '.-1 • ,_ rrn A 21_ o ,.., c o . · .. a szln_s.. , _ 1-1., _ '- - c.. .:J • 
~ - t l ,.., ..., ). lllr , '"!R ·'111- TD ·~ ?6° .2° 0 "-~r . c.. __ _ ancc ., c . s z -'- ,~ , n, _ - u • 
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further supplemented by his own studies. In philosophy, he has 
generally been identified with Democritean and Stoic philosophy, 
which accounts for Tertullian 1 s interest in and approval of 
Democri t u s as well as providing his basic contact with a general 
1 
l y Stoic psychology. Unfortunately, Soranus's work exists to-
day only in fragments, 2 and among Christian writers, Tertulli 
alone seems to hG.ve made any extensive use of it. 3 
For informat i on about ancient philosophy and medicine, 
Soranus' s ovm statements derive ultimately from Theophrastus an 
Alexander Philalethes respectively. He also had direct access to 
Vetusta Placita, an important item in doxographic literature.4 
Through this and other sources, the ancient philosophies~ stream-
ed to Soranus' s lTep'L 'fl1J~S and from tb:'r>e to De Anima. Most 
of Tertullian's information about Aristotelian philosophy came 
t h rough Soranus. On the other hand, "Soranus never shows any 
particular interest in Plato, 11 _5 who was important to rrertullian 
as the patriarch of all heresies, thus indicating tbat Tertul-
lian had other sources besides the Ephesian physician. 
vn~ile Wa szink would be the last to suggest that Tertullian 
did not de pend heavily on Soranus, he does suggest that some 
have overemphasized as much as others have underemphasi zed this 
dependence. The fact that Tertullian and Soranus do not always 
correlate exactly in their views really indicates that Tertul-
lian " ••• was a highly abstract and original character, who, whe 
1. 'trvaszink, ·TDA, lLi-5 , 201. 
2. Kind, A,..,t.(l927), 1115 and Waszink , TDA, 28°, 26°. 
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3. Kind, Art.(l927), 1130. 
~ · Waszink, TDA, 29°-30°. 
========~~~ F=~=o-============================================*========= 
borrmving vievis or fa cts f rom othe rs, usual ly adap t ed them most 
c a r efully to h i s s pecial purp o s es . "1 T'h u s, 11 ••• we should r;u a rd 
a gainst t h e supposition that Tert . should eve r have a d o p ted a 
view u pheld b y Soranus, if on other g r oun ds he had not a l ready 
convinced hims elf of its being right ( or useful ). 112 'Ha s z ink t s 
eva luati on of the relat ion of Sora nus and Te:c"'tullian is th:.Is 
c le2..rl y i n h a r r!lony with the poi n t s :;_yr•ev:lolw l;T e stablisl--_._ od re -
g ardins Tertulli an 1 s met h od s. 
Th e influe nce of So ranus on Tortull i a n i n De Anima has been 
established with p r>e c ision in two different \7a y s . The f i rst is 
t h e c;e n e ral s i mila rity of pe Jlnima with vrhat is kilown and c an be 
re c on s truct ed of Tic-p'"l.. 1fv xY1s· 1jia s z i nk bas p r e sent ed a p arallel 
outl:lne of t h ese tw o treatises a nd conch.1.siv e l y shows t hat Soran 
us ' s work , based on those of The~phrastus , Vetusta Placita , and 
Aetius , guide s Te1"'tullian 1 s De Anima_ cl~apter by chap ter in the 
3 
ove r a ll s truc t u r e of top ics, subtopics, et c. There are , of 
course , some important d i fferenc es , e s pe c:ially 1.1vh~re Tertullian 
leaves the constructive par t of De Ani m8:_ f or more p olemical p u r -
po s es , e . s ., his op p os ition to tran s mi g ration, Val entin ian p s y -
ch ology ( cf . Referenc e Outline ) . 'l'he sec on d n ethod of p r oof is 
o.. line by l i ne comp arison of De Ani r.1a vrith ·what is m ovm of all 
of Sor a nusts ·writin g s . 'rhis l a t t er me t h od i nvolves a g o od deal 
of de tailed ph ilologic a l ex.arni nati on a t vihlch 'Ha szink exc e lls . 
_ The resu lts of h is d i f fuse find ing s c an be brought t o geth er he r e 
l . Waszink , TDA, 3~-0 • 
2 . ',-'.ia s zink , TDA , 318 . 
3 . See 1Na s zin k 1 s outline in 'I'DA, 30° - 38°, and p articulal"' l y 
30o - 3lo. 
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and the following . p icture is r evealed: 
1) The position taken in De Anima , V-VI on the corporeal soul 
and against its incorporeality i s based on Soranus, although 
1 Tertullian considerably revised the actual arguments. 
2 ) The cont ents of De Apim~, XV, outlining the argtunent for the 
faculti~.s, unity , and d irecting principle of the soul derive 
from Soranus. 2 
3) Much of the information marshalled to support traducianism 
derives from Soranus. Specifical l y, Soranus held that the soul 
and body are mixed, 3 t hat the embryo has a s oul,4 and tnat in 
""" 
all, traducianism is an acceptable medical doctrine. 5 
4 ) Th e argument s in De Anima, XII, XVII, criticizing Platonic 
and Sceptic anti-sensationalism and s u.pporting sensationa lism 
were adapted f r om Soranus. Specifically, the animus and anima 
are not ultimately distinct substances (following the Stoics) 6 
and t h e senses are p1•ima r y over the intellect in ac quiring know-
l edge ( follovring the Epicur eans). 7 
5) Of les ser i mportance, Tertullian followed Soranus in the de-
8 t ails of h is theori e s r egarding sleep , dreams and death. 
From these points, it can be s een t h at most of the basic 
positions in De Anima outlined i n Chapters III-IV derive from 
1. Was zink , TDA, 126 , 132. 
2 . Waszink , TDA, 219. 
3. Wasziru~ , TDA, 176 , commenting on De Anima, IX. 
LL. Wa szink, TDA, 318, conm10nting on ~Anima, XXV. 
,5. Waszinl;;: , TDA, 34°-38°, 344-347, commenting on De Anima, X..'<VIl. 
6. Waszink , TDA, 201, commenting on De Anima, XII. 
7. Wa szink , TDA, 238-240 , commenting on De Anima, XII. 
8 . Waszink , TDA, 461, 481, 527, 529, 535, c ommenting on De Anim£ 
XLV, XLIII, LI-LIII. 
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Soranus. As the next chapter vYill indicate, they could not de-
rive f rom the Christian literature simp ly because this wealth of 
detailed non-theolog ical infonmation did not exist an~vhere in 
Christian literature. Tertullian, vvho regards Soranus quite 
favorably, thus imp orts into Chris tianity ideas new to it. Was-
zink frequently suggests t hat most of the passages in De Anima 
I ' 1 
of real philosophic worth were directly cop ied from Soranus, 
and there does not seem to be any grounds upon which his conten-
tion c an be denied. 'l1here can be no doubt tha t Tertullian would 
have been hard-pressed for arguments as well as scient:i..fic in-
forrnat :L on -relevant to his polemical aims if he had not had avail· 
able the h elp of this Ec lectic physician. 
Hov:ever , before Te rtullian is completely condemned for a 
lack of any orig inality in philosophica l thought, it . must be 
remembered that, as Waszink observed earlier, - every instance 
of h is use of Soranus's theorie s and arguments was g overned by 
his O'Nn p revious conviction of their truth and t heir ha~mony 
with Christian doctrines. A most imp ortant instance of t h is is 
v.rhere, after a g lowing exp ression of his resp ect for Soranus, 
Tertullian d enies his view of the mortality of the sou1. 2 Thus, 
Soranus 1 s theories one and all fall under the re quirements of 
a Christian p sychology , and those which can not meet it mmt be 
rejected. 
, The relation of Stoicism, Soranus and De Anima has been in-
dicated by the fact tha t most of the arguments which rrertullian 
r.-3ee- thetypical statement in Waszink, TDA, 37°. 
2. See Ele Anima, VI, vi and Was zink, TDA, 132, 567. 
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found approved by Soranus were al:so Stoic arguments which the 
latter had in one fo~1 or another accepted. Besides the points 
listed above, others could be mentioned, e. g ., the relation of 
1 
nature, God and the soul as rational,- and the freedom of the 
will . 2 And the _pre cise form in wh ich most of these theories of 
the Stoics appear in De Anima is due to Tertullian's reworking 
of Soranus's paraphrasesor reports. Thus, for various reasons, 
3 
errors easily occur, and the v.rhole of De Anima takes on a very 
unde pendable cast when re garded from the aspect of its relia-
bility in documenting the opinions of the ancients. 
ii. Aenesidemus the Sceptic.--Among the more important 
treatises used by Sormus in preparing hi s ovm philosophic wri-
t ings were those by Aenesidemus. In De Anima, Tertullian refers 
to Aenesidemus onl y three times and with significant agreement 
but once, i.e., on the view that the soul is diffused throughout 
the body.1+- This information almost c ertainly c ame through Sora 
us. Tertullian's knowledge of Epicureanism p os sibly c ame in 
part from such sources as the Sceptic writi~gs of Aenesidemus. 5 
Tertullian's scorn for classic Greek philosophy and view of 
Heraclitus as a Sceptic may derive from the similar attitude 
6 
tak en by Aenesidemus as reported in Soranus. Even Tertullian's 
1. Waszinfz;-TDA, 465, conrrrl:nting on De Anima, XLIII, vii. 
2. 1/ilaszink, TDA, 292, corrnnenting on De Anima, X.."'\ I. 
3. Waszink, TDA, 126 lists errors which occur in De Anima of 
this sort. One, in De Anima, V, i, is where Tertullian 
claims that Critolaus is a SJ1!11pathizer with himself and the 
Stoics on the corporeality of the soul, which is wrong, ac-
cording to other information about to Critolaus. 
~. De Anima, XIV, v. See also De Anima, IX, v, XXV, ii. 5. Waszinlc, TDA, 387. 
6. Waszink, TDA, 30°, 97 -98. 
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knowledg e of Aristotelian concepts regarding the soul may be 
traced from the Theophrastean writing s to Vetusta Placita, which 
1 Aenesidemus used, and from whom Soranus copied it. The interes 
by both Soranus and 'rertullian in Heraclitus 1 s arguments re-
garding the soul refers back to Aenesidemus's original attention 
2 
to this problem. Beyond these prob able· 1""el 2.tions of Aenesidemu 
3 to Soranus and Tertullian, little can be said that is certain. 
Aenesidemus i s believed to have b een educated in the Aca-
demy and been influential as a teacher about 85-65 B. c.4 Pre-
viously, as a student, he had objected to the pseudo-Stoic 
vie'ns taught in the Academy in his time and turned to Eeraclides 
I 
an affirmed Pyrrhoist, whose views he largely accEpted. 5 There 
is some doubt, however, even as to the consistency of Aeneside-
6 
mus's Scep ticism. Patrie~ suggests that he was the bridge be-
tween Academic Scep ticism and Ale:;tandrian Pyrrohism, 7 bring ing 
them tog ether in his own philosophy. This is equivalent to 
asserting that Aenesidemus was an eaT•ly Eclectic. 
iii. Arius Didymus.--Tertullian refers to Arius only twice 
8 
and disagrees vlith .him both times. Hovvever, these are trivial 
points and Arius 1 s influence has been established as has Saran-
us's, by textual comp arison. 
) / 
Arius 's work, E-rrLTOt-t~ , remains only in fragments, but 
L Waszink , TDA, 209. 
2. Waszink, TD.A, 30°-31°, 217. 
3. V!aszink, TDA, 30° makes a point of mentioning this. 
l_~ . Patrick, GS, 215-216. See also in general Patrick , GS,212-24 !-
5. Patrick, GS, 216-217. 
6. See Zeller, HE, 22. 
7. Patrick, GS, 212. 
8 . De Anima, LIV, ii, LV, iv. 
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when Soranus used it, it represented a popular survey of Platon-
ic, Peripatetic, and Stoic philos ophy . 1 Arius was well read in 
the Aristotelian writings, 2 and was supposedly committed to 
Stoicism. He fl ourished in the first century A. 0. in Alexan-
dria. Both Vifaszinl{ and Zeller suggest that his philosophy was 
re ally more Sceptic and Eclectic than Stoic , 3 and Von Arnim 
characterizes i t as "einen ~hnlichen Ecklekticismus. "L~ 
vu~ile Tertullian probably did not personally use Arius's 
) / 
E-rrL \:O~V) , Soranus almost cert a inly di d have access to it. 
Waszink feels that it was from this source tha t both Soranus and 
Tertullian took furthef information about Aristotle and rece i ved 
subtle Sceptic and Eclectic influences in the process. 5 Arius 
may have been one of the first to systematize the :Platonic dia-
6 
logues for western philosophers, but while these may have been 
available to Soranus and Tertullian, neither took much Platen-
ism from Arius . It was rather Albinus, a widely acknowledged 
11 famous authority on Platonism11 7 whom they used. 
iv . Albinus the Platonist.--Tertullian refers to Albinus 
only t wice,e and both times as a source for Pythagorean and Pla-
tonic philosophical views on metemp sychosis. Wa szink is certain 
t hat the extensive references to Platonic philosophy in De Anima 
1. 1Naszink , TDA, 34 ° and Zeller, HJ:I: , 109 . 
2 . Waszink, TDA , L,_0°. 
3. We.szink, TDA, L~l 0 and Zeller, HE, 73-74• 
4. Von Arnim, Art , ( I'B95), 626. See also Vlaszinlc, TDA , 37° and 
Zeller, }ffi , 106-109. 
5. Waszink , TDA, 39° -40°. 
6 . Ritter, HAP , IV, 229-230. 
7. 'vVaszink, TDA, L[-1 °, 3411-• 
8. De Anima , XXVIII , i, XXIX, iv. 
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1 
stem from this source. 
Albinus was a Platonist of the second century A. D., 2 the 
teacher of Galen and a student of .Gaius. 3 His great work, 1\E":-p~ 
" .,..\ / ) r 
_T"w" 11 AOt."'C~VL O(.pE:cn< .. c:>'IJTwv, was an extensive study dealing with 
the whole of Plat onic philosophy . This work is lost and only 
fragments of it remain.LJ_ ~nile Soranus probably did not use it 
since its date of .composition is after his ovm 1\e:p'L Y-uJ.~s, Ter-
tullian almost certainly did have access to it.5 
It has been pointed out that both Aenesidemus and Arius had 
Eclectic tendenc:tes in the ir writings which tended to corrupt 
the purity of their respective Sceptic and Stoic doctrines, as 
well as their inter•pretations of earlier Greek philosophy . How-
ever, far more than either of these according to most scholars 
6 
is Albinus t he Eclectic of the group . As a member of t he post-
New Academy, i.e., between Gaius and Apuleius, 7 Albinus was 
thoroughly infected with the Eclectic ge rm. Consequently, his 
interpvetation of Platonic philo s ophy was possibly spurious in 
the extreme. Ueberweg~Prachter, in the attempt to characterize 
the philosophy of Albinus , sugge sts that it was 11 ••• ein almdera-
ische r - peripatetisch-stoischer-Eklektizismus mi t einer anti -
stoicischen Polemik; 11 Albinus i gnored only Nee-platonism and 
1Teo-pythagoreanism. 8 Galen, Albinus 1 s student, also indicates 
1. 1!\fa szink, TDA, 43°, 121, 30)~_ , 368-370 and Zeller, HE, 347. 
2 . Zeller , POA, 99 suggests tha t he also organized the dialoguef 
3. Freudenthal, Art . ( IS93 ) , 13lq_ and · Patrick, GS, 247. 
tt- . Vvaszink, TDA, ~-3° . 
5. Wasziru~ , TDA, 43°· 
6 . Ze ller, Ueberweg-Prachter, Von Arnim and Patrick concurr. 
7. Ueberweg-Prachter , C~P , I, 41. 
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8 . Ueberwe g- PracliG\gr, GGP , I, 557 . See :especially Witt, AMP, 
, _ n.:..-:t -AR=t-ffi-s M-8-..J.?acl-e..D:i--&at-=LGJa g ; :_ 4,_L~fl:,.L, l &· ,q~fi · ~=!' n~'l'"ll ;.!::·~ 1'\111~=====11======1 
in his own philosophical writings the Eclecticism of his teacheD 
As a c onse quence, the standard appellation, Alb:Lnus "the Pla-
tonist," seems highly unjust t o Pla to and Pl atonism. 
In the three centuries betweeil:Aenesidemus and Albinus, the 
Ac ademy had b een practically destroyed over the controversies 
between Stoic ism and Scept icism, and only a dissolute Eclecti-
cism remained. By A. D. 175, it was increasingl y difficult to 
distinguish b etween the various schools of philosophy, 2 This , 
rather than any clearl y delineated system, was the heritage in 
philosophy bequ eathed to TertulJ.ia.n when he pre pax•ed De Anima. 
From the point of view developed in this chapter, De Anima 
can be viewed as following in the doxographical and Eclectic 
tradition of He llenistic philosophy, a dimension not usually ac-
corded to it at all. To place it in the context of treatises 
mentioned in this chapter, it was written about one hundred and 
ten y ears after Vetusta Placita, about a century after Arius 
) / --- . 
Did-;y-:mus t s C1TL TOfJ \-') , about seventy-five years after Soranus' s 
, ye~ .. ~ 
lTE:p~ lfv_x~c; ' and perhap s sixty ,.after Albinus ' s lTe:: p ~ -r-~ 
II\/ > / 3 
II/\ Q(.TW\/ L ()(, pE:a- \<..Ov'TWV. 
4. Smrrmary: De Anima and Non-Christian Thought. 
A good deal has been accomplished in this chapter, adding 
significantly to the understanding of De Anima and to ascertain-
ing its place in the history of philosophical literature. Nlost 
important, it has shown where the majority of 'rertullian' s phi-
l. Von Arnim, A:rt. ( IS9S), 1315 and Patrick, GS, 247. 
2. Pat rick , GS, 278-281. 
3. See WaszinJ:l: , TDA, 30°, 4-3°, 38° respectively for dates. 
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losophical arguments came from and has examined most of the 
; sources of his s pecific doctrines, and has also discovered the 
cause of some of his errors in historical interpretation . Equal 
ly important , it has shown that Tertulli an's antipathy to non-
;Christian philosophy , which should be restricted primarily to 
·Pl a tonisn1, did not deter him from using extensively a totally 
p a gan, n ellenistic, and philosophically Eclectic writer a s his 
:main direct source and basic model for De Anima. 
In g eneral, Tertullian's vie w of Greek ph:iJoso:PhY c an be 
! 
p assed over rap idly because it does not bring many important in-
, s i ght s to bea r on the understanding of De Anima itself. His 
~ attitude to such men a s Plato and Aristotle vacillates between 
/g rudg ing agreement and violent ad holi!:..inen.! antipathy . He criti-
cizes on p rinc iple a l l philosophers and philosophies which have 
an y discoverable r elation with Platonism. He a lso touches on 
some interesting controversial top ics in ancient philosophy as 
well as singling out Democritus for s p ecial approval. But GreeB 
philosophy from Thales to Aristotle had almost ce rtainly no di-
rect influence on his thought, with the p ossible exception of 
Plato's Pha edo, a Hellenic counter part of Tertullian 1 s De Apima. 
However , later Greek philo s ophy , viz., Stoicism, Ep icurean-
ism an d Scept ici&~, do have a much closer affinity to De Anima. 
From Stoicism, Tertullian drew basic doc~es in metaphysica, 
e t h eory of man, and e p i stemology . The basic d octrine of the ma-
teri a lity of all thing s f or Stoicism becomes the corp oreality 
of a l l thing s in De Anima. Other views, such as the soul as 
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breath, its inherent rationality, and i t s r elat ion to God, all 
find counte~)art s in Stoicism. The relation between sense and 
!intellect, and t he unity and faculties of the soul as presented 
,in De Anima are found first in the Stoics. In anthropology , hi s 
g eneral philosophical theory of traducianism, the relation of 
is oul to body, the directing organ of the soul, and even the defi 
~ition of death and sleep are all originally Stoic doctrines. 
1The same is true of ep iS:emology, where Tertullian' s primary con-
cept of common sense is seen to be essentially a variant on the 
!Stoic theory. 
I 
However, De Anima is not just a l ate Stoic treatise. r:ehere 
are other influences which it exhibits, , indicating that Tertul-
l ian went be yond a strict aceeptance of Stoic doctrines. For 
!instance, he prefers t he Ep icure an views on a number of topics, 
such as sensationalism and freedom of the will. He completely 
jdenies the Stoic and the Epicurean views of immortality in pref-
erence to the Chri stian view. But his independence of Stoicism 
iis best seen in his dependence on non-Stoic Eclectic documents 
for De Anima itself. This is also t he point at which Scepticis 
exerts its influence on him, for Scepticism and Eclecticism are 
'as sides of one coin. 
Eclecticism enters De Anima in a variety of source material 
lupon which Tertullian drew for the actual composition of De Ani-
~' as well as the sources used in turn by his sources. Leading 
1this group because of his pervasive influence on De Anima is 
Soranus of Ephesus, the Methodical physician and Eclectic phi-
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ilosopher with sympathies for Democritus, Stoicism and Sce pticis 
J Tertullian 1 s De Anima and Soranus 's 1\e:p~ Tv'X~ <; bear strHdng 
!resemblances line for line and in ove r all structure. Specifi-
' lcally, Tertullian took from Sot~anus the actual arguments for the 
!corp ore ality, faculties and unity of the soul, the physiological 
idetails of traducianism, and other les s important doctrines. 
I 
IThus, Tertul l ian, a Christian writer moving v.rithin the Rule of 
,Faith, takes as his basic source in the preparation of his Chri 
ltian p sychology a non-Christian phy sician! 
I His other Eclectic sources include Aeneside_mus the Sceptic, 
;an early Eclectic with an especial fondness for Heraclitus, 
IArius Didymus of Alexandria, the source with Aenesidemus for 
!Ari s totelian philosophy, and Albinus the Platonist, whose nmae 
I 
fails to indicate that his Platonism was very suspect because of 
its highly Eclectic character. Tertullian directly used Albi-
jnus's writing s, while his l{nowledge of Aenesidemus and Arius 
i . probably crume to him solely through Soranus. 
Thus, De An~~ may be placed n ot only in t h e Christian 
1tradition but a l s o in t he He l lenistic literature of the first 
I 
jcenturies of the Christian era. Tertull ian's methods, sources, 
jand doctrines were all typical of the Eclecticism in philosophy 
; at tha·t time. However, it has also been p ointed out that, with 
only a few exce ptions about wh ich he could have had no indepen-
l dent knowledge or interests, e. g ., physiological facts of pro-
creation and ancient Greek philosophical doctrines, Tertullian 
1
used his sources, from the Stoics to Soranus, with the prior 
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conviction of their truth , perhap s even indep endent of their 
arg1..1.me nt s . It is a contj_nua lly r e levant f a ct in the interpre -
tation of De .Anima 1 s doctrines and sources to . recognize t h e 
silvex' cord between the Christi a n tradition and the treatise . 
It may even be a rgued t b.at there is s ome basis in the Christian 
tradition for viev1 s which have b een tra ced h ere to Stoicism; 
I~ ~ - l . 0 tl . . . .L 1 'illUCtSOn n as c_.alm.ea · ns 1n one 1nsv ance. The next ch apter 
Hill also mal{e clear that t he -:vealth of il'~ormati on about non-
Christian s ubjects in De Anima is simply indi sputable e vidence 
of its non-Christian s our ces and 'l' ertullian 1 s extensive d e p en-
done e on them for t h e structure of :the YJh ole treatis e , doc t rine 
by d octrine, even line by line . However, h:i.s interest in psy-
ch ology and its attendant subjects, and his choi~ of some doc-
trines and his rejections of others , in short , his ph ilosophi c 
motivation in De .Anima, is explained only by recognizing h is 
fundamental Christi anity . 
1 . l\J:mcl.son, DOR, 97 observed that there may be 11 a basisi! for 
Tertullian 's 11 ••• c once p tion of the s oul in t he languag e of 
Scripture . 11 
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CP~PTER VI 
DE ANiil~ I N THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION 
It has been re :oeatedly emphas i ?.ed t hat De A11.ima c a11.not be 
intern reted outside the Christia n tradit ion if its philo s ophical 
d octri nes a r>e t o be understood . It is rather surprisin g to no -
t i c e , h oweve r , tha t i n De Anima Tertullian does not mention any 
Chri sti2.n vrriters or Ch risti a n docu:m.ent s except the Sc r i ptures . 
Ye t it is c ert a in that V!hen he wrot e De Ani~1'!.a , he wa s fairly \"Te L 
ac quainted with the wr:Ltings of sv.ch Christi2.n thinke r s as Her-
mas , Justin, 'l1 a tian , Melito , p ossibly Clement, and certainly 
l 
Irenaeus ,- as well as t he OT, ITT a nd Apocryphal literature , Et s 
was ob served in Chap ter I . However , t h e r eal signific ance of 
De Ani ma in the Christhm tradition c annot be seen until the 
treati se is loc ated in the h istoric line of literatui•e f ollowine; 
t he NT , a nd this must be b rief l y at t empted here . 
l . The Problem of t he Soul in Chri s ti an 
Th ought Befo l"'e De Anima . 
The most charact eristi c descrip tion of De Anima i s tha t 
propose d by Esser vrhen he says t hat it is 11 clie erste christliche 
h l . u2 p s y c o_og le. BL.t just p recisely v,rhat is "f i r st 11 ab o·ut it, 
what is 11 Christia n 11 ab out i t , a n d v1hat is 11 psych oloc;ical rr abov.t 
it, are no t c lear f rom his st atement . Ce rt a inly , the psychology 
1 . Ea:0naC1~-,-Art. (19 1 1 ), 662 men"Clons als o Eilitia des , and s ee 
J.\.aye, ~"H , 72 and Adv . Val . , V for Tertul l i an ' s ovm words . 
2 . E sser, ST , 232 , Kellne :e ( u be rs. ) , T._, II , 280, BarderJ1.ewer , 
PAT, 108 , Schneider, Art. ( 1897), 2L!.8 and Harnack , Art. ( 1911 ), 
663. 7a s z:i:r1k , TDA , 7° r:: i v e s a cri tici sn of this view whic h 
was ~1oted in part i n Ch apter I of this t hes is . 
/i 
I 
I 
,/ 
1/ 
l pf the--t reatise has no·w been analyzed, as has much of its Chris- , ~ ian and non-Christian content, But its priority has remained 
~ nconfirmed. This chapter will point out that De Anima is not I 
I pnly the first Christian psychology in point of time, but as the 
~ast chapter suggested, a generally Stoic-Eclectic interlude in 
~ he preeminently Platonic interests o:f other Patristic writers. 
II i. The foundations of Christian_psychologx.--Neither the 
~ T nor NT is an explicit philosophy o:f the soul, the body, 
,complete man or of the relation of soul and body. This is 
the . 
underi 
I 
'I 
I 
16tandible when it is remembered that neither was conceived as a 
/1 . 1 
~~speculative treatise, but were instead religious documents. 
II 
lt~evertheless, Christian psychologies can be understood only by 
l~eferring them to the original impetus given in the scattered 
r jr nd occasionally contradictory suggestions found throughout the 
IBible. 2 
I! I (1) The Nevv ';L'estrunent. 
I 
I 
psychol j This thesis will not investigate the theologies and 
;og ie s of the OT or NT, since 
'r 
il this is too great a task for the 
Yet a few basic observations must be made. It can r pace here. 
1
p e noted that the UT builds on the OT, and thS:; in the 1:rT itself, 
' ~arying views are proposed in the Synoptic Gospels and the Paul-
:ine and Johannine writings, which center on the interpretations 
II 
'I l? f Hebrew and Greek terms for 11body, 11 11breath, 11 11 spirit, 11 11 soul, 11 
l; 
1: 
I 
Bethune-Baker, EHC, 16. 
Bethnue-Baker, EHC, 11. · See also Gilson, Su~ , Chapter IX, 
11 Christian Anthropol0gy, 11 which develops this topic very 
t ho roughly. 
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11 life,n and so forth .-
Probabl';{ the sj_ngle theory most influential on a l l subse-
quent thoue;ht i s that of St . Paul . Certainly, the p l'"'ececfing 
p a g es have shown that some of 'l1ertullian 1 s imp or t ant i d eas and 
'b ' ' . ,.., p 1 " ~ 2 me·c _oo.s o_erl ve r rom au lne cb_eology . St. Paul reg ards man Ets 
a free and therefore a ccountable Cl'"'eaturG . Sin, v1hi ch is so 
imp ortant in the Pauline ethics , is closely b ound up vii th the 
nature of n an . 3 This relat ion is further expl ored and cla rified 
in the t h eory of traducianism in De____::~2J::rp_a_ , vv-hi ch tries at both 
)I 
t h e physiol og ical and metaphysical levels to a ccount for it . -,-
As to his view of the relation a mong the var i ous metaphys ical 
comp onents of man---body , soul , spir:tt --r~e has been interpreted 
c:: 
as suggesting both a c:U chot o:rnic a nd tl'"'ichotomic viev~· • .? St. Paul 
no more than Tortullian, gene rate s in his writinr-; s a "real 
paragraent of the boc:y , n although man 1 s inte l l e c tual p ovvers 
usually ext ollecl over mer'e physi c al or sensual pursuits . 6 
, . 
eLlS -
are 
These brief suggestions of St . Paul 1 s theories c an be nice -
l y supple.nented :Lr:. the swmna:ry of the NT con c e pt of man by 
Robin son. 
The fundamental i deas of personality in the NT 
are derived from the OT; the most i my ol'"'tant ad-
vanc e is the beli ef that esse ... ntial personality , 
v1h eth er called yvx v1 or TtEVVf"'o<., survives bodily 
1 . See Baab, TOT , 61:.- 68, Gr ant, INT, 160-168 and Hobinson, Art . 
(1916 ) for recent discucsions of p ersonality i n the Bible. 
2 . Al e:;r_andel'"' , EP, 60 - 9 1 is very helpful on St . Paul here . 
3 . See Yiilliarns , IFO, 123-156, 162-163. 
L\-· Se e Uilli ams , IFO , 1 23 and Kaye , EH, 2 7 0 on sue passage s a s 
Rom. V, xii - 1;:xi Emd I Cor . }CIJ , xli v , found a lso in De Ani r:1a . 
,5 . Robinson, Art .(l916 )-;---733 denies that st . Paul was a trichot -
omi st; and see Grant, I HT , 1 62-163. Cf. V!Jaszinl{ , TDA , 200 
on Tertullian and St . Paul he r e . 
1 8 7 
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I 
death ••• The body is conceived as an integral 
part of the personality, whose consciousness 
is diffused throughout it, and differentiated 
into the local consciousness of its particular 
members, 1 ••• as in Hebrew psychology •.• 2 
In regard to the psychical side of this 
unified life of body and soul, no hard and fast 
division was made by the NT writers; the inner/ 
life might be called 1T\/E:.LI~ OC. , \jrll X Vi , or K.o<.p<5 UA 
•• ~But when we speak of] the full personality 
[it ••• ultimately involves the union of body 
an soul, here and hereafter.3 
Also relevant is Knudson's observation: 
~n the NT]the psyche (soul) and persona (spirit) 
were assumed to be analogous to breath and to be 
of a highly refined material nature. The idea 
of pure i:mr11aterialism nowhere receives eXPression 
in Scripture. The biblical writers ••• move on the 
plane of naive realism; [for them] only the spatial 
is real. No matter how much the vital, the psy-
chical, and the sp iritual principle may transcend 
the purely material, it must have a material basis, 
though the4nature of this basis may be vaguely conceived. 
I !This statement clearly recogni~es that, for all his various de-
lviations from later Christianity, the "vaguely conceivedn cor-
lporeal nature of the soul in De A]:.~_ima is not foa:-eign to the 
1
earliest Christian writers. 
IJ 
I But the real significance of the NT and its theories for 
!later 
I 
developments in Christian psychology is portrayed by Rob-
II • 
ll lnson 
,, 
in this manner: 
The NT characteristically shows little conscious-
11. 
12. 
!I 
ll 
I 
1
3. 
4· 
I 
. ness of the problems inevi ·tably arising within 
See, for instance, I Cor. XII, xii and f ollowing . 
Imudson, DOR, 74 observes, 11 ••• in the OT, nepesh or soul was 
rega1.,ded as the principle of life, and here w~s identified 
with both breath and the blood, vfi thout either of which life 
could not subsist, 11 whiCih makes i~ close to Tertullian's 
spiritus or perhaps TO VJ ye-p..ovl~ov. See Baab, TOT, 64 also. 
Robinson, Art. ( 1916), 734. I 
Knudson, DOR, 94· 1 
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I 
tb~ circle of this idea of the soul, such as the 
method of the soul's origin, the relation of the 
soul 1 s activity to God (freedom and grace), the 
degree of moral development required for member-
ship in the Church, the mediation of spiritual 
energies to the soul by institutions or truths 
respectively. The gradual emergence of these 
problems in the subsequent coui•se of Christian 
thought has profoundly affected the history of 
the Church.l 
I 
The importance of De Anima can be seen from this conclusion!, 
lfor it certainly explores these problems, always relating them 
II so far as possible to Scriptural t exts and Christian doctrines. 
II The evaluation of De Anim~ as first Christian p sychology is not 
! impaired by the impetus g iven it in the New Testament at all, 
for without the NT thought, especially Pauline theology , there 
would have been no later Christian p sy ch ologies at all, since 
II 
II 
:I 
I 
II 
II 
' I' 
1 it provided the pl""oblems which such writings as De Anima attemp-! 
ted to solve. 
(2) The Apolostic Fathers. 
I 
I 
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F ollowing from the NT, howevel"", one doctrine very imp ortant jl 
De Anima receives a s p irited defense, although little thought1 
II 
jjful analysis, in these v1ri tings . This was in the p os i tion found 
!! esp ecially in the Ignatian writing s t:b...at sense p erceptions were 
1 
re liable and do report the natu!'e of the external world.- For 
t h e same basic reasons as Tertullian, the Apo stolic Fath ers de-
l 
{ ended sensationalism because they were confronted with docetic r:· Ji 
Christ ians who denied the real humanity of Ch rist. Or~hodox 
lchristology could be maintained only b y referring to t he infor- · 
1
1
mation of the senses, just as in the Johannine writings , vrhich 
li d d t' 2 Th' . 
1 oppose oce lsm. ls Vlew was furth er supported by the Greek ! 
IIApolog ist s and used for exactly the s ame purpose. 3 The real 
j!indubi tability of sense perceptions found in De Anima is conse-
lquently motivated by the needs of Christian doctrine, for Ter-
iitullian was confronted by much the same prob lem as were the wri- 11 
ters of t he Gospel of St. John and Ignatian Epistles. But be-
11
y ond this suggestion, no ideas are found in the Apostolic Fatherf 
,relevant to the development of Christ i an p sychology which d6 not 1 
II 
eman a te d irectly from the OT and NT. 
ii. The Greek _!pologi3t~.--It is vJith these writers that 
lt h e NT d octrines in theology and re ligion become comb ined ·with 
'the Greek philosophical deliberations on the same problems. 
I 
liiVhile influences from the Greeks on the late NT ·writers may be 
I . . 
1. Se e J...gnatius, Epistle to the Sm:y:rnaeans,_ V, ii; II Clement, IJ 
VIII and t h e =S~h~e~p~h~e~r~d~o~f~H-~e~rma--~~· ' Similitude IX, xxxii may alsq 
be con~ed. ·-
1!2 . See, e. g ., Jolm I, xiv, xxiv ff. 
3. Kaye, EH, 2~ 
I' 
II 
\I 
found, it is vli th the Ap olog ists that philosophy .9J>enlY-_ enters 
into the structure of Christian theology . The Christian writers 
II 
of this and later periods freely borrowed Platonic ideas and II 
II j found nothing essentially inconsistent in this action with thei~ 
1 p rimary devotion to the Scriptures because even u p to the time 1
1
. 
of Augustine, 11 ••• we must recollect that these same doctrines 
I 
I 
were suppos~d to have been borrowed [by the Greek s] from H~ly 1
1 Scripture 11 a view also shared by Tertullian in De An-tma I 
I - ' (1) Justin Martyr, . • 11 
Of the early Christian apologetical theologians, Justin is il 
I 
I 
t h e most import ant. Many sugge sti:ons toward a Christian psy-
I 
chology are folmd in his ma jor vn>iting s, viz., the two !Pologie~1 
(Ap ob_l, II), Dialo p;ue with Tr•YPhO (Dial. Try. ) , On the ~e sur-
I rection (On Res.), and the disputed 
1 (Dis. Gr. ) • 
Discourse to the Greeks 
An d;dea of Justin's found in one form or another in all 
1 
the major Christian writers includi n g Te r tullian is t hat Plato 
j borrowed his doctrine of the cre ation in the Timaeus from t h e 
I 
l .!'_entateuch. 3 This view expressed in Apol. I becomes the whole 
i subject of Dis. Gr., wher$ the author intends to show that all 
I 
I 
I 
II 
I 
of Greek philosoph y is derived from the OT and therebv establis ~ 
the authority of the Hebrew-Christian tl ... adition throu~h its I 
tem:ooral p riority. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
In his doctrine of the soul, this view is exp ressed when 
Fairweather, JG, 323 and Hatch, IGI, 127. 
De Anima, II. 
Apol. J:-;- LIX~LXand . Roberts, TT, 6~-· Cf. also Clement of 
Alexandria, S~romata, V, xiv, 89. 
191 
1 Justin says to Tr ypho, "• •• Philosophers know nothing ••• abo~t-.-~~-----­
the se things: for they c a1mot tell what a soul is. n1 His p sy - I 
chology p roper includes the concepts of human fr ee will and di-
vine _  'for-eknowledge, 2 disputes the doctrine of transmi gration jl 
and argues for the innnortali t y of the soul, but only for a con- 1
1 
ditional and not necessary immortality , since the soul is not 1
1 
by nature inm10rtal; 11 ••• the soul partakes of life since God I 
I 
\"Tills it to life, u3 slightly different than Tertullian 1 s views I, 
on 11natural immortality." Justin presents his views against 1 
t h e baekground of both Platonic and Aristotelian theories, 
which become pronounced in t he Dis. Gr.4 
Justin tends to follow Platonic theories in viewinG t h e 
b ody a s a hindrance to the soul, especially when it seeks the 
vision of God. 5 Yet he recognizes the excellence of the body 
in God's sight, since Christ while true God was also true man. 
At this point, J'ustin defines man a s " ••• the reasonable animal 
composed of body and soul. 11 7 The relation of the soul, body, 
and spirit is put: 11 ••• The body is the home of the~l and the 
soul is the home of the spirit. 11 Tertullian also used this 
8 
fi gu r e of speech to describe the relation of soul to body . 
6 
Beyond these scattered views, t he theory of man and of the 
II 
I 
I 
soul prop osed b y Justin Martyr is vague. He, as Tertullian, , 
I 
1. Dial. Try., X, in Roberts and Donaldson (eds.), ANF, 1, 197- ~ 
2. Dial. Try,,CXCL. See Donaldson, CHCL, II, 289. 
3. Dial. Try., XI, in Roberts and Donaldson (eds. ), ANF, I, 198 ·
1 4. See e specially Dial. Tr.:Y.!., IV, VII, XXVII. j· 
S. Dial. Try~, IV. I 
6. On Res., VII. Gilson, SMP , 171 examines t h is problem. 
7. On Res., VIII, in Roberts and Donaldson (eds.), ArW, I, 297· j' 
8 . On Res., X, in Roberts and Donaldson (eds.), ANF, I, 297-298 
and com a re with De An_i ma, LIII , vi. J 
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sugsest s t h at death is the result of t h e miss uid ed use of free -
l 
wi11 , -- a vim-r p opu lar' •.v i th many Chi•ist ians . Btrt b y no means 
c an :Lt b e suge;ested t hat Justin, a n y more t han the HT oP Apos-
tolic VJriters; has a comp r ehensive , unified and d irect e xu osi -
tion of p s y ch ology , althou2~h he is definitely more philo sophic a l 
and l ess h omi letic t h an his p redeces s ors . C oncernin~ the rela -
tion of Justin 1 s thougb.t a n d Tertullian 1 s De___J~p_ima , onl~;r t b.e 
most insi s n i fi c cnt c orrelation b e tv,re en t h e tvvo can be establish-
ed, a n d "c~1ere does not s e em to be 2.ny di rect inf luenc e of Jus -
2 
t i nc on De Anini::l . 
r-111.il e t .he fa ct of Justin 1 s p ioneer ·worL: ir:t philos o_ hizinp; 
Chri stia nity is noted , he offer s no E.ystenat ic vwrk worthy of 
the title of the f irst Chri st ian p sychnlogy , even thou~h h e 
p rovides enou gh s c atte re d insisht s to mal.;;:e one possib l e . Ei s 
..-rri t ing s , a s Tertull j_an 1 s, v1ere mot iva ted by an a !}olo;.;et ic a n d 
anti - he r et ical :pu rp ose , h ence s pe cul a tive inquiry Via s secondar y 
to his p j_mar y ciefense of Cl~ristian d oc trines . 
( 2) 'fl"' -'- -i an - ~ l.J- c - • 
As did Justin, Tat ian evidences s ome knOi.'rl ede;e of Greek 
philosophy by hi s rcfo2.'ences t o the leading ~;h:U. osophors i n hi s 
') 
Adc!.T•e s s -~ tlle Gr~l{s ( :0-dd . Gr . )/ and also by sur;cesting t hat 
L' he stv.d i ecl.. uncle:;_, the i r succ e s s o :;_"s in the schoo ls . .- In t h is 
treatise l:.e mentions p r oblems re lated to the soul , o.nd foll ows 
Justj_n in affirmi ng t hat to be imrrlO:i."t a l is not t he nature of the 
1. Donalds on , CECL, I I, 293 - 29L~- · 
2 . 1Naszinlc , TDA , LL6°, L~_OJ a r:.d Roberts, TIJ:l , l-!-5 · 
J . Add . Gr ., II - I II . 
L~- . Add . Gr . , VI I , XI. 
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I soul. 1 If, howevei•, one achieves 11 t h e knowledge of God " in the 
Gnostic sense, 2 one c an a chieve salvat i on and c onse quent i nrm.or-
tality . Hi s own Gnostic tendencies are further indicat ed b y 
the statement t hat n ••• there are some who p os sess only soul," 
3 deny ing t o some men any c a rnal natui•e in much the same manner 
as d i d Marcion and Montanus, but whi ch Tertullian vigorously 
opposed in De Anima. 
I 
il 
[ Tatian f ollows in t he tradition a s h e affirms the free will 
I
I of man . Like others, he hesitated between the trichotomic and 
l d ichotomic theories of man. 4 He also sugge sted that certa in 
I . 5 
, "mat eri a l spirits 11 p ervade t he world and seek to corrupt me n , I . . 
I and thus accounted for moral evil in man. Tertullian on occar 
sion also took t h i ·s view. Tatj_an further pi'opos ed a vague con-
cept of t h e soul as a materi a l entity, with various degrees of 
materiality corre spending to the Gno st ic v iews of t h e tlr ee -
6 fold nature of man . In fact, t hroughout his writing s, there 
! are strong Gnostic tende ncies, and Neander has suggested t hat 
I He r mogene s, Tertul lian' s arch-opponent, -vvas influenced by Ta-
il ti an' s materialism. 7 This would weak en the cla im of Tat ian's 
-~ inf luence on Tertullian, for De ApJma expres sly contradicts 
the v iews of Her:mogenes . 8 H0 wever, in general it i s clear that 
I
I l. Add. Gr., XIII. 
3. A.Cfd . Gr ., XV. See also Donaldson, CLT, 166, on the ..... •
1 2. See Scha.Lf , HCC, II, 445-~-47 on t he Gnos tic t h eory of yvc.vaLS , 
t h e secret tradition which, if lm.oY•m , [_l;uraanteed salvation. 
~. See Roberts, TT, 248 and Donaldson, CHCL, III, 52. 
~ . Dona ldson, CHCL, III, 46, 48 . . 
6. Add . Gr., XII . Cf. Dona l ds on , CHCL, III, 53 and Knudson, 
I 
· DOR, 97• . 
7·. N e andei', AST, L~59 . 
I 8 . Nasz i nk , TDA , 46° su gge s ts but doe s not s pecify the influen- i 
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in ll ~s not concerned with developing a theory of the soul 
' his apology for Christianity. 
Many scholars have pointed out the affinity between Tatian 1 
and Tertullian in the comnon spirit whi ch seems to animate both 
I
, of . them~ Tatian opp osed the philosophers 11vJi th the utmost con-
I tempt," and did not follow his master , Justin, here at all. 
I It can be agreed that Tatian anticipates the attitude of Tertul-
1 j lian toward speculative philosophy , but with this important dif ~ l 
/' II ! f erence: Tatian, approaching Gnosticism, was oppos ing competing 11 
/! Philosophical systems in h is appeal to Christian Scriptures, 
! whi ch he thought supported his views; Tertullian, on the other 
1! hand, was opposing just such deviant doctrines as Tatian's and 1 
/I t he philosophies upon whi ch they fed. 
I 
I 
(3) Athenagoras. 
I 
The writings of Athenagoras on psychology are even more 
j ske tchy t han either Justin 's or Ta tian 1 s, even though h e may 
I have been an !! ••• Athenian philosopher v,-ho h ad embrace d Chris-
tianj_ty."2 As with the other Apologists , his main inter est was ll 
I I 
I to defend Chri sti anity against the calumny of t he mas ses and of 
t h e Roman leaders. His views conc er ning the s oul and body are 
J, elucidated in coru1ection with the Ch ristian theory of resur-
1 
3 II 
rection, on which he also ,Nrote a treatise, _9n the Resurrection 
I
I of the Dea~ (Res. Dead), similar to Tertul lian's treatise. In 
Re s. Dead, At henagoras suggests that man is the ucompound 11 of 
l. Donaldson, CHCL, III, 29. See Add. Gr., I-III, X:X.V-XXVI. 
2 . Robe~ts and Donaldson (eds.), ANF, II, 127 on Athenagoras, 
I Ap ology , VI. 
======~~ --Athenago~s. ~A~p~o~l~o~g~~~rk~xxx~~~~-~·~========================~========~========= 
I 
I 
I 
lsoul and body, 1 and, as TePtu-llian; proposes the anal~gy-between II 
sleep ing - waking and death-Christian resurrection. 2 Hi s argmnents 
re frequently in eloquent language; he 11 ••• meets his opponents 
••• on their h ighe st . levels of speech and of reason. u3 'l1ertul-
_ian shares this oratorical flair, it will be remembered . 
I
I Among the similarities betv1een Athenago r as and Tertullian , 
~oberts suggests t hat both accep t a similar concep t of the free - ~ 
r om o:f t h e will .
1
l- Dona ldson writes as i:f AthenagoPas also held ~~~~ 
fO an early but ill-framed concept of traducianism.5 But it is 
l. mpossible t o point out mor•e than similarities between A~hena- I 
goras and Tertullian, for De Anima and even the other wri ..... ting s 
f Tertullian do not mirror anything unique of Athenagoras's , 
or did Athenag oras himself contribute anything of systematic 
imDortance to Christian psychology . 
I ~ (L~) Melito. 
I 
i It has been suggested that Me lito of Sardus wrote one or 
b ore treatises c oncerning anthrop ology and p sychology v1hich are 
b ow lost, including one ti tlec11fE:p\- e-yo-wp-.~ToV' 8E:cV, v;hich antic-
ilipates:-Tertull ian' s Christianized conce pt of the corp oreality of 
all existence. 6 Vfuile the names of these treatises are perpetu-
ated (th ought their contents are hardly even imagined), they 
j'wuld seem to be the first which dealt with the same p roblems 
r ere s pecifically examined in De Anima. 
as , 
I 
1. Res. Dead, XV ; Roberts and Donaldson (eds.), AliiF, II, 157. 
1
2. Res . Dead, X:VI . 
3. Roberts and Donaldson (eds.), ANF , II, 149· 
~ . Roberts, TT, 5o, 248. · 
15. Donaldson, CHCL, III, 159. ======i+"'J6~-·=""H!&'.a@nhllch, TIID, . "' J 08_and Donald.son_, GHGL, III 
There d o e s not seem t o be any reason to s u ggest t h a t '.Eer -
tullian was infl uenced by these t r eatises, however , nor is it 
k il0 1.'ll1 y.rh ether they ii1..fluenced a n y Ch risti8.n p sychol ogists . But 
these facts c Em hardly de ny pre c edenc e t o Te rtullian in the ran_k: 
of Chri stian p sycholog ist s. 
ii~ . Cle_~enj? of Alex~m~.ria . --F oll ovving in the tradition in-
it is.ted at Alexandr ia by Philo Judeaus , the most p r ofound of t he 
early Chri s tian phj_losophers i s Clement of Alexandria. lm exact 
contem~1orary of 'I'ertul lian 1 s , it has often been argued tha t he 
re ceived influences from Clement, but this seems to be one of 
1 
.nany suc h 11·ungelosten F rage n . 11 
The Clementian psych ology is too det a iled and t oo signi fi -
I 2 
c ant for more t han a brief treatment here , but Clement make s no 
notab l e p r ogress over h is p re d e c essors in givi ng a con cise con-
s iderat i on of t h e problems of the _s oul, f o r his views are scat -
tered t h roughout h is St romata (Stro .) and other writ ing s . 3 In 
this _. se n se, his c ont r i bution is not as import ant as Tertullia n 1 s, 
a lthough per hap s by the criteria of intrir1sic wo r t h and i nfluenc , 
he is Tertullian 1 s peer . 
The attitude of Clement towai•d philos ophy is e:~pres s ed i n 
the phrase, 111 n othing is to be believed Vihi ch is unvwrthy o:L 
God •.. , nt~ Thi s seems t o allow reason to ,judge revelation, a nd 
T. 1:Ja szinlr: , TD_A.E , 1 2 . Clement, on t he other hand , d oes not seem 
to have known of Tertullian , according to Biggs, CPA , L!-6. 
2 . ChaPn .. an , Art .(l912 ), 525 sut;f:;ests t hat 'l1 e rtullian u ••• p rob-
ab l~· had parts of Cleraent 1 s •.• vfritln g s. 11 See Roberts, TT , 62 
2 . See Bi ggs, CPA, Ln ff ., on Clement r s views on philosophy , and 
CPA , 76 f f . on h i s p sy·chol ogy a n d a nthrop:iogy .'- ,.. 
3 . Clement se ems t o h av e pro jected a treatise , lle-p'- Y-uxl'l~, accor 
ding to Wa s zink , 'I'DAE, 1 2 . 
1=========*·9.~&~~~~=B~~~~~~~==~~======================~======= 
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lf he movement from Christian do gmatics to Christian philosophy ca~ 
p e susp ended from this statement of Clement's. Hi ghly sympath et i : 
~c to philosophy--Ba rdenhewer sug g e sts that he is too symp athet- l1 
~c~-Clement often app roached the Gnosticism which he tried to 
H C ""'' 2 r efute. e c a refully outlines a h ristian lVWQ"L?, which is 
I
'Fu p erior to the merely p lebian lmowledge of Christiani ty . How-
1r ver, this higher knoviledg e in no way eliminates Scriptural au-
~ hority, nor does it rep lace revelation. 
II 
The exercise of fa:i:t h di r ectly
3
becomes knowledge, 
re posin$ on a sure foundation •••. As without the 
[breathj •. , it is not possible to live, so neither 
can lmowledg e be attained fi thou t faith. I t is 
t h en t h e suppox•t of truth.LJ-
I 
/ Thus all knowledg e in Clement 1 s Christian p s y ch ology and 
~pistemology begins in faith,5 but does not end with faith as 
I ~'~ does 
Tertullian impliesAin De Car. Chr. Philosophy itself for Clemen~ 
l annot be cast out from orthodox Chri s tianity ; " Philosophy is 
I 
I 
r ot •.• the p roduct of vice, since it make s men virtuous; it fol-
1 [L ows, then, that it i s t h e worlc of God, whose work it is solely 
l~ o do g ood. "6 
' [ Philosophy is] systematic Wisd om, which furnishes 
But when he defines philosophy, he says: 
I acquaintance with the thing s which perta in to life. 
1 And we define Wisdom to be a certain knowledge ••• 
I 
vvhich the Lord hath t aught us, both by his advent 
I 
and the p rophets. And it is irrefrang ible b y rea-
son, inasmuch as it h as be e n communicated. And so 
it is wholly true ••• 7 j! 
l
i-1--. - B-a_r_d_e_nh_e_vver, PAT, l33-l3L~. _ II 
·12• Stro., I, i-xx ; it is the 11 ••• p erfect knowledge of all that 1!/ 
relates to God, Ris natu re a n d di s p ensation. 11 Bigg , CPA, 91. 
13. Stro., II, ii, in Roberts and Dona ldson (eds. ), ANF, II, 349· 1 
14 . Str"O:", II, vi, in Hob erts and Dona l d son (eds.), ANF, II, 354.
1
' 
6 . Bigg, CPA, 52, 82. ;6. Stro., VI, xvii, in Roberts _. and Donaldson (eds.), A:N""F, I~ 
:7. Stro., VI, vii, in Roberts and Dona lds on(eds.), AlJF, II, 4 92. 
!I 
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vri tten about a decade or so before De A_p.ima), 1 Clement develop ~ 
theories of Plato, Philo and the Apolog ists concerning the 
2 
oul and body and their relationship. Dean Inge regards Clemen 
I 
I 
s p ostulating a tripartite soul: the irrational, the rational, j 
/ / I 
nd the 0"1tE:.pp..~ '1lVEI.TpOC.Tt.KOVJ this last being similar to Plotinus 1 iJ 
lvoVs • 3 However, " •.• Clement ascribes so lll1ich Divine inspira~ 11 ~ion to the rational soul that the tripartite classification I 
!
seems hardly necessary. "4 He also asserts that the nature of the~~~~ 
soul is 11 ••• to move it self 11 toward salvat:ton, since man is en-
b owed with the c apacity for perfection)~ 'I 
I Regarding the source of the soul, for Clement it is defi- I 
b itely not the parents .
6 Y~udson suggests that while Tertullian l 
I 
as developing traducianism, the Alexandrian school developed 
11 creationism11 (Clement) and 11 pre-exi s tencen (Origen). 7 
In epistemology, after recognizing the relation between 
faith and reason, Clement proposes a Platonic view that man 
should " ••• trace out his proce dure in human affairs from the 
rl 
II 
I 
I 
I 
II 
ar- 1 
chetyp es above. 11 8 His investigations into e p istemology seem to I 
I 
I 
e limited to cons iderations on the Gnostic theories in Stro. II, ,· 
-- I 
and a l"eview of the Academic and Peripatetic concepts in Si:iro. _' . I/ 
1. Roberts and Donaldson (eds.), AlW, II, 168 date Stro. at A~D. 194-202. 
2. Inge, Art.(l908 ), 314: 11 Clement 1 s psycholo;sy is Platonic. 11 II 
I?• Ing e write s K.(vTpov yv?{~c; f or Plotinus 1 s vovs in Art. (1908), 3J.4 
. ~i ggs, CPA, suggests· nothing on the point. ij 4. Lnge, Art.(l908 ), 314. · / S. Stro., VI, ix, in Rob erts and Donaldson (eds.), ANF, II, S02.
1 6. Stro., VI, xvi, 135. See Biggs, CPA, 81. 
7. Knudson, DOR, 101. 
8. Stro ., VI, ix, in Roberts 
II 
and Donaldson ( eds. ) , ANF, II, 498 · j1 
========~f==========================================================~-==-_j~,j======== I :1 
II ! 
l"'Y of the freedom of the will among Chri s tian thinkers vas de-
veloped simultaneously b y t he Alexandrians and 1:C ertullian. 1 
On t h e relat i on of t h e body t o t he soul, Clement p ronounces 
a faniliar doc t rine. 11 The soul of man is confessedly t he better 
part of man, a n d the body the in..ferio r . But neither is the soul 
g ood by nature, nor, on the other hand , i s the body bad by na-
2 
tu:r'e . 11 T<'ven so , he p refers the Plat onio te n dency t o glorify 
the soul and d isparage the bod , ~ . Thi s d oes n ot come fr o:11 a view 
of t ,J.e i nhe rent depravity of the body , as vras seen above, but 
') 
f ro:r:_ a more l op p osition t o sensual overi ndulg e J. .ce • .J 
The Clement ine app roach to psycholog:r , philos oph ..,r , a nd 
Christhm theoloe~Y i s , in g eneral, v ery imp ort a1it . It contrib -
ute s t ovmrd t he Christian a cc eptanc e of reason as a use f u l and 
rali d ad j u n c t t o divine revelation, is a n i mportant element in 
the ma jol"' tradition of Eastern Ch ri s·c ianity and refle cts the norl 
of earlier Alexandrian s ch olars , whi l e als o constituting part of 
t he g reat f or ·; s..rd mover:10nt of We st ern thought . Tertulli an often 
seems to have been on thG fringe of this moveJ~lEmt , in spit e of 
his denende nce on highly reputable n on- Ch risti a n s oul"' c es . If 
t he tit le of rt the first Christian p s y chology 11 i s still to be re -
serv ed for De ~YJ.ima instead of aPlJl y in:; to Clerilent 1 s Stro ., it 
is only be c ause Tertullian 1 s vie ws are rnore self - consciou s l y 
organ ized and confined t o t he limits of one vro :2. .,k, and incor·Jor-
I . liatch , TGI, 232 . 
1 
2 . Stro., IV, xxvi, i n Roberts and Donalds on ( eds . ) , Al'!F:, I I, L~39. 
J . See, for instance, S~ro . , IV , iii. 
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ious, re petitious and fragmentary work, as its title suggests. 
In general, Roberts suggests t h at Clement and Tertullian 
1 
are better contrasted than compared . Indicative of thi s is 
the possibility that Clement was actually planning to wr•ite 
2 
against the Montanists of Phrygia. I t also points to the tem-
peramental differences between the t wo men, 3 i.e., Clement's 
near-gnosticism and Tertullian's opposition to Gnosticism. 
I 
iv. I renaeus.--"A study of the writings of Tertullian leads 
II 
to the conclusion that he was much influenced by t he theology 
of Asia 1'1Iinor. 114 Of more importance to Tertullian 1 s whole out-
look in theology than any other influence out of Christian or I 
pagan philosophical literature i's t hat of the theo~ogy of Ire- ·1 
naeus, found in his Adversus Haereses (Ad . Haer~). A brief 
account here of some of Irenaeus 1 s views will indicate the in-
debtednes s of Tertullian to him. 
Irenaeus opens Ad.._Haer. in the same way as does Tertullial)-
in De Ani~, by announcing t hat his treatise is expressly writ- ! 
t t h t . 1 . f Cb . ..... . ' t . 6 II · en o oppose ere J. ca vJ.ews o ~J.s~J.an aoc r1ne. -e pJ.ous1 
l y remarks that in such fields as anthropology and psychology, 
7 l ove and faith are far superior to reasoning , a t ypical state- 11 
. I 
ment which has l ed to characterizing I renaeus as one who 11 ••• es..: 
1. Robert8; TT, 61. 
2. Svvete, HS, 126~ 
3 Biggs, CPA, 47-49 discusses Clement's temperament. L~: Morgan, IT , 17. Irena eus' s theology is called 11 Asia Minor 11 
because he was a student of Polycarp of Smyrna, believed to 
be a student of Ba rnabas, the companion of St. Paul. 
5. Waszink, TDA , 14° and Har•naclc, Art.(l911), 662 agree here. 
6. Ad. Haer., I, vi, 1. 
==========*=~ ~.d_--lia~r=~, __ r~~--xxNi,_x~ii.~-~--===============================f=========== 
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li 
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II 
r 
I 
-JP'l~;ed ;l~i~o~o~hy~~~d- soue;ht to build up a s pecifically Biblical jj 
]p octrine. 111 In this conscious aim, Tertullian is easily seen a s 
f ollowing the lead of his predeces s or. Also, Soranus obviously i! 
[pmld offer him no gu·idance here. 
II 
I 
Toward the end of the second book of Ad . Baer., Irenaeus 
f egins his discussion of the problem of the soul in order to re-
1 
~ute the Gnostics, espe cially Valentinus. 2 Irenaeus affirms 
~hat the soul is created and immortal; it endures. 3 He also 
lsugge sted that it was a ttre al material body. 114 It is closely 
I 
!"mixe d up 11 with the body and belong s to it as its forra, yet b y 
I
. his association with the body, 11 ••• it does not ••• lose its pe -
. 5 
;culiar powers 11 of sp iritual vision, since the soul is superior 
6 
o the body. However, the flesh and the s pirit are of equal 
sight, since Christ took up the flesh himself. 7 l alue in God 's 
jireanus continues the tradition by describing the body as 11 ••• the 
!
temple in which the spirit dwells, 11 ·which metaphor was later 
I 8 
'used b y Tertullian in De Anima. F or Irenaeus, 
2. 
~ : 5. 
116. 
-18. 
the perfect man consist s in the conn:hing ling · arid 
union of the soul receiving the spirit of the Fa-
ther, and the aclmixture of t hat fleshly n~ture 
which was moulded after the image of God .':J · 
Warfield, STA, 88 and Roberts, TT , 58-59. Morgan, IT, 51 is 
wrong i n h olding that Ire naeus indulged in "p rofound specula-
tions 11 and that Tertullian did not follow him here . Neve :; 
HCT, I, 79 observes, "Like Tertullian, Irenaeus wa s opposed 
to philosophical specu1ation in matters of relig ion." In 
g eneral, on II•enaeus ' s 11biblicait theolog'iJ 11 see Lawson, BTI. 
Cf. Ad. Haer ., II, xxxi , i with De Anima, XVIII. 
Ad. Haer., II, xxxiv, 2. 
V.Ja szink , TDA , 148, K...nudson , DOR, 97 and Lawson, BTI, 199. 
Ad . Haer ., II, xxxiii, v, in Robert s and Donaldson (eds.), 
ANF , I, ~10, 411. 
~dt . Haer., II, xxxiii, v. 
Ad: Haer., V, viii, ~. 
7. Ad. Haer., V, xiv . 
9 · Ad. Haer., V, vi, 1. 
---- ~-
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In Irenaeus, Tertullian may h ave found the concept of the soul 
as the "breath of God," following the Genesis account of crea-
l 
tion, as well as the whole framework of anthropology which 
asserts that man is not soul alone but is only_ found as totus 
2 homo (body and soul). However, Tertullian did not follow Ire-
naeus in hi s view of t he spirit added to Ad@.ill by God, which the 
latter regarded as inte gral to man and not an accidentia as did 
' ? 
Tertullian._; 
As Justin before and Tertullian afterwards, Irenaeus af- W 
firmed the free will of man and the divine foreknowledge of God, II 
apparently wit hout concern over their relation. Tertullian in 
De Anim~, as has been observed before, greatly contribute d to 
the theory of the freedom of the will but was not too concerned 
about God's foreknowledge. 
Another of Tertullian's views in De Anima which was sug -
l gested by Irenaeus is t he concept tha t all souls originated frorr 
Adam, anticipating the theory of traducianism.5 However, u p to 
De Anim~, the transmission and origin of the soul was stj_ll a 
problem whi ch had never been fully discussed by Christian wri-
ters. 
I As a source for the views of the heretics, Irenaeus was 
invaluable to Tertullian in his preparation of De Anima. In 
his extensive lmov:rledge of Valentinian psychology this is most 
l. Ad. Haer., V, xii , 2 . See 
2. ~ygren, AE, II, 125 , 190. 
I. Jt. Ad. Haer., IV, xxxvii-xl. 
I 
3. See Lawson, BTI, 202-203. 
5. Ad. Haer.; III, xxiii, 2. 
I zirik , TDA, 3~-7. 
also Waszink, TDA, 14 °, 19~- · 
See Williams, IFO, 237 and Was-
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In summary, it can be asserted with Morgan that u ••• Tertul ji 
lian's theology is, for the most part, the theology of Irenaeus~ 
J but with the difference that Tertullian 11 Latinized, i.e., legal- '1 
II i zed and some what coarsened it. "
2 
As ha~een observed earlier, 11 
however, there are no references to Irenaeus in De Apima. StiJJJI, 
I Irenaeus remains the main source of Tertullian' s information Jl 
I about the Christian tradition just as Soranus is the main sourc 'I 
1 
I 
for his k nowledge about the non-Chris t i an tradition. Irenaeus, 
1 ~~ however, would probably object at too close an identification i 
I' of his views vdth Tertullj_an 1 s, sin ce "(he] was an advocate of il 
1 
the mystic method, whereas Tertullian favo r s the materialistic. ;?I 
1 Irena eus does not emphasize as much as Tei'tullian the view that I 
I\ the soul is a body , and their tempe I ' aments do not seem wholly 
comp arable. Irenaeus, even whe n opp osing the heretics wi t h all 11 
his energy, remained a Biblical scholar and theologian, whereas li 
II Tertullian willingly incor :c)orated philosophy into his t hought, 
I and was really only affected by the ntheology of Asia Minor " 
from a distance. 
From the above analv sis, the p riority of De Anima in 
" - ----
Ch ristian psychology is somewhat further quali fied becau s e it 
I 
Tertullian' s II is seen that the s pecific Christian ori entat ion of 
The soul com- 1 
1. 
I views wa s in larg e part anticip ated by I r e naeu s. 
1 ing f rom God's breath, a kind of quasi-material substance, 
1: 
I 1. Cf. Ad~ Haer. , I, vi, 1 with De Anim~, XX- XXI. 
I' I 2. Morgan , IT, 17. 3. Morgan, IT, 18 p l agarized from Bigg s, CPA, 52, probably. 
I 
-~ ~--L~=-=== 
transmitted by some means similar to traducianism, the unity of 
:man and the exceLLence of the flesh, these and many other theo-
ries are found in Irenaeus. However, once again, the unique 
characteristic of De Ani~ is not that it has originality or 
temporal priority in its major theses, but that it seems to be 
t h e first treatise devoted solely to the whole catalogue of 
j psychological problems. For while Irenaeus in h is Ad. Haer. 
I 
covers as much ground as does Clement in his Strom., Tertul-
lian1 s expo.sition is concentrated on the life of man, from the 
creation of his soul in Adam to his death and purgatorial after!; 
II 
life (cf. Reference Outline). 
It can also be seen from this examination of Irenaeus' s 
theology :just how his doct1.,ines as part of the Christian tra- J 
dition were buttressed in De Anima with the more scientific and ~~ 
detailed medical and philosophical theories of Soranus. These I! 
two sources, worked up into a k ind of heterogeneous unity, con- II 
'I 
I 
I 
' 
stitute the documentary backbone of De Anima on which Tertul-· 
lian's contributions are largely mere embellishments. 
li 
I 
2. De Anima and Later Christian Thought. 
De Anima, seen against the preceding Christian tradition, I 
first Christian psychology, eve4 deserves to be evaluated as the 
though severe limitations must be placed on the interpretation II 
of its 11 Christianitytt (because of its Eclectic sources} and its 
"p sychology" (because of ita antignostic aim). But is it of 
equal significance when seen against the subsequent Christian I 
I 
tradition? As Christianity beca..111.e more and more philosophical, J, 
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what happened to De Anima and t h e ideas it advo c ated , and how 
206 
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~ 
were Tertullian 1 s teachings in general received by his succes-
sors? 
The initial conclusion derived from investigating all the 
I li philos ophical literature available on the place of De Anima in 
I medieval Christian thought is tha t it has practically no place 
I l 
at all . The standard historie s of philoso phy for t his period, 1 
. I 
e. g ., Ueberweg -Geyer, De Wulf, Brehier, Gilson, completely i g - 11 
nore Tertullian Is writings and any specific influences th~y may I' 
I. h ave had on l ater medieval thinkers . It seems that after the ,I 
fifth century, Tertullian c eased to be a force in Christian 
thought; his writings disappear for almost a thousand years, 
~ I 
li 
I' 
and it is not until the ninth century manuscript, Codex Ag obar- It 
I di~, is edited in 16222 that Tertullian 1 s De Anima is a gain 
1: read and studied in Christendom. To clarify this state of af-
, fairs it may be well to indicate Tertullian 1 s status in the I 
Church f ollowing his death. 1! 
i. De Anima and Lat_in Christian_:tt;r .--Tertullian died some- ll 
time within the first half of the third century, and in the . 1i 
decades follovlin g , his writings seem to have been widely d is-
seminated over the Latin-speak ing p ortion of the Churc~, de s-
p ite the fact that he had been a Montanist ~ince about the 
II 
'I 
II 
year 200 and even developed his own sect later, the "Tertul- I 
a 4 T • ·t· I W lianists. 11 In 92, Pope Gelasius declared ertulllan 1 s wrl lng Tr 
~See Morgan , IT , 148-196 for a 
sion of this topic. 
2. vVaszink , TDA, 1°. Goodspeed, 
I 
I 
g eneral but inadequate discus-
1
, 
t . . t ' rlliCL, 213 dates hls manuscrlp 
==a-t~.-D~40-- ========,==========;ir 
1\ 
:I 
:I 
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~====1!====-----------------~-heretical. 1 Tertullian himself was not declared a heretic and !I 
what remained of his sect seems to have escapied with nothing I 
2 :1 
worse than being branded schismatic. The strong influence 11 
' which Tertullian and his writing s had on most of the Latin Fa-
1
1 
t he rs f r om his time to and incllJ.ding Augustine's, i.e., Cyprian J~·I 
Novatian, Lactant i us, Jerome and Vincentius Vic t or (Vincent of 
3 I 
1 
Lerins), may account for this mild condemnation by the Church. I 
I TJ:le significance of the influence and thought of Cyprian, '
1
•
1 j Jerome and Augustine can hardly be underestimated on the devel-
1 opme nG of Latin Christianity and the theology of the later !.lid- II 
I \ dle Ages. Yet if the question of Tertullian's precise influen-
ces on these thiru{ers is focused to the treatise De An.ima, Was-
zink undoubtedly gives the most succinct answer and one which 
is difficult to dispute. 
In his short section titled, "The Influence of De Anima on I, 
Later Authors, 11 he says: 
For obvious reasons the influence of the present 
treatise in the succeeding centuries was extremely 
slight. In the first place, De Anima does not con-
tain a well-thou ght-out sy stem of psychology, but a 
series of theses which are primarily due to polem-
ical intentions , so that the interest aroused by 
this vvork was _ largely de penden'ti on the currency of 
the theories combated by Tert.;~hen the heresies 
of Valentinus, Marcion, and Carpocrates, and the 
doctrine of metempsychosis were no longer of pri-
mary importance, a considerable part of De Anima 
had lost its significance as well. Iv'Ioreover,~e 
chief thesis, viz., the corporeality of the soul, 
1. Morgan, IT, 197. I 2. Evans, TAP, 3, fn. 1 and Iv'Iorgan, IT, 265. Gi;Lson, PMJI., 99 1 
sp eak s only of Tertul1ian' s 11 defection de 1 1 Eglise. 11 
3. Morgan, IT, 166 ff. 
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which was part l y based on arguments borrowed from 
a pagan physician , must soon have re pelled Chris-
tian readers; the same applies to the material-
istic doctrine of traducianism. Final ly, it should 
be pointed out that Tert., who was well read in 
Greek and in this work drew upon Greek autb.oT'-
ities in the first place, discussed various topics 
(e. g ., metempsychosis) which were never of par-
ticular interest to the western part of the Empire; 
if De Anima h ad found readers in the East it would 
certainly have aroused much wider interest. 
On -account of these considerations it is not 
sur prising t hat in the v10rks of Novatianus , Arno-
bius , Lactantius , Ambrose and Hilary ••• not a single 
trace of an influence of De Anima can be found. 
More curious is the fact t hat in this field even 
Cyprian did not regard Tert . as his magister. 
On the other hand , Jerome knew Del'Giima as well 
as Tert . 's other work s; however, he-only '"borrovJed 
from it detached sentence s and expressions admired 
b y him for their felicitous phrasing •.• 
The only author who was really influenced by 
Tert. 's p sy chological theses wa s Vincentius Victor ••• 
Augustine, too, must have b!en well acquainted 
wi th the contents of De Anima ••• 
For these reasons, and particularl y from the fact that De 
Anima wa s primai•ily antignos t ic, Wa szink concludes decisively 
that " ••• the usual qualification of De Anima as 1 the first 
Christian p sychology ' is apt to call up false associations, 112 
such as coT'l.noting t h at it is original, reas onably speculat ive, 
thoroughly scientific, and a la·sting influence on its successors 
in the field ·when it was in fact none of these. Yet t he brevity 
of Wa szink's answer to t h e question of this chapter re quires a 
few expl anatory passages. 
The 11 obv:tous r easons 11 of wh:bch VJaszink speaks for the lack 
of infi~uence of De Anima on later writers include the condemna- J 
tion of it and Tertull i an 's oi'her writing s in 492, the immediai:B 
1. Waszink, TDA, 48° -49°· 
2. Waszink, TDA, 7°. 
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~ ~---- 1polemic ~~ ~i~~r-the treatise, the fa;t -t~~t-t~e author never 
achieved any imp ortant p lace in the Church hierarchy, and es-
lb ecially that while those whom he did influence were the impor-
tant Latin Fath ers, there was not a good philosophical mind among 
11them. M:organ s p eaks of Cyprian as "dull, 111 and Ueberweg-Prachte~ 
I 
jiadds, "Philosophische Ansichten sind bie ibm kaum zu finden; 112 
11
and while Vincent of Lerins lauds Tertullian excessively in his 
iCommonitorium, 3 there is nothing to indicate t hat he p ossessed 
i: 
l'a sp eculative mind. 
with Augustine when 
He was completely routed in his conflict 
he defended the 11materialistic 11 concepts in 1 
D r. ~ • 4 1 e .tU.Llma. 
II 
ii. Tertullian and __ Augustine. --The "acquaintance 11 of Augus-
litine ·with Tertullian 1 s De Anima is not stressed by Warfield, 
~ ourke or 'las zink, even though he mentioned 1t. 5 Much less do 
\~hey emphasize any important influence by Tertullian on Augus-
tine. However, 8.n examination of De Anima and certain writing s 
!'of Augustine reveals that if there were no direct influences, at 
I 
,least both writers dealt with the same p roblems in a similar 
llr 1 · ,... • ·1 d · tl ble lt Th . \
1
· as 1.lon ror Slml ar reasons an Wl :1 compara resu s. - lS 
l~tatement apnlies primarily to the concepts of the free will, I - -1 • ij ,orig inal sin, origin and transmission of the soul, and lmrt10l"tal-
;ity. 
I 
It is particularl y inapplicable, hov1ever, to epistemologic i l 
u roblems, where Augustine's Platonism contl"asts 
,-
JCL. Tvio-rgan, fT, 1 67. 
2. Ueberweg - Prachter, GGP, II, 87. 
G· Se e Bindley, CVL, 7 8 - 80 . 
unmistakably witl 
It\-• Waszink, TDA , 48. (' . . _5. Morgan, IT, 47 , !53, 17_15-ld7 cla1ms extensJ_ve influences on 
Augustine by Tertullian, but he fails to bring :forth a single 
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Tertullian 1 s sensationalismT ---
In the development of his mm views, Augustine had occasion 
to criticize Tertullian and the 'rertullianist s of the fourth 
1
century for their views concerning the conc ept of the soul as 
I I 
i I !corp oreal. However, Esser suggest s that the typ e of materialism ; 
[opposed b y Augustine 1 s Epistle to Optatus was nevei' prop osed by 
1
Tertullian. 2 In a different treatise, where the discussion 
!turns to the source of the soul, Augustine leans toward Tertul-
!1 
ilian 1 s ,theory of traducianism, although he declines to attempt 
I 
Ia phy siological explanation comparable to that in De Anima. 
I 
!Bourke observes at this point that although 
I 
••• Augustine criticizes him, he does not think 
that his position should be held u n to ridicule. 
These are-tremendous problems and no serious at-
tempt at a oo lution should be laughed at. 3 
It is important to note that Augustine was not always 11 re-
bulsed 11 
l 
by materialism as Waszink sugge sts. Both he and Tertul- I 
,lian tended toward an underlying agreement because both came to 
1 
!f b ri st ianity under tbe inf'luence of p revious materialistic modes I 
1
of thought, Stoicism-Epicureanism in the case of Tertullian, and li 
Manic1Eari:lsm in the case of Augustine. This Manichean influence 
baused Augustine to have a difficult time grasping the Platonic 
b oncept of spiritual swJstance; eventually his Platonic tenden-
~ies ~on out~ and Augustine moved away from Tertullian bere.4 
o... See Au~ustine, De Libero Arbitrio, II, in McKeon (e d . ), S1liP, 
I I, 3-64, where this epistemological dif ference is acute. 
I' 
,r 
1
2. Esser, ST, 231, fn. 1. [3 . Bourl\:e, AQW, 2~_0, fn. 97 refers to Augustine, De Generatione 
I ad Literam, X, xxv-xxvi, xli-xliv. See also Esser, s~W,78.1 ~-· See Bourke-, AQ1JV , 34, 57, 78. 11 
210 
lis till, Bourke 
II he view t hat ception, t h is 
claims that Augustine never wholly rid himself of 
the soul is spiri~ualis materies. In its root conl 
may be similar to Tertullian's corporis_~EJ~. 1 
ut it is the centuries of Platonic tE?aching s stemming primarily 
rom Augustine that best expl ain t h e 11 repulsion 11 of Christian 
I 
-eaders to Tertullian's materialism rather t h an any inherent in- ~ 
""eriority of the doctrine. 1 
Augustine 1 s account of the orig in of the s oul is not 2.s I 
clear as Tertullian 1 s in De Anima. Vv'hile he vaci l lated between I 
~enerationism , cre ationism, and traducianism, Augustine seems to 
r ave taken over a majority of t h e traducian c oncepts in his own 1 
heories while still repudiating most of t he details of Tertul-
1 ian's genetic · psychology. 2 In fact, the term, ,tttraducianism)' 
,, 
itself is first applied in accusation of Augustine's theories 
. 3 
d 
by I 
Pelag1us. 
Of special import ance is the influence of Tertullian's 
hought on August ine's concepts of f ree will, original sin, and 
_atural depravity. Ess e r observes t hat it is but a short step 
· rom the yit i~n originis of De A_pim_~- to the corruptio naturae of 
ugust ine. )_~ Morgan ins i st s that Augustine 1 s concept of total 
of man was developed from Tertul lian 1 s v iews. In fact 
ugustine took an even 11 ••• darker vievr of human nature than Ter-
tulli an, while rejecting , though not qui te positively, the doc-
trine of traducianism, on which t hat teaching is based. 11 5 Esser 
1. Bourke , A QW , 23 7, 102-103. See also Waszink, TDA , 153 . 
2. See Bourke , AQ1N, 100, 102, 235 , 236, 240, Esser, ST, 227, I 
Morgan, IT, 181 , Waszink, TDA, 430 - 431 and Williams, IFO, 327 l 
211 
• Williams , IFO, 233 , fn., 327. 
, • E_.s s er ST 22 and Williams IFO 5__!_Iv1or~an 1 "LL. 
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seems to have b een one of t h e first to observe the imp ortant ~~--------
point here when he says that the theories of traducia nism and 
1
1 
g enerationism in Tertullian and Augustine, respectively, were 
motivated by one common problem: how to accom1t for the Chris-
1 
tian doctrine of the Fall of man (orig inal sin), even though 
t h e exact term, "orig inal sin, 11 was not to occur until Augus-
2 
tine, for it is not fom1d in Tertullian 1 s writings. 
Concerning the free will, Waszink makes it clear that it 
was Te rtullian 1 s terminology of arbitrii libertas which Augus-
tine simplified to the more usual liberum arbitrium. 3 Both 
phrasings contain essentially the sarne meaning, as illustrated i 
I 
in a comment from Augustine 1 s early treatise, De Libera Arbitrid. 
Here he say s, as does Tertullian in De Anima, ~CI, that 11 ••• the !! 
II 
human will is the role direct cause of sin. We do evil ex li- I 
b ero yolunt_a_~.~-~ , __ ar~.t~.E.i~; sin non est uti que natur_alis, sed 
voluntaris. 114 
These few comm.ents do not by any means exhaust t h e rela- I 
I 
tion of Tertullian and Augustine, but as far as De Anima is conl i 
cerned, t h ey do indicate the major lines of development and the ~~ 
influences which prop e r l y exist in Augustine from Tertullian. ~~ 
iii. Scholasticism.--There are t h ree levels at which Ter-
tullian, De Anima, and Medieval Christian t hou ght can be dis-
c us sed. F'irst, the certain and direct · influences of De Anima 
on later thinkers, vrith t h e f ew exceptions noted above, are 
1. See the e vnlally original conclusions here of Esser, ST, 228 
and Williams, IFO, L~93. 
2. Williams , IFO, 73 fn. 
3. Waszink, TDA, 288-289. 
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I
I t h ought is concerned~ 1 Second, the g eneral influence on later 
thinl{ers from Tertullian' s writings and central doctrines as 
'I 
11 illustrated in D~ Ani]11a has been explored in part and a more 
11 thorough examinat ion would indicate a wider area of influence 
I, than the first, although even this is largely restricted to his /! 
il 
theological language and terminology r a t her than his orig inal 
doctrines. Third, the similarity of Tertullian's modes of 
reasoning and h is theories in general to those of later thinkerf: 
11 ha s hardly been mentioned • . Both these latt e r areas suggest 11 
li furthe r study, much of which has recently been accomplished by 
11 other students in the field. A v ery few observations may be 
I mentioned here in the closing p a g es on this point. 
li 
tl 
It is very imp ortant to note that the t wo centra l doctrines 
l
i for 
,I . and traducianism, gradually disappear from Christian thought. 
,I which De Anima is generally remembered, viz., corp orealism 
I ij 
!I These doctrines reached their fullest expression in Tertullian, , 
II 
Il
l 
I 
while later writers, such as Arnobius, Lact antius, Hilary , the ;; 
Cappadocians, Victor and Augustine, all moved inexorably in t h e 
dire ction of immaterialism. Minor p oints defended in De _!1-_!t_~!_TI.a 11 
give way completely in latel"' ages to a more sophisticated I! 
Ch ristian t heology , e. g ., ecstasy disappears and mysticism tal{eJ 
I 
its p lace. Tertullian's ambivalent attitude toward Plato and 
r:-In t1~is-connection, one recalls the words of Harnack, utter~ 
some years a go, on the opening words to De Anima, XLV. He !; 
said, 11 [ Tertul l ian here J definitely established within the li 
Church the idea that there is a 1 Christian 1 vi ew in all 1 
:1 s pheres of life and in all questions of knowledg e. 11 HarnacY.;: ,~ 
l1 _Ji0Ik __ Il,~~l2_~._=== 
.I 
t' 
,! 
I 
1l 
II 
" 
I. 
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philosophy in r;enoral also fades from p rominence within a f evY 
hundred years , and was out of faovr t hroughout the main :;_::>e ri 0 d 
o·P Scho lasticism, except for minor theologians and mystics, sucl:; 
as Bernar d of Clairvaux. 1 
It also is relevant to notice t h at as C:-:.I'istian philosophy 
c arr..e mo re and more under the influence of Platonism, especially 
in Au gustine, thinkers no longe r ·worried about the p roblems in-
valved in defending a d oct rine of sense perc e :;_::> tion ' as did Ter-
tullian in De Ani ma . The l i teral vie-vv which he tool; of the HT 
accounts of sense verification of Chri s t 's teaching s and p erson, 
which be c ause of h is anti - d oce t i sm was raised to a philosophic 
p osition of e p ist emolocical sensationalism, seems to h ave dis -
appeared compl e tely in later centuries . Although the previ ous 
leng thy quot ati on f rom Waszink is t rue, the reason f or t h is 
p1ovement away from De_.An.i~ here is n ot because the heret ics 
c ombatted by Tertull ian had lost al l interest for later thea-
logians . On the contrary , it is because docetism it self, in 
the f orm of Platonism, entered all Christian thought and remaine 
for c enturie s following . The kind of opposition to docetism 
made by Tertullian was thus b oth no long er Deces sary and i n fact 
imp os sible, since it had b ecome in essence orthodoxy, \Yhereas 
s u ch v5_ev.r s as Tertullian 1 s bec2Jlle he terodox. 2 
1 . For a discuss i on of the p rob lem of faith and reason in the 
late I"' r:Tiddle .Ages , see the ver;-}" different views of Gils on, 
RRH.A, De Ylolf, Rl~AR , and Brunner, RR . 
2 . This is the gist of the fan-1ous thesis by Harnac k of nt;he hel-
lenization of Christianity . n See his HOD , I . Cf. tho sirnilar 
view of Leisy, BCR, 295-296 that Christianity is really a 
11discip lined · r.;no s is." Neve, HCT, I, 56 has re cently c riti cized 
Harnac k 1 s viev'lpoint, a lthough perhap s less than refuted it. 
=---=--== ·======·======='-====== 
It was sug 0 ested in the firs t c~a~ ter of t h is the s is t hat 
Tertullian s'l.ould be re[';arded as the founder of Lat in I-.Iedieval 
1: Ch risti an philosophy, if the orig ins of We stern relig ious phi -
I 
' losophy a s advan c ed by 'ifolfson are accepted . I This is an imp or- j 
t ant ap·-. I·o a c _l t o Tertullia.n which has not b e en e;;:plored by p r e-
vious \'Trlters . However, it ha.s been s een t 1at De Anima 1 s p ri - I 
I 
II I 
'mary sic;n:i.f:Lca nce for ChrisLt8.n t hought is larr~ely one of chro-
nolor; i c al p riority rathe r t ho..n d i rect or l a sting inf l uence on 
l a ter thousht . Since it is only i n this se n se t hat De Ani ma c anl 
1 ~e ally be reg arded as t he fir s t Christian psychology a rtd a s p a r t / 
!1 of the fotmdat ion of Latin Ch rist i2J1 philosophy , Tertullian 1 s 
I' place in t h e h istory of J; s ;_rcholor;y , :9hilosopl:.y and t he ol or;y on 
tl;.e basis of this treati s e c a n never bo one of c omparable ilil-
I 
I. 
I· p ort arwe to that of Phil o OI' Au c;ustine, for ins tanc e . 
It has a lso b een sug13e s te d t h a t I'ePtullian founded in larg e 
1Jart both t he terminology a n d method of analysis f or 't:estern 
·c h e ology and phil osophy . Altho:..1gh t h is con clusi on is shared by I 
1 Lavrlol'' , S,:·re t e, Evans, Lovej oy , Boas and a ll the rest , and hi s I 
11 been acce _:J t ed and e v en e1abora ted il1 t he body of t l-... is thesis, :Ltl! 
real1y ·cakes a very detai led exami n ation to subst antiate or ,_i s - / 
1
,1 prove this c lain , and i.'iaszinl~ h a s not s t udied tllis p roblem a s I; 
1 Bu~ whether or 1, /I closely a s _le migl:xt have , nor has anyone el se . 
1 n ot Tertul1~an really did influenc e l ate r t ain ~ers with hi s 
tcrr!1inology anc. 1:1ethod , i t i s p robab l y safe to sa::- that thi s 
fluence did not come d ire c t l y ano. exclus ive1y froB pe !U'1.i itla , 
J 
butJJ 
1 . F or inst a n c e , Be thune - Ba ker , EHC, 232- 233 ;.; ive s 
n it e asserti on of t h e j_nfluenc e of 'i'ert u1 li a n 1 s 
@,Yl.d 11 :Q.atur..e.~ on_ l at.Dl''_ thou:~:i·tt ~ 
n v e r y defi - ~l 
11 sub staDce 11 
I' 
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. I these treati s es we1 ... e studied more closely by later writers be- II 
I I! 
1 cause they dealt with trinitarian theology and Chri s tology in 11 
!/ the ante-l'H cene period , where terms and c onc epts for " substance~~ 
I 
II I 11nature,rr etc., were very imp ort ant, while De Anima dealt with 1i 
,, 1 11 
lj di f ferent and l ess i mportant uses of these terms. 
I' 
I 
1 n or"G a nce I ~ 
On e example may be mentioned to indicate the possible im-
of De Anima for l a ter thought whe re direct influence 
I 
is definitely absent. Profes s or Harris has suggested that the 
. I 
term, anima, was ill-f itt ed to exp ress the Arist otelian concept I; 
- , 
of lf'V'X, V) in Albertus Magnus and his fo llowers because of its 
I urevious and therefore traditional use with non-Aristotelian I _, 
1\ meani ngs . 
I 
I 
I 
The result of these other u sages of t he term p reju- ! 
diced the whole concep t and relati on of the soul to the body in
1 
1l St . Thomas away from a correct Ari s totelian view and made the 
I, 
I 
II 
II 
II 
il 
I: 
Thomist ic inte r p retation t h ereby unf~thful to Aristotle, 
~V\a. 
Thomas 's authority, the Christian tradition, a lso Thomas's 
" . I 
authority , as well as basically contradictory as a logical con- ;j 
2 
cep t in i t self. Now, it h as been shown e a r l ier that it was 
\ Tertullian who imp orted much of the initial meaning into this 
term, anima , through h is e arly Christ i an treatise <;m t h2.t sub-
j ect. Thus, pe rhaps the difficulties of St. Thomas vvith the l: 
term can be traced to the initial u sage ·of it b y ~ertullian and il 
'I II j
1 
t h e influence of this usag e on later writers, particularly at j1 
il 
II the point of the unity of the soul and the subordination of ' 
·I I 
j· naturalia and esp ecially accidentia to this unity . jl 
=====1!;1 -J--.~--~~n..-(3:!-.N,-__ -dic.rr=- ~-.9-~ 2_._Har:ri s _J2?_,_r_,_l5_~5_.8 . 
I 11 
II i! 
Occasionally St. Anselm has been mentioned in this thesis 
and it has been indicated that ideas in his philosophy are si-
milar a lthou gh almost certainly not directly influenced by Ter-
tullian's g eneral legalistic mode of thought, particularly con-
c e rning the divine-human relationship . Both Esser a nd Morg an 
h ave emphasized this similarity, but neithe r indic ates s p ecific 
relati onships with parallel passages. T~e sv.ggesti.on can only 
be made that Morg an's statement quoted earlier in this thesis 
rega rding the legalism from St. Paul to St. Anselm via Tertul- . 
lian needs much more support t h an this thesis discovered before ~~ 
it can be taken a s conclusive. · 1 
I 
In conclusion, one of the p rqblems of continual contro-
versy wherever philosophic a l theolog ians meet and t h e one with I 
which this thesis was int roduced is the r e lation of f aith to 1 
reason. The positions of Gilson, Brunner, Ferre and DeWolf' on li 
II 
this very top ic indic ate tha t a satisfactory s elution has b y no 11 
means received acceptance or p erhaps even been reached. It is ~1 ce r t a in, however, that Tertullian took one of the first imp or-
1 
I 
tant stands on t h e i ssue, and that apparently later thought 1 
moved away from h is p osition. Ultimately, for most Scholastics J 
I 
1 the precise clarif'ication of the p roblem occurs in the opening 
questions to St. Thomas's Summa . Theologica. 
resp ected j~~taposition of reason with faith 
But even t his much ll 
should b e amenable ! 
to a further investigation showing it as essentially only a I 
clarif ication of Tertullian's own anilii guous and vacillating 
position, motivated b y l a r g ely t h e sa~e interests and desires, 
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j and Vlhile aided by a thousand years of deliberation, essentiallVl 
II no more adequate than Tertullian' s, once its ingenious app ear- - ~ 
I ance of logical clarity is stripped away. 1 However, this topic 'I 
would c ai•ry the investigation well beyond the limits of Ter-
1 
IJ tullian's De Anima, and must therefore be i gnored here . 
I 
3. Conclusion: De An:i.ma as the First Christian Psychology. 
After this summary of De An:Lma and its predecessors and 
i 
successors in Christian psychology, what can be concluded about 1 ~ I / the thesis that Tertullian 's De P~ima is the first Chri stian 
I 
1
i psycholoe;y? Foul .. quot ations may be adduced to illustrate the 
1/ views of others on the point . Esser observed in his introduc-
1 
I 
tion to the German translation of Tertullian's writings: 
Man hat sie neuerding s treffend kurz dahin 
charakt.l3.risiert: sie - sei die erst chr.istlicb.e 
p sychol6gie, welche in Streben nach syst~~a­
tischer Auffassung und in selostlindiger Weise. 
geschrieben wurde:2 · 
In his incomparable exposition of Tertullian's psychology , he 
concludes: 
Die erste C h r i s t 1 i c h e Ps y c h o 1 o g i e 
welche im Streben nach sy stematischer Auffassung 
und in selbstandiger Weise i n ... nerhalb der latein~ 
isch en Kirche geschreiben vro.rde , ist die j enige , 
\velche der Gegenstand unserer Abhandlung v:rar . Wi r 
sag en c h r i s t 1 i c h e psychologie; denn mit 
dem Bevro.sstsein ging Tertullian an seine Aufgabe, 
dass aus der in....neren Wahrheit der christlichen 
Lehre ein neues Licht auf jene den Menschen selbst 
angehenden Fragen fallen werde, in welchen die 
menschliche Vernunft sich b.isjer unter vielfachen 
Widersprtichen versucht hatte. 
Il
l. See Gilson's defense of the Thomistic position in RRMA , 
2 . Kellner ('Ubers.), TA, II, 299-300. 
I 3. Esser , ST , 232. 
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!I 
suggested: 
The importance of this work lies, not in the coh-
clusions at which the author arrives, for these 
are in some cases very remote fron1 our modern views, 
but in the impulse which the treatise gave to fur -
ther study and investigation of the subject. Ter-
tullian was the p ioneer who lepd the Christians 
into the reaL.'TI of natural science .1 
even more briefly, said: 
~ertullian was] ••• the p ioneer of orthodox anthro-
pology.2 
II 
Viewed against the background of a hundred and fifty years 11 
of previous Christian psychology, Tertullian' s De Anima may be !i 
regarded a s the first effort in a systematic and inclusive I~ 
Christian psychology. Its priority is not in doubt . Nor is the 
fact that it is essentially a Christia n treatise, since Tertul-
lian aimed to be and always wrote as a Ch ristian . The only 
competing Jcreatise here, one by Iilelito, is lost and seems to 
I 
I have h ad no influence on later, writers . Therefore, the chrono-
1 
log ical priority of' this treatise in Christian psychology can be 
reg arded as confirmed. 1 
But what about the priority and originality of the a ctual !1 
11 content of De Anima, its psychological, philosophical and theo- il 
;, 
'I I logical theories? It has been sho~~ that just as t h e non-Chris~ 
I' 'I 
·I tian tradition dealt freely ·with the ideas embodi~a in De Anima l 
11 t h e Christian tradition also had included in its literature the il 
!i essentials of Tertullian 's vimus. Even though the NT and Apos- !1 -
tolic Fathers vrere averse to non-I•elig ious writing , they did 
l. Schneider, Ar t.(l897), 248 . 
2. Mo r gan , IT, 213 . See also Carmichael, Art . (191~6), 93£.91~ . 
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ground u p on which a ll later Chri s tian p s y - 1 
' chology was built. 
I sensationa lism were 
I gnost ic relevance. 
Such views as Te~ullian 1 s p seudo-Epicure~ ~ 
cert a inly encouraged because of t he ir anti- ;
1 
'11he l ate r Chri s ti an writers , beg inning with 11 
II Jus tin , i n s ome ways went f arthe r t h an Tertullian b y bri n g ing II 
qui t e consci ously into Chris t i anity ph i lo s ophic doctrines a nd 11 II 
I. mode s of thought, a s well as seeldng a dequate interpretati ons ~~ 
11 of origina l s i n, f\ree will, orig in of th<;l s oul, i nrrnortality , I'e-
11 il l ati on of body an d soul, an d t he l ike. The p e al. of t h is a ch ieve-
~~ ment p rior to Tertullian is r e a ch e d in Clement and Irena e u s. :' 
I! Clement' s vi ew of philosophy , h is Pl a tonic t en denci e s, and h is 
II f amiliarity with Alexan drian psycho l og ical views made his wri-
li t ing s generally su perior t o Te r tullian•s, a lth ough less co~-
!1 c en t r a te d psychologica lly t h an t h e l atter's De Anima. Ire n a eus {i 
~~~~ on the other hand, actually p rovided t h e Ch risti anized interp re 1llll 
tations .of p sy ch ological doctrines which Tertullian j oine d with li 
11 ma t eri a l f rom Soranus to form his views of traducianism, cor-
p ore a l soul substance, r elation of mind to body , and so forth. 
I' .I 
I' I 
i 
I 
It i s doubtf ul whether there is one basic concept in De Anima 
which Tertullian defends as Christ i a n which is orig ina l with 
li 
h i m. Of course, such c onscious orig inal ity vvould h ave been re- I[ 
li _ g a rde d as heret i c a l innova tion an d he obviously esch ewed it for I\ 
11 t h a t r eason, sinc e~t was just such innova t i ons which he opposed ;; 
in t he Va lent i nians a nd oth ers. Thus, wh en the t h eory of De 1' 
An ima a s t h e f irst Chri s ti a n p s y chology is f a ced with the f a cts 1 
that h ave b e en summarized above, t he t h eory is viti a t ed of al- ,' 
.e 
!most all 
I :tng that 
significance e::::c ept u'!Lat can be g leanec1 fr om re c ogniz-
no p revious Christian devot ed one whole treatise ex-
1! :olicitly to a systematic syrvey of tho problems arising f_ ... om tho 
I origin , [Srowth, nat Ere and future life of man ' s sm1l . 
!I i~ven 
'~ tullian 1 s 
!! this does 
vYhon it i s recogni 7,ed t hat few of the details of 'l1er-
basi c themes had been found in Christia n literature, 
not mean that he conducted oriGinal emp i rical studies , 
I vias re:narx ably a cute in 
I 
.. • 1.. , I 
11l S 0l1.0Uf,11.·c , O l ... ho.d oric;:tnal insi r;ht s 
I: into philosophico.l ) roblems . 
• been out lined in t he previous 
It Here l y reminds one 
chap ter, namely, t hat 
of vrhat ha s 
a n:um.ber of 
~~ Eollenistic thinl:e rs vvell outside all Christian intere st s or 
com:rrlitments, anci es·pecially Soranus of EDhesus , b.ad been used 
~ - . -
II extensively as sources for anti - philo sophic argrunents and 11 pro -
II Christian 11 scientifi c information . iiJhat exists in Tertullian Is 
;
1 
• ' l ' . b ' . ~~ o C1_,J.-r_ l. s ·:-l· an. l l . D A . . , orl ~slna_ con·crl Ul~lon v u psyc 10 ogy ln e . nlma lS 
I 
II largely constituted by his amal g amat i on of these two literatures 
1 one , the Chri stian from the l'!"T to I renaeus, and the other , the 
I 
I 
pagaD, frm~1 the St oics to Soranus . 11hus , what i n De Anima is 
genuinely 11newrr to Christian psych ol og;/ is not due to Tertul liar ' s 
orig inality ; it is I'eally qui te common coin to Hellenisti c phi -
losophy . 
// 'l1he theory of De .An~ma as the first Christ i an ps-yc h ology 
II 
\' also has to meet the c riticisms from another direction , viz ., 
II 
11 
nhen it seeks to relate De Anima to subsequent Chl"istie.n psycho-
1 log ical thought . It is easily shown t hat De Anima had prac t ical -
li ly no direct influence on any . later thinlcel ... , with the exception 
II 
li 
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1 of a few of the lesser Patristic vvrit ers. Although some o~ 
I more imp ortant such as Cyprian, Je rome and Augustine may have II 
been fami liar vdt h it, it apparently did not influenc e their 
thought very mt.~ch, with the possible exception of Au gustine. 
[, ., ., •r 
The predomin{t~ Pl a tonic tendencies in Christian Medieva l Phi- i 
Stoic-Eclectic interlude of II losophy make De _Anima essentially a 
which h ardly a trace remains. Ev en the recognition that Tertul~ 
lian constructed much of the lan~uao;e for la~er t h eolo gical and ~~~ 
u , __ I 
philosoph ica l theory does not pl a ce a higher value on De .Anima ~~~ 
simp l y becaus e the se te~tinologic al inf luences more likely c ame 1 
'I from his t rinitarian and Ch ristolog ical writine;s, which were il 
closer to Patristic theological interests t han were his rumi na- II 
tions on late Stoic psyc h ology . Of course, many similarities 
i I between Tertullian and Augustine c an be observed; but it is 
I, qui~e dif'ficult to trace any p recise influences, excep t in the 
I' ,I doctrines of free will, n atural dep r avity and orig inal sin. 
I Sch olastic t : ought, e. g ., Anselm , Aquina s, bears no trace of 
I! Tertullian's De Anima. 
Thus , if De Anima is regarded a s the first Christi a n p s y - ~~ 
chology , Ivlorgan' s statement of the p ioneer work done b y this I' 
treatise in "or thod ox anthropology " was p ioneer work with no i 
1
1
!' immedi a te f ollowers. Schneider's statement t hat the i mpol'tance II 
' of De Anima lies in its 11 impulse 11 to further inve stigations is Jl 
I 
\I 
a more f i gurative use of 11 i mpulse 11 than it ought t o be; Was-
zin.1{ ' s view would be that it \'las -at best a ne gative i mpulse. 
I But it is Esser who has devoted his labors to elaborating and 
_ji 
d efending this view; his reasoni n s need be met with only one 
1
criticism: as Ha s zink has suggested , and as this thesis has 
: a g reed, De Anima was one of a r;rmxp of writings co:m:p osed by Ter-
ltul]_i an for the p rimary purpos e of ov9osing heresy . 
I 
De Anima is 
Of course , t h is 
)of faith to reason and h is leg alistic methods and crimes a g ainst 
I 
11oc;ic, b oth 5.nductive and deductive, all of which tend to mal;:e 
/
:hi s writing s more p olemic and the :Pefore less philo s ophical than 
I -
i 
II t h ose of Clen ent or Irenaeus OT' Augustine . Tbus , as WaszinJ.~ 
1 c autioned , u~e e v a lua ti on of De A..11.ima as "the fi l~st C..:.ristian 
' ------
!1 p sych ology 11 c an be misleading unless the critic a l qu r.l i fications 
I 
I' develop ed in the last tvvo chapters are lce p t in mind. But these 
;, qualific a tions cannot a l ter the fac t , nor does t h is thesi s deny , 
tha t 'rertullian's De Anima is in SJIEe senses t h e first CDrist ia· · 
p s y cholog ical treatise , and as such desePves thoughtful study 
, i n the histories of psychology , phi lo sophy and Chri stian d oc-
/I t rine . 
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Sm.u,IAHl AHD CONCLUSIONS 
l • s·u.mJ.~lary . 
In this t h esis, Tertullian 1 s De Anima has been explored fror 
a number of p oints of vie·w. Re c alling the problems sugg e steel i n 
the Introduction , vre have analyzed the attitudes of various cri-
tics to many aspe cts of the philosophy p rop osed i n De Ani ma , 
vraced the various influences on Tertullian i'Ih ich channeled his 
cheology and p sychology , exmained Tertullian in terr.1s of his ir-
fr'at i one.lism and raatel"ialism , l ocated his p osit i on in Hellenist ic 
~s ·....rell as Christian literature , a nd , finally, studied the view 
that De Anima is the f ii•st Christi a n p sychology . Th is has indeec 
been a broad survey and has inc JJJ.ded references and excursions, 
~even if brief , into most of the c las s ical Gr ee l-:: , Rom.3.n , and 
i ebrew- Ch risti a n heritag e of the first few centuri es of this era . 
But vrhat in fact have been the p o sitions developed in the course 
of tllJ.s thesis , nov1 that it c an be reviev.red and smnmarized as a 
.'Thole? 
Chap ter I, tiThe Ba c k g rm ncl for De Ani m.a in rl'ertullian I s 
.l..Jife, n concent;r'ated on four p roblm:1s , fou:r· areas of influence 
l'.rhi ch a ppe a r in De Anima in various ways. These al"e his leg al -
istic method of argument and legal source of his terr1inolog y , 
h·' •.L t' 'h ' h . _,_.,:r of· C,n~_ l' s'·l· ::- -;·:1~-t--y, u lS COI:1:mlvlilen- ·co u~ e au-c; OI'lv.;; • v ~ ..!..v· including ·che 
B., l e ·'-~"ell'~- 1· on lO _ , v.L· ,,. v ____ , Rule of Faith s.nd _9.hari smata, his r.1ontanistic 
• • • 1 '- • l t. .J. • • • , • 
1ce ndoncies, a nd hls ancl - ~l.ei'e'l-':L c a_ or an l e;noscl c alm lll n ls 
~Yrit ings. These f our ·ooints 1J.el1J inte grate De .Ani ma with the 
- . -
life of the ma n vrho wrote it . 
Tertulli an 1 s l e g alism raise s the problem of ·G11.e log ic a nd il 
P-ogi c in h is argmr1ent s . Unfortunately , t he latter is qui te ~:)rev 
alent and i n clud es ab out every p ossible type of fall a c ious re a -
the hereti cs 1s a spe ci a l l egalist ic mode of argumentat i on which 
1.e dove lops . The general ef.L e c t of his le gali sn was t o influe n ce 
him :Ln t he d i re ct ion of ind:i_ffercnce to stri ct l ogi c a l c onsi s -
cenc y in s p ite of the fa ct t hat in De An):._E1a , for instan ce, he 
'Jalces the c onsi stent pret ense of p resenting a p os ition , nhich on 
the basis of its log i c a lone, i s adequate . 
'J.lertullian 1 s c ommitment to Christiani t y m.e ant p rimarily 
that no d octrine s '.'lould be p r esented in De Ani ma vrhich vrepe not 
a ccording t o the d o ctr i nes of the Cb.urch as interprete d by Ter-
cullian . His criterion of Christian d oc t rine v.ras three - fo ld, 
starting vrith the Bible, the l iterary tradition in terms of the 
Rule of Faith, and final l y the Par a c lete . This l atter is related 
t o hi s concept of persona l revelation, 11 ecstas:)rn a s 'I1ertulli a n 
calls it , 1vh:i.ch i n turn l e a d s to the p roblem of h i s l 'Ion t anisr.:. 
in De Anina . De Anima vms comp osed some time after Tertullian 
!had become G. EoEtanist; t hat much is certain . However , the p ri -
mary pas s age in De Anj_ma whe re the Eont~:mist influenc e on h i m i s 
supposed l y most c learly r eveal ed turns out to be only an m~pir-
i c a:L validation of a doctrine whi ch h e held to be true on other 
g round s. On the oth er h e.n d , 'l'ertu1lia n 1 s emphasis on rev e la-
tions is not p e c ul i arly Hont an:tstic but reflects a general em ... 
phasis of t he Ch u r c h at the tii:ne . ivTontaniEml in De Anima is t h us 
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larcely a ref l ection of Te~etullian 1 s temperament a nd interest s_, 
'!hile the Christian trad i tion in the TilE1.i n j_s the basi::-; of autho:;_,.., 
-j f- \T 
- '-' v 
,, b . . lO:r' ~J_S Vl8Yi S . 
'I'he controvorsie s with the hereti c s a nd their ~9hiloso:ohi c al 
s ources i s the imnediato cause of I'ertulli an 1 s v1ri ting !2~-=!1..nima , 
~.nd this anti;i,no s tic aim m.ust :i.J.ever be overlooked 1nhen the trea-
tise is bo ins studied . 
losophy and wa s inimical to it i s sb.0\'!11 to depend on the rela-
l-ion v;hioh he believes t o e.xi s t betvieen h eresy and ph5_loso:ohy . 
On the other hand , Tertull i an frequently uses pure l y philosoph-
ical d octrines, an i mportant quaL i.fi c ation to his sup:0osecl anti -
t)hiloso;_;hics. l attitude . 
Chapter II , "De Anima and the Other Wr it i ngs of Tertullian,' 
pr esents first 8. brief outline of De Anima for future reference . 
relation of De Anima t o Tertullian 1 s other writing s is 
i ndi c a teo. by selecting s ix t reatis es contemp orane ous with it and 
shovring h ow· the i deas developed i n pe Anima are either found 
"'irst in the::.e six , rece:l.vo a ful l er and :m.oro luc id e xp o sition, 
or -,Jarallel theil,.., treatment in De Anima . 
The treatise agai nst Her:rnoge:o.e s, Adv . ~ern~ , definitely 
established Tertullian 1 s repudi ation of intrinsic evil i n r.I.at -
ter , God - matter dualism.s, a nd 2..ll monistic materiali sms . Thi s 
is import 8.YJ.t , because it malce s it diffi cult t o c atec;orize his 
oos::ttion :tn De_ .Ax~_im~ as 11materialistic , 11 since De Ani_r~ , as 
Adv . Ee r".!11 ., is a i med at the same general he r etical doctrines . 
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-i co c l o s e 1-- -re J _,_ e c' ·1- D A · · · · " • · ' 
_ .., - :; - . . D.u . - vO e ll.J.ma a ;:.; l··~S 1.];1J•1.0Gla"GC T'j:'GCt OC OSc;or, and 
De An:L:1a f oll on s :l. t a s :1.t s loc;i c :::~l stwc es s o !:> . I n t his t r e at ise , 
Tertullian p resented, some in outline and others in detai l , all 
1.is i deas which wer e elab orated in De Anima . Uni' ortu...n.a t ely , 
ft his treatise i s lost , for' it wouJ. d p rob ably be a g r e at help in 
ch e i n terpret a tion of De_ jl.nim§!:. if it v1ere available . 
In b.is ·writing s on the llt e stimony 11 of the soul , t h e resUI' -
rection of the body and on ecstasy , D~~.?.?..!.~_Ap..,.:., p_~_!:e_~-~- _C_?.r . __ , 
' ) I 
and t h e lost treatise lTE-pL ~'<O'"'C<X.O'Ews r e s p ectively , Tertullian 
elabo r a tes h is basic concep t of nature in t he first , hi s cora_:; le -
b:i. on to De .:1\nir~a where h e deals vvith eschatology and the doc -
tr :i.ne of re surrect i on in the second , and examines the conce ;ct of 
ecst a sy in the third. All these are lmp ortant to D~ __ f..l_lj.m2: and 
jvalua bJ.e in establishing Tertullian 1 s deni a l of materialism, 
~eni al of intrin sic f lesh l y evil , . a nd reasoning with in Chris-
ft ian do c trine in opp osition to heresy . 
rrhe most dramati c pas sage in a l l of Tertul l ian 1 s writings 
is f ound in h is treatise on the fle s h of Christ, D~~r. __ 9.1!-}.~ ·, 
vhere h e cla ims to acce p t the orthodox Christology because of 
its a pparent absurdity to natura l reason . This p assag e ha s 
evok ed t h e cry of ; rirrationalism~' and in part j ustly . EovieV e i', 
to c a ll 'lertul l i a n an irrationalist needs many qual i fic ations 
bec2.us e it overlooks his fre quent claims to lo g i c al reasoning , 
:1is use of philosophy , his appeal to authority rathep than non-
rat i ona l i ty , and tends to confuse his illog ic with irrationality 
as well a s g los s ing over the fac t t h at thi s passag e is t oo often 
,solat~d from it s context when it is used to claim t hat Tertulliarj 
!adopted a syst emati c irrationalism in theology . De qar_~]?.r ~ is J 
a l so im-oortant because it int r oduc es th0 basic motiva tion behind 
1is concept of e pi stemolog ical sensationalism and metaphysical 
c orporeal ism in De __ !l-E-._ima, neJnely, the verifi c ation of Christ ' s 
J.UY!lan nature against do ceti sm an d the requirements of a Chris-
tologi c al soteriology . 
'~·vith these t wo chapter s in mind and wb.a t t hey port end f or 
the actual content of De2ni_E.:::_E1;_, the s ystemati c examination of 
!2_~!1-.J:.'liE:-_~ b e gins i n Chapter III , liThe Systematic Philosophy of 
De Anima : Terminology , Rational Psycho logy and Epistemology . 11 
- - ---
r ertullian 1 s bas i c te rms in De An5.:ma can be r e duced to three : 
substantia , corpus and natura. 
~- ----· ---··- --··---
11 Substancen f or Tertullian 
·11eans a.ny J...,eal t hing or the matrix of all things, but is defined 
fby him only in conne ct i on with the soul . 11Bodyn is quite close-
l y 1..,elated to substanc e , f o r all real bodies are substance s and· 
the ~orimary one :~ s the s oul. But 11b ody 11 is not the same as 
11matter , n a.nd while t he En glish d oes not re cogni :1;e any speci a l 
d i stincti on in :rneaning , f or Te r tul l i an, 11b ody" s eems log ically 
to mean nsubstance. 11 Actuall y , howev e r, he oft e n d e scends to a 
one mus t c onclude that he is vague as t o v1hat body a ctually 
me ans as di st inct from substance and matter . 
terr11 , i s quite complex. , and metaphysi c a lly it means the collec-
t i on of any substance's n aturali a, its inh erent charac teri stics. 
'i'hese terms indicate that his l a n guage is not mere l y juristic, 
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but is philosophical , too . 
Tertullian's r a tional psychology is traced out in teTIIs of 
h is arguraents for the corporeal soul and for immortality . T r ne 
provide s a numbe r of ai'p;u..rnent s for the soul as a body , but none 
of them can meet the critici sm t hat t he soul is not experienced 
in the same way as are all other bodies . Vdhen hi s a i m of p ro -
tecting the concept of a I'eal and indest ructible soul are recal -
led, his claim that the soul is a body is understandable , al -
though his choice of terms leaves room for improvement. 
The two arguments for i :nmwrt ality constitute the essence of 
!p~_!l-1~~!:'!:_~ as a metaphysical treatise , foi' here 'rertullian u nfolds 
his concept s of the "LUJ.it y a nd activity of the s oul , each of 
~rhi ch is so constr•ucted as to be a separate p roof €lf i mmortal ity 
Ibw:ever , these arguments are open t o the basi c critic ism that 
:1is con cept of indestructible c orp oreal substanc e is not con-
ceivable , and that he finds the soul to be active only by er-
roneous inference from unconsc ious activity . 
'l1ertullian 1 s epistemology is quite interesting in its com-
bination of sensationalism wi th the appeal to nature as norra of 
truth . His conc ept of nature is very suggest i ve of t h e Stoic 
view, and in it he finds the theory of common s ense s_nd natul~al 
.rationality. The relation of n ature to God is the brrtdge vJhere-
1nited to ordinary reve l ation or c ommon s ense . Both 2.I'e in a 
sens e rrnatural , 11 sinc e both proceed fromp od . The s ame holds 
true f or the soul, rvhich is at its essence naturally rational . 
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This further opp oses the theory of Tertullian 1 s irrationalism, 
altb.ou gh i t d oes not claim that he was consistent in his nra-
tionali sm. il 
Just as his e p istemol ogical sensationalism wa s in its affir 
m.ation of the unity of sense and intellect desi gned to protect 
the c ardinal Christian empha sis on the unity of body and mind 
after death in r•esurrect i on, so does Cl1apter IV, 11 Th e Systematic 
F'hilosophy of R_~_,!inil1];?.: (cont inued): Geneti c Ps ychology , Ethics 
and Summar y , 11 observe that his b asi c d octrine, traduci anism, 
~rhi ch with hi s corp o realism has made l2_e _ .. ~nima famous, is itself 
[Understandable pri mai·ily as the physio log ical theory 1:7hereby the 
conce p t of h ereditary guilt , orig inal sin, or inb.erent corruptior 
of the race since Adaril , is p ossible, as -vvell as accounting for 
the Christian view of men 1 s moral e quality. Tertullian traces 
tthe soul from its orig in in God 's breath, t hrolJ.gh its insemi -
1ation vrith body-substance i nto the intl~auterine unit;r of soul 
f-1-nd b ody , to birth, parturition, adolescence and, ultimate ly, 
p.eath . But again, Tertulli an 1 s arguments f or his basic d octrin e 
fi e not st and up , f or• traducianism is born out neithel"' by p resent-
~ay k nowledg e of genet i cs nor is it phi losophically or eth ic a lly 
satisfying as t h e exp lanation of the unity of man before God or 
pf orig inal t3in (a doctrine which itself has suffered extensive 
jcriticism because of its unreasonableness ). 
'l 'ertullian 1 s concept of man , h<2E._l.O , _ i s examined briefly , but 
p_n De Anima , it is readily seen tha t h e does not a chieve an ele-
~a ted con cept of pel~sonali ty . Othep concepts in h is genetic 
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tp sychology, while of some interest, e. p; ., environmental condi-
~ 2on2ng , accidental irrationality , rational emot i ons , are sub -
ordinate to h is theory of traducianism . Ag2.in , all of' t he se are 
caught u p in h:ts CI'iticism_ of heretical doctrines Vih ich denied 
[these supp osedly Christ ian views of his . 
"I . J. lS ethics is built upon h is g enetic p sychology and es-
:;ecial1y the traducian theory . His vie;,v of first and second na-
tures of the s oul, fi•e e wi l l , a nd his approaches to a t h eory of 
orig inal s in and natural depravity, are all basic to his vievv 
of man . Ye t it is interesting to obsei'Ve 'l'ertullian 1 s contin-
ual opposition to Platonic asceticism which denied the utility 
of the body to the soul in ethics as we ll as e p istemology. 
Thus, these t wo ch apters int erpret De Al~in~~- as Tertullian 
~in1s e lf p re se nts it, drawing a ttention to the Christian doc-
[t rines whi ch he defended and to the heretical do c trines VIhich 
~e attacked. 
When the question becomes one of determininG Tertulli an 1 s 
sour'ces fo1, his arguments, now t ha.t the underlying motivation 
-ror them is understood, one must study his s ources, a s in Chap -
cer V, 11 De Anima and Hellenistic Philo s ophy . 11 1J\J1"lereas the em-
tphasis on the first four ch8_pt e rs wa s on Te rtullian 1 s Christi an 
orientation, this chapter reveals t he extent of his relation 
and d e p e11:denc e upon Hellenic and He llenistic philosophy . 
Regarding his viev1s of earlier Greek philosophy , from Tha -
les to Aristotle, Tertullian concentrates on criticizing ~ll 
philosophers who have any i nmortant rela tion to Plato, for it 
is Plat o in De j.\nima whom 'l1ertullian opp oses as the primary 
source of heresy , using frequent ad h_011!._~E-~~ methods to achieve 
his a i m. I-Io~:vever, he als o prai ses certai n philosophers , such 
as Democritu s, and also mi sinterprets other~ such as Heraclitus. 
A brief excursion into post-Aristotelian philosophy , par-
ticularly the general doctrines of Stoicism, reveals i:mrnediately 
that the materials ' out lined in Chapters III-IV are quite common 
to the Stoi c s . Metaphysically in his theory of corpoi•eal l"'eal-
ity, anthl"'op olog ically in the t heory of traducianism, and e p is-
temo l ogi c ally vrith his view of nature, he found t hat Stoi c phi -
losophy agreed with him and i n tui'n , he b o r•rowed extensively 
from these philosophers. He also f ound Epicureanisn helpful, 
and from this source took his detailed theory of sensationalism 
and a lso h is arguments against Sce p tici s m. 
\~hen his errors in interp reting the h istory of philos ophy 
are examined, they lead to a study of the d ocu.-"llent s upon which 
he based the c omposition of De Anima. 'l'hese do cument s come 
f[rom Hellenistic philosophy and represent various a s p ects of 
ithat n e r iod 1 s Eclecticism. 'l'e rtul lian 1 s De Anima is pal"'t of 
!this mov ement i n the sense t hat it uses its writing s and its 
11ethods and some of its doctrines. The p rimary source f o r the 
p s y cholo g i c a l and historical informati on in De _!mi ma i s the 1\E:p~ 
fo/u 7(~S by Soranus, an Ephe si an physician. 'n1.is work brought 
to Tertullian, as did those of Aenes :tdemus , Arius DidylTIUs a nd 
Albinus , a knowledg e of ancient Greel{: philosophy as v.re11 as a 
v a riety of theories in psychology . All this wpal th of infon11a ;,.. 
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in De Anima, as well as its frequent errors 
II and uncritical and undependable reportmrial work. Thus, De Ani l 
! ~, when seen in the perspective of Hellenistic philosophy, not I 
1! only argues against Tertullian 1 s originality in philo sophical 
! thought but also against his exclusive dependence on the Chris-
,! tian tradition fo r his psychology, philosophy and theology. 
l1 Soranus, as the major source of these argument s , is often the 
I 
11 real ag ent behind De Anima and Tertullian. 
Hovvever, De Anima is not to be interpreted primarily as 
11 part of this Hellenistic and Eclectic stream in philosophy. 
1
J iJl hile its argumentation is often drawn from this s ource, the 
theses to b e defended come from Christianity. Thus, it is ne-
;1 cessary to ascertain the place of De Anima in the history of 
I 
'I j Christian thought, and the final chapter, Chapter VI, "De Anima 
:: and the Christian Tradition," does this by relating Tertullian' ~ 
1
: treatise to its predecessors and its more immediate successors 
I 
II 
II 
in Ch ristian philosopical psychology. 
This chapter indicates that the description of De Anima as ' 
I 
11 the first Christian psychology" is open to a number of cri ti- I 
I cisms. First, all Christian psychology gets its impetus from 
I the Bible, especially the NT, and particularly Pauline theology I, 
1 Second, a number of early Christian writers before Tertullian I 
II had dealt with the basic ideas in his De Anima, and one (Melito l 
. may have devoted a whole treatise to them. Certainly, Clement 
and .Justin were more amicable to·wa rd philosophy in general, 
while as a source for theses in De Anima, Ireneeus was to Chris fl 
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tianity vJhat Soranus was t o Hel l enistic philosophy . Without 
I renaeus, Tertullian might have b e en unable to write De Anima . 
However, none of these criticisms c an deny the fac t that De Ani -
~a, even if not comp letely original, ·was the first treati s e 
r--· 
(whi ch still exists) devoted exclusively to the problems arising 
out of Chi'istian concepts on the orig in, n ature, and futm:'e of 
the soul and its rela tion to tho body. One might oven argue f' o r 
Tertull ian 1 s orig inali t~v on the basis of h is unique amalgrunation 
of Hellenisti c and Christian thour;ht in De Anima. 
'-· -· - ·--------- ........ -
The most disappointing fact recognized in t hi s thesis is 
fthat fl~.~-~ma had prac tically no dil"ect influence on any l ater 
Christian philosopher , even though some of the ante.:Hi c ene 
Fath ers were familiar with it e.nd :i.n a more general sense v1ere 
g reat l y influenced by Tertullian 1 s t heology . But De .A.nima fell 
stillborn from Te rtullian 1 s pen as far as his succe sso1~s are 
concerned . And the reasons for this ai'e not hard to loc ate . 
~ying a s an uni'econcile d schismatic, his writine~ s condenmed 
short l y afterwarcl. s, and De _ft..n:i.:_~ itself a mixture of foreign 
elements and quite closely tied to the heresies it opp osed, 
':Certullian did not -oresent a p sycho logy in R_E> __ A!,lim~_a_ which could 
11ave any real ut i lity in the centuries f' ollovJin g , dominated a s 
they vve re by Plat onic influences . 'l'hus , DeAnima as nthe first 
Chl~istian p s y chology , 11 while an. irrepl"oachable chronolog ical 
truth , is rather devoid of other l e g itimate connotat i ons. 
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2 . Conclus ions. 
Brief l y stated in prop ositional form, the follmving con-
elusions can be drawTl. from this thesis on 'l' e rtullianl s De Anima : 
1 . De Anim.a ref l ects influences on Tertullian fr·om his legaJ 
training , commitment to Christi a nity, r~Iontanisti c tende n cies 
(ve ry slightly ), and ant i gnostic aims . 
2 . p~_ Anima has a p lace in the body of Tertullian 1 s liter-
ature among the antignost i c, antimaterialistic ; and antidualis-
t i c tre a tises , s p ecificall y Adv . 
~e Res . 
t-· 
_!-Ie~1 . ·' De Censu .Ei.£11~ (lo s t ) , 
) / "' 
E:"'-6 'ot.o- E.w S and De Car . Chr . 
3 . Alth ough Tertullian often uses illog ical ~eeasoning and 
insists upon the overarc h ing authority of Christian revelation, 
i t is not pi·ecJ.sely cor•J:•e c t to call h i m an :r i rrationalist 11 -ori -
,1arily because this label fai ls to tak e into a c count his claim 
It o rationa lity in R.~ .. 4-n~EJ.a · 
LL. De Anima is essentiall y a tre atise in I'ational and g ene -
1 ----·-- -
cic psychology , where the major theses are c orporeal soul sub -
stance and hereditar y transmission of the s oul, traducianism . 
r·Jeitb.er of t h ese doctrines , however, withstand criticism. 
5. The selecti on of theories to be defended in De Anima 
IY>ests p rimaz-ily on Te rtullian 1 s view of Christian do c trine , lead 
ing him to a cce pt the c orpoi•eal s oul (irmao r t ality ), t r aducianism 
(ori g inal sin and unity of mankind ), sensat i onalism ( anti-do c e t-
ism), and n a.tural rationalism (creation by God) in h is p s :,JChciLogy. 
6 . Te r tullian 1 s theoi'Y of corp oreal sou l substance should 
not be inte r p reted a s a s p ecie s of 11materialism, " be c ause he ex-
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~licit ly re pudiates materialism; however, he never fully dis -
uinp~uisb.es corpus from substant i a nor really clarifies in what 
... ....----·- -- ·- ---
sense CO.J:P_l-2-..?.. is non-material . 
7. DeA~1~~ :Ls based on He l leni s t:L c docmnents , p rimarily thE 
wreatise of Soranus , and i s thus an Eclectic treatise, also in-
lic a ting that the psychology in p_e il.pima is neither exclusively 
Stoic nor Christian , alth ough it has a closer affinity to Stoi -
[cism t h an to any other nsch.oo l philo s o~Jhy . 11 
8 . De Anima can be called nthe f irst Chi'istian p sychology , if 
if qualified b y the recognition that it is first only in p oint 
of t ime a nd exc lusive devotion to p s y ch olog ical top ics , vms un-
orig inal exce p t in its juxtap osition of He lleni stic and Chris-
t ian t b.ought, and had little if any inf luence on later Cn.ristian 
f>chink ers . 
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AJ3STRACT OF TEE~:3 IS 
':Vhis thesis is an attempt to examine the t!'eatise De Anima 
vritten by Quintus Se;ot imius Florens 'l'ertullianus circa A. D. 2 10 
Special attention is p aid to the s ources for his do c trines , both 
Chri s ti a n and non-Ch ri s tian , as well as the influences t h is trea 
cise had on later medieva l thought . 11h e systemati c p resentation 
of Tertul l ian 's views is n ot construed to mean that Tertullian 
;J roduced a really s ystematic ph i loso"Qhy in De Anima . One thread 
- - - ---- ............ .. ~R --
uns continuously t hrough the t h esis, namely, the u r ob lem of 
a1th a n d intel lect, revelation and reason, wh i c h o ccurs i n ever:; 
context and influences the a ctua l philos ophi c a l p o sitions a dop -
'l1he thesis is divide d into six chapters whi ch focus on the 
entral core, Chapters III-IV, whi c h is a syst emati c s tatenent oi. 
he ~)hilosophic al and p sycholog ica l i deas i n De _Anir0:§: · These tw 
chapters deal basi c a lly with t wo broad areas in whi ch Te rtul-
ian 's ideas cluste r : rat i onal p sycholog y , whi ch includes his 
.r g tunent s u nderlying a Chris t ian theory of i mmortal i ty, a nd g en-
tic p sychology , vJhi ch c at e g orizes all his comments on the life 
f man studie d as a hist o r ic I'OUte from initial c reat ion in 
darn t o death and purg at o ry . These two areas also include Ter-
:.-ullian ' s r,lajor ideas on p s y chol ogy and philosophy which occur 
· n De Anima . 'J:he se are his the ory of the co r poreal (b ut n ot 
ate,rial l) soul, s ub s tanc e , a cc i de nts , and dreams . 'vVith the se 
ideas, h e finds the matei'ial f or t wo basic ax•gume nt s f or i m-
·nortality : fr om the indivisib l e uni ty of the s -oul and from the 
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ponsLani.. activity of the soul. However, neither of these aT•gu-
tnent s withstands CI'i ti c ism. In his genetic p s y c h ology , Tertul -
~ian deals p rimari ly vdth t he concepts of traducianism, 'f ree 
7ill and orig ina l sin. Here is clearl y illustrated t h e princip le 
1p on which he develop ed a ll his philosophical theories: the de -
j3ir•e to exp lain or a ccount fox' Christian do ctrines , such a s the 
" 
"all of man , hereditary sin, moral responsibility, rnoral equal-
'ty , and purg atorial punishment. 'Iis epistemology, a cur i ous 
rlixture of sensationalism, common sense , natui·al rationality; 
~nd authoritarianism, also illustrate s his orientation to p s y -
f::holo gy and philo sophy a s a basic Christ ian one. 'l1he syste matic 
phi losophy of De---"''l_~ima t hus necessarily emphasizes t he f unda._men-
cal alleg ience of its author to Ch ristianity . 
'rhe rather detailed thoor:i_es in these two chapters are made 
Jo re intellig ible by a p rior account of ~CeJ'tv.llian 1 s baclrg :;."ound 
and l e a d ing ideas. Chpat er I deal s wi th the bach:g :r·ounds o f De_ 
,A.n..J..E.1~: in 'r e rtulli a n's pre -Christi a n and heretical activitie s. 
f:)uc h topics as Scriptural authority, l egali sm, irrational ity , 
'.'lo n tanism and antignosticisin are d iscussed . 'rhis. chapter shmvs 
chat 're rtullian ' s interests and p re p aration p x•ior to !2_~ _ _11-n~ma 
ruere no t such t hat one would expect h im to write objectively . 
jRatbe.rJ, one i s l ed to expect a p olemic, occasional l y ill-:r•ea soned, 
and rhetorical; De -~:Jma unf ortuna tely conf oi'ITl.s to thi s exp ecta-
C; j_on in many ways. The i nt roduction c ontinues as the s e cond 
charter take s up in brief manner t h e major ideas to be found in 
D~.- .. A_l1_i]]l_a_ by shovdng that ~~-~~im~ be l ongs within a definite con-
text of Tertullian 1 s vn"j_tings. Six treatises are chos en from 
the body of his writ i n gs , and each one of them is related to De 
An~~1a as either the souT'c e or supplement to its ideas . Of these 
impoi'tm"lt , for the former leads to an extended analysis o:f the 
t h eory that Tertullian is an 11 iJ.'"'rational::_st 11 and the latter is 
seen to be in most particulars t h e paradigm foi' De imir,,a . 
Follovring the s ystemati c ex.sJ.nination of ~~- l~P-~!n~ , the i'inal 
two chaptei'S exDlore the treatise in the wider conce:;:::t of Hel -
lenistic and Christian phi losophical psychology . Some surprisinm 
facts are noted , the most-important one being that Tertullian 1 s 
scientific and historical ls:nowledge about non-Christian p s ychol-
ogy (of which ther-e is a g ood deal in De ~~E~.:~Ii~_l3.:. ' as the Reference 
Outline prefacing Chapte r II shows) is derived from a work in 
psycholoe;y , lT€-p'L. Y1..1"( ~<;, by a Hellenistic p1~ysi cian, Soranus of 
:,'phesus (9_• A. D. 125). Not only did r.rertullian model DE) __ .A!'..:..J.:~1~a 
after lTep~ Yvx~s line by line; he also used a n:umber of other 
p a gan sourc es as aids in h is refutation of Platonic and hereti -
cal t h eories. This conclusively shows t hat in s p ite of Tertul -
lian 1 s claim to be an orthodox Christian thinl::er :moving vv5.thin 
t he limitations of the Hule of Faith in his comp osition of De 
~_!1im_~ , he depended to a remarkable extent on n on-Christi an 
sources . The philosophical system of ancient thought to vvhi ch 
:Q._~ . AI~i~]~.§l.. has the g r e atest affinit y is Stoicism. While there a re 
I impo1•tan~ Ep icurean overt ones (free wi ll, sensationalism), most 
of the root ideas a re Stoic , sucb_ as corporealism, traducianism, 
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a nd co:nnnon sense, as well as the ·wealth of minoT' details subswnec 
iby these~ But because De Anima de pends on He l len.istic docurnent s , 
i 
it is mo re prope l" to call ;Q~ __ !?-pj._!;1a an Ec le c tic a nd not a .Stoic 
' treatise~ since all his Hellenistic sourc es were Eclecti cs of 
one soYt or another , and all his non-Christian theories we re 
i 
more or less contami:o.nted by this :movement. · 
I-Iov.reve:e , De_ j\n:tm?:_ is pre eminently a Christian p s y cho logy . 
Hany h ave suge~e sted that it vms rrt he first Christ ian p sycholog y . i 
I 
The last 1 chapter endeavors to review Christian psyc h ology from 
tb.e bas i c s ources in the New '.r estament to Irenaeus , 'rertu1lian' s 
I 
naj or Ch~istian sourc e and gu i de , and al so carry the analysis 
I 
' past TeT·tul l ian and even Augustine into Sch o l asti c ism prop er in 
I 
order t o · examine this jv_dgment . ~L'he conclusion is disap::; ointing 
I 
De Anima ]not only fails to be orig inal in its Christi a n theories 
--- - --- ~ . 
(all of which were found prior to Tertullian); more i mportant , 
I 
it seems ! to have failed in mal_..;:ing any imp ortant contribut i on to 
I 
later thought , 
I -
although Augustine does reveal s ome overtones 
f rom De Anima . 'I'hus, t h e only real sense in wh:i.ch p_e_!'U:~)-ma is 
I 
t h e first Ch ristian psychology is in t he fact tha t it was the 
first treati se to be devoted · exclusively and self - cons ciously 
i 
to an exhmination of t he major problems c on c erning Christian 
t he ories : about the orig in , nature , grovrth and fate of the human 
soul. 
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